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Introduction 
In what has become an essential and regular part of the dialogue between the 
European Parliament and the Commission, this report sums up developments in 
competition policy in 1973. 
This was a year when three new Member States joined the Community; as a result 
not only was the field of application of the competition rules extended to countries 
in which major firms are established but also, as a result of recruiting new officials 
from those Member States, the Commission's experience was considerably 
broadened. 
The report is inevitably of a somewhat fragmentary nature, since it simply sets 
out the results of a single year whereas the main lines of our competition policy 
have been developing more progressively and continuously than that, particularly 
as the Commission only gradually outlines new approaches through its decisions 
in individual cases. 
The Commission proposal on merger control has already provoked extensive 
discussion between the various European institutions (especially with the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee) and with trade associations 
and trade unions represented at Community level. 
Although the need for merger control has been recognized and the broad lines of 
the Commission proposal have been approved in principle, certain objections have 
nevertheless been raised. Criticisms are directed particularly at the fact that 
advance control of mergers is proposed, at the effects of the regulation on other -
Community objectives, in particular as regards employm(!nt and industrial policy, 
and at the social protection of workers. 
The Commission is convinced that the process which has been set in train will 
produce balanced legal rules which will help to maintain effective competition in 
the general interest of the Community. 
The Commission will remain as active as ever in applying Article 86 to merger~ 
which constitute abuses of dominant positions; in this it was encouraged by the 
Council in the Resolution on economic and monetary union adopted on 3/4 Decem-
ber, where the Member States were invited to assist the Commission in carrying 
out the economic and commercial research required for the systematic implementa-
tion of Article 86 of the Treaty. Likewise, in order to put a brake on rising prices 
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in the Community, the Council has invited the Member States to apply the provi-
sions of their national law providing for checks on abuses resulting from market 
dominance more strictly and more vigorously. Furthermore the Member States 
and the Commission will regularly exchange information-general and specific-
on comparative price movements in the Member States. 
On the steel market, the trend towards larger production units is leading to the 
formation of joint ventures and to diversification into areas other than primary 
processing, thus cutting down the risks involved in fluctuations in economic 
activity. This has prompted the Commission, when giving prior authorizations 
under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, to take account also of Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty. In its MannesmannfDemag and ThyssenfRheinstahl decisions, the 
Commission considered whether the extent of diversitication and intra-group 
consumption would place the firms in question into positions to pursue strategies 
without regard to market conditions. 
The ThyssenfRheinstahl merger was authorized only subject to certain conditions 
designed to ensure that, in an industry which was already highly concentrated, the 
various groups would remain independent and would not interfere in each other's 
affairs-a need that is the greater the more powerful the groups. 
In view of developments on the oil products market, the Commission has decided 
to investigate whether Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty should be applied. 
The investigations will continue in 1974. 
The Commission has stepped up its activities relating to restrictive and abusive 
practices by firms and has endeavoured especially to extend its guidelines on the 
approach to be adopted in selective distribution cases, where it is necessary to make 
a very detailed examination of the pros and cons for consumers so that the only 
restrictions on competition allowed will be those which are necessary for the attain-
ment of other Community objectives. 
Decisions giving exemption from the ban on restrictive agreements will tend to 
encourage desirable forms of transnational cooperation between firms. For 
instance, the decision in favour of an association of marine paint manufacturers, 
for whom a suitable and essential means of increasing supply and improving sales 
outlets was to enter into an association and to coordinate the individual sales net-
works of the members, will enable them to compete more actively with major 
world producers. 
Special attention is still being paid to auto-limitation agreements concluded with 
private firms outside the Community, whose direct or indirect effect is often to 
make imports more expensive. Proceedings have been initiated in respect of an 
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agreement concluded by manufacturers of a product which is widely used as a 
component by industry in Europe. 
Policy on State aids will also have been affected by the accession of the three new 
Member States in 1973. Among other things it was necessary to broaden the 
Community approach to regional aids, originally established for the Six, and to 
implement Article 154 of the Act of Accession, under which the principles concerning 
the general arrangements were to be applied to the new Member States as part of 
the Community system. Acting under Articles 92 to 94 of the EEC Treaty, the 
Commission has taken the initiative in amending and extending the principles 
already accepted by the Member States so as to bring them closer into line with 
problems in the various regions and to give greater consideration to the priorities 
determined by the Member States for their own regional aid schemes. 
When dealing with aid to particular industries, the Commission has endeavoured 
to give them a Community orientation and framework so that they can be used 
as the effective basis for a real Community industrial policy. This can be seen 
particularly in the proposals on shipbuilding sent by the Commission to the Council, 
the object of which, by means of temporary measures coordinated at Community 
level, is to replace the aids hitherto granted by Member States to shipbuilding by 
incentives designed to make the industry competitive in the long term. 
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Chapter I 
Main Developments in the Community's Policy 
Section 1 
The Control of Mergers and Restrictive Practices 
§ 1 - The Control of Mergers 
1. The year has seen a move towards the control and regulation of mergers. 
In February the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's interpretation in the 
Continental Can case l on the applicability of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to the 
control of concentrations, although the Court reversed the Commission's decision 
against Continental Can on grounds of insufficient proof. Apart from the effect 
of the ruling in relation to mergers, its importance lies in the demonstration by 
the Court of its practice of interpreting the Treaty. The Court declined to confine 
its construction to a narrow reading of the text of one Article in isolation from other 
Treaty provisions, since this could have negated the clearly expressed aims of the 
Treaty as a whole. In the judgment of the Court, the acquisition of a competitor 
by a dominant firm, with the result that only undertakings remain in the market 
which are dependent on the dominant firm and which do not constitute an adequate 
counterweight, amounts to an abusive exploitation of dominance. The Court 
read Article 86 in the light also of the prohibition against distortions of competition 
in Article 85 and refused to admit a paradox. It accordingly rejected that Article 86 
could permit a strengthening of dominance which was capable of eliminating 
effective competition completely. . . 
It is therefore clearly established that Article 86 enables the Commission to intervene 
post hoc in cases of concentrations which result from a strengthening of market 
dominance and which substantially impair competition. As foreshadowed in the 
Second Report on Competition Policy, the Commission is now seeking powers 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 235 of the Treaty by way of a Regulation which is to 
give opportunity for the assessment of mergers prior to their consummation, 
regardless of whether they arise from a previously existing dominance of one of 
I Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Company Inc. v. EEC Commission. Case 6/72. 
Judgment of 21.2.1973, OJ C 68 of 21.9.1973. p. 33; Reports 1973, p. 215. 
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the merging enterprises.1 Subject to certain exceptions in favour of relatively 
small mergers, any proposed concentration which will exceed an aggregate turnover 
threshold of 1 000 million units of account must be notified to the Commission 
before it may be put into effect. 
The duty to notify an intended concentration by virtue of its turnover raises 
absolutely no presumption of condemnation. The threshold for notification 
simply provides a mechanism which entails analysis by the Commission. As such, 
it must be certain, objective and simple in its operation. Once this mechanism 
has been engaged, qualitative judgments are relevant to determine whether the 
proposed concentration threatens effective competition. 
The proposed Regulation recognizes that, in exceptional cases and on grounds of 
overriding Community policy, the adverse impact on effective competition of 
some larger concentrations may need to be accepted, and accordingly it makes 
provision for exemptions on these grounds. In the interests of preserving future 
flexibility for possibly changing Community needs, the Commission has resisted 
requests to specify in advance in what circumstances such exemptions will be 
granted. 
2. In the steel sector, the Commission approved under Article 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty, the acquisition by August-Thyssen-Hiitte AG of a majority of shares in 
Rheinstahl AG.2 The approval was granted subject to far-reaching conditions in-
tended to enable the new grouping and other existing producers in the industry to 
maintain their independence of each other. The conditions were designed to secure 
disengagement by Thyssen from certain of its other involvements in the sector and 
included undertakings by Thyssen (i) to reduce its holdings in a company jointly 
held with another group (Mannesmann) to 25 per cent or less, so as to lose minority-
vote blocking rights, and to dissociate itself from management agreements in 
respect of the joint company; (ii) not to maintain interlocking directorships with 
other steel groups; (iii) to withdraw from German steel rationalization groups and 
(iv) to apply for prior consent to the Commission before acquiring 10 per cent or 
more in any steel producing or dealing undertaking or in any undertaking with a 
specified minimum steel consumption. 
§ 2 - Decisions on Restrictive Agreements 
3. The cases which the Commission has decided during the year illustrate several 
different aspects of Community competition policy in the field of restrictive agree-
ments. 
1 Proposal by the Council of a Regulation for the Control of Mergers, OJ C 92 of 31.10 1973. 
2 See point 15. 
REP. COMPo 1973 
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS 17 
The Commission took two decisions 1 to prohibit the coordination of distribution 
of potash fertilizers. The two cases involved major producers in a highly con-
centrated sector. 
In its ruling relating to marketing arrangements for water heaters2 in Belgium; 
the Commission condemned an aggregated rebate scheme which covered purchases 
from suppliers outside the scheme. 
The Commission approved a cooperation agreements between manufacturers of 
sewing machine needles under which one of the parties agreed to cease production 
and to transfer manufacture to the other party. 
An extension was granted for a further period to an exemption previously given 
to a cooperation agreement between medium-sized enterprises for the sale of marine 
paints under a joint trademark.' It was the objective of the agreement to increase 
the competitive position of the parties vis-a.-vis larger international groups. The 
Commission made its decision subject to the abandonment by the parties of certain 
territorial limitations which had been sanctioned by the previous exemption. 
The Commission fined Deutsche Philips GmbH5 for having failed to eliminate a 
ban on exports of electric razors to other EEC countries. Arising out of previous 
proceedings in 1967, Deutsche Philips' parent company had then declared its 
willingness to lift all export bans in respect of EEC member countries. Only a 
relativ~ly small fine was imposed on Deutsche Philips, since the. Commission was 
able to regard the retention of the export ban as a negligent oversight rather than 
deliberate policy. 
The Commission's decision in the case of Du Pont de Nemours (Deutschland) 
GmbH6 underlines that the imposition by manufacturers on dealers of conditions 
of sale involving restrictions in respect of resale price maintenance and inter-
dealer sales is within the prohibition of Article 85 (1) if trade between member 
countries is affected. 
An abuse of a dominant position was called into question in relation to tenders for a 
development contract issued by a prospective purchaser, under which the purchaser 
claimed excessive rights in the development results. 7 This matter was settled on 
1 See points 47 and 49. 
2 See point 53. 
3 See point 58. 
e. See point 61. 
5 See point 65. 
e See point 64. 
7 See point 68. 
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terms which involved a relaxation of those rights and, although a formal Commission 
decision was not called for, the case is notable since it is the first to have been 
raised with the Commission in which a purchaser was able to influence market 
behaviour from a position of dominance. The case is also likely to be of interest 
in relation to many thousands of development contracts which are regularly placed 
by substantial users of high-technology equipment, particularly in the public 
sector. 
4. A number of cases were settled during the year, so that formal decisions were 
not called for. There is also some evidence that numerous previously existing 
restrictive agreements, involving market sharing, price and quota limitations to 
which enterprises in the acceding countries were parties and which would have 
called for notification to, and consequently for examination and decision by, the 
Commission were voluntarily abandoned or modified by informal settlements so as 
to conform to the Treaty and to the applicable block exemption rules. It is 
plausible to conclude that the jurisdiction which has so far been evolved by the 
Commission and the Court of Justice in applying Article 85 of the Treaty to agree-
ments in these fields is resulting in some measure in a reasona1;lly clear under-
standing of what is permissible. 
§ 3 - Nullity of prohibited Agreements 
5. In a judgment given on 6 February 19731 the Court of Justice held that the 
nullity provided for in Article 85 (2) is of retroactive effect. This means that 
'new' agreements, whether or not notified, cannot be considered to be 'temporarily 
valid'. This judgment is therefore extremely important for the Community's 
competition policy and as regards compliance by firms operating in the Com-
munity. 
The Court confirmed the absolute nature of the automatic nullity provided for 
by Article 85 (2), citing Article 1 of Regulation No 17, which reads: 'Without 
prejudice to Articles 6, 7 and 23 of this Regulation, agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices of the kind described in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty and the 
abuse of a dominant position in the market, within the meaning of Article 86 of 
the Treaty, shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required.' 
The decision distinguished as to the way in which Article 85 (2) should be applied 
with due regard for the general principle of certainty in the law, between old 
1 Case 48/72: Brasserie de Haecht. v. the spouses Wilkin-Janssen, OJ C 45 of 23.6.1973, p. 28; 
Reports, 1973-2, p. 77. 
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agreements, i.e. those existing before Article 85 was implemented by, ,Regulation 
No 17 (13 March 1962), and new agreements, i.e. those concluded after that date: 
(a) For old agreements duly notified, the Court ruled that the general need for 
certainty in contracts required that a national judge could rescind such contracts 
only after the Commission had taken a decision under Regulation No 17. How-
ever, this rule only concerns a continuously diminishing number of agreements. 
Although the Court did not come to a decision on this question in its judgment, 
the Commission feels that the principles applicable to old agreements could 
also be applied by analogy to agreements which became subject. to Article 85 
following the Accession of the new Member States, provided they· were already 
in force before the date of accession (1 January 1973) and were notified before 
the end of the six-month period following accession. 1 
(b) On the other hand, for new agreements, whether or not notifiable, whose number 
and economic importance are greater; the Court stated that, as long as the 
Commission has not given a decision, the implementation of such agreements 
was at the risk of the parties; and that notification under Article 4 (1) of Regula-
tion No'17 would not have a suspensory effect. For the purpose of the pro-
hibition in Article 85, the Court explicitly stated that the principle of certainty 
in the law for undertakings was of less importance than the absolute nature of 
the nullity provided for in Article 85 (2). 
The Court went on to say that, in the case of a new agreement, anational judge 
could decide whether proceedings should be suspended to enable the parties to 
obtain a decision from the Commission. However, in the case of a new agreement 
which is, beyond doubt, incompatible with Article 85 as a whole, as judge may, 
without waiting for a Commission decision, hold such agreement void under Ar-
ticle 85 (2). 
This principle is likely to be applied where, having regard to reported cases of the 
Court and to the administrative practice of the Commission, there is no good 
reason for expecting an exemption to be applicable. 2 
§ 4 - Relationship between the competition rules in Community law and 
in the laws of the Member States 
6. Until provisions to the contrary are adopted pursuant to Article 87 (2) (e) 
of the Treaty, it must be expected that the Treaty rules on competition can be 
applied in parallel with national rules to restrictive agreements and abUSIve practices 
1 Annex to the Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the 
Treaties, Section V, Competition: OJ L 73 of 27.3.1972, p. 92. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 1. 
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by dominant firms. This is the result of the coexistence of two legal systems, 
each based on its own considerations, and each pursuing objectives which can to 
some extent differ. 
In a judgment given on 13 February 19692 the Court of Justice expressly recognized 
this principle, while limiting its application, when it held that 'the national authori-
ties may take steps against an agreement in accordance with municipal law, even 
if the compatibility of the agreemen.t with the Community rules is at the same time 
being examined by the Commission. This is, however, subject to the condition 
that the implementation 'of municipal law must neither prejudice the full and 
uniform application of Community law, nor be in conflict with measures taken 
in pursuance of such application;'. 
This general principle contained in a Court of Justice ruling, which confirms the 
primacy of Community law, nevertheless needs to be expressed in more practical 
terms. A whole series of complex legal problems can arise from formal definition 
of the relationship between municipal law and the competition rules of Community 
law as also from any measures which are adopted in order to reconcile possibly 
conflicting rules. These problems will be discussed this year at a meeting with 
national experts on restrictive practices. 
It is quite possible that, as a first step, conflicts arising from the parallel application 
of two legal systems could be averted simply by laying down procedural rules to 
be followed by the relevant authorities. This is why the Commission is now 
examining, among other measures, the possibility of intensifying the exchange of 
information between national authorities and Community authorities which have 
responsibility for competition and improving existing consultation procedures, so 
that close cooperation between national authorities and the Commission can be 
ensured where national law and Community law could be applied at the same time. 
§ 5 - Selective Distribution 
7. The Commission is currently considering cases which raise questions of 
compatibility of certain selective distribution systems with the Community rules 
on competition. In view of the importance of these questions, the Commission 
consulted government experts of Member States at a Restrictive Practices Con-
ference in November 1973. A selective distribution system limits the sale of 
products at the distribution stage to selectively authorized dealers only. This 
has the effect that dealers outside the selectively authorized network cannot 
1 . Case 14/68 (Walt Wilhelm et at. v. Bundeskartellamt), OJ C 30 of 7.3.1969, p. 2; 
Recueil 1969, 1, p. 1. 
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normally deal in the products in question. Such limitations are sought to be 
enforced through appropriate contractual obligations in agreements by which main 
and sub-dealers are appointed. 
The qualification criteria by which dealers may be admitted to the authorized 
network can rest on qualitative and/or quantitative tests. 
It is recalled that the Commission has had previous opportunities to express its 
views on the applicability of Article 85 (1) of the Rome Treaty to limitations 
placed on dealerships. 
8. In the Kodak case l the Commission gave a negative clearance to terms of 
trading which required that the products should only be sold 'by trained personnel 
and on premises where storage and display facilities and business arrangements are 
satisfactory'. The Commission approved this provision because 'neither the Kodak 
companies nor their wholesalers can refuse to supply retailers who meet these 
conditions' and because there was no reason to think that the terms of trading 
were being applied for the purpose of restricting exports through refusal by Kodak 
to make supplies to exporting dealers. 
9. In the Convention Faience case,2 a multi-party agreement between a manu-
facturers' association and an association of dealers concerning collective limitations 
of supply, the Commission had refused to approve a restriction under which the 
goods in question were to be supplied only to 'approved customers' since some 
customers (as, for example, general contractors and public authorities) were ex-
pressly debarred from approval by general description. In this case the Commission 
condemned the restriction as discriminatory, in that it touched upon entire classes 
of customers. 
10. A decision to similar effect was taken in the Gas Waterheaters case,3 which 
concerned a sales agreement between producers and importers in Belgium under 
which the participating firms were to supply only certain groups of customers. 
Selection of purchasers on the basis of qUalitative criteria can only escape from the 
ban of Article 85 (1) if such criteria are applied uniformly and without discrimination 
to all potential purchasers for the purpose of determining their suitability as 
customers. 
1 OJ L 147 of 7.7.1970. 
Z Bull. EC 5·1964, p. 46. 
3 OJ L 217 of 6.8.1973. 
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11. In the Omega case,! in which both qualitative and quantitative restrictions 
were involved, the Commission ruled that a limitation of dealers amounted to a 
restraint (in competition, not because such limitation was applied to dealers who 
satisfied certain objective requirements as to their professional qualifications, but 
because the' main distributors were empowered to limit retailers to a number to 
correspond to the presumed purchasing power for the products in particular areas. 
Nevertheless, the Commission granted an exemption on the grounds that, in this 
particular case, removal of the restriction would have resulted in such a small 
turn-over of Omega watches per dealer that individual dealers would no longer 
have been interested in actively promoting sales and in stocking a sufficiently wide 
range of models. 2 The Commission in this case particularly stressed that its 
decision rested on special circumstances and did not establish a general principle. 
12. Reasons which have been typically advanced to justify selective distribution 
systems include: 
(a) the need through a highly trained dealership network to provide pre- and post-
sales services, as well as the need for close and continuous collaboration between 
manufacturers, dealers and customers, in relation to technically complex or 
more than ordinarily expensive products. This applies particularly to poten-
tially dangerous goods and to products the efficiency of which depends on 
regular and skilled maintenance; 
(b) to preserve the exclusivity of a minority market for luxury or prestige-brand 
products or to conserve products with a limited shelf life which is dependent on 
expert attendance. 
Decisions in such situations require a balancing of the probable advantages to 
consumers against the extent of the specific restrictions involved, having regard 
to the market environment of the parties and their products. Approval of selective 
distribution systems could in certain cases inhibit advantageous sales to consumers 
through recently developed low-price 'supermarket' marketing and methods based 
on 'discount' schemes. 
It is clear from the administrative practice of the Commission that selective 
distribution systems cannot be set up on a territorial basis which conflicts with the 
objectives of the .Common Market. In the Commission's view, any limitations on 
sales between main distributors and retailers and between retailers and ulimate 
customers are justifiable only if they result in a downward alignment of prices in 
the various Member States. 3 
1 OJ L 242 of 5.11.1970. 
2 See analysis of prices applied after decision. 
3 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 56. 
REP. COMPo 1973 
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS 23 
A survey of price trends for the most popular models of Omega watches in the EEC 
since the Commission decision of 28 October 1970 has shown a clear movement 
towards a progressive alignment of retail prices in each country. The differences 
between the lowest and highest prices of different models which in 1970, as was 
pointed out in the Court decision, lay between 33% and 50%, dropped to between 
4% and 21 % in 1973. . 
§ 6 - Licensing agreements 
13. One of the most important current tasks of competition policy is the scrutiny 
of patent licensing and knowhow agreements. The Commission has had previous 
opportunity to express its views on a number of aspects of this subject,1 The main 
problems arising from an analysis of cases now under review concern assessment, 
in the light of Article 85 (1) and (3), of the various aspects of the allocation of 
markets and production between parties to agreements. The points at issue 
include: 
(a) the territory or technical application which the holder of the patent may reserve 
to himself as against his licensees; 
(b) the territory or technical application which each licensee can protect as against 
the patent holder and the other licensees; 
(c) the mutual protection of the parties which may be provided for under cross-
licences. 
The foregoing may be achieved by export bans, restrictions on the sale of the 
protected products for given uses or measures having similar effect. 
In order to centralize and speed up the examination of agreements of this type, a 
special Industrial Property Rights Division has been set up within the Directorate-
General for Competition. Its first job was to undertake an initial analysis of 
newly notified patent licensing and knowhow agreements. These make up the 
largest single category of notifications received under Regulation No 17 following 
the accession of the new Member States. 
Section 2 
Competition Policy and Current Problems 
§ 1 - The Oil Industry 
14. Although, in 1972,.it did not consider that an inquiry into the oil industry 
under Article 12 or investigations into undertakings or associations of undertakings 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 69 et seq. 
Second Report on Competition Policy, sees. 45 et seq.' 
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under Articles 13 and 14 of Regulation 17 were necessary, the Commission 
nevertheless stated that it would remain vigilant and investigate any circumstance 
suggesting that competition was being restricted or distorted in the industry.l 
The shortfall in crude oil supply in 1973 affected the quantities available on the 
market, and the price of oil products on the world market rose substantially. 
Most Member States have rules governing oil prices the effect of which has been to 
slow down the tendency of prices to follow international trends. Applied fragmen-
tarily, this policy is likely, if public authorities do not pay close attention to what 
is going on, to encourage refiners to release their products only to their own distri-
bution networks or to find markets which are more profitable than those which are 
controlled. 
The shortage of supply and the existence of national rules have led to a situation 
in which supplies to independent distributors have been jeopardized and in which 
substantial price disparities have been found between purchasers and between 
national markets. 
Indeed, the disparity between world prices and national controlled prices has made 
imports virtually impossible for those independent suppliers who hitherto always 
imported their products and who do not have long-term contracts with 
refiners in the Community. 
Moreover, the fact that certain markets are not regulated has made it possible for 
ex-refinery prices to vary considerably depending on the destination of supplies. 
15. In view of this trend, the Commission has concluded that the maintenance 
of competition on this market as between the various types of firm which have 
traditionally supplied it, was likely to be jeopardized, and that it was necessary to 
prevent present circumstances from causing the disappearance of independent 
dealers or their absorption by the majors. In response to a parliamentary 
question on the situation of independent firms, the Commission stressed that it 
could, among other things, use its powers under Articles 85 and 86 if the majors 
resorted to concerted practices with the effect of eliminating independent com-
petition or if it was found that they were abusing a dominant position. If 
the majors refused to supply independent distributors fairly, they might be caught by 
the competition rules of the Treaty, in particular Article 86. This could also be the 
case where the majors apply differing terms to equivalent transactions with other 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 62. 
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trading parties or make the conclusion of contracts subject to the other parties 
accepting supplementary obligations. 
For these reasons the Commission decided to open the necessary investigations 
into producer companies and dealers in the oil industry.1 
§ 2 - Multinational Companies 
16.. In a Communication to the Council, the Commission has proposed measures 
for solving problems arising from the rapid d~velopment of multinational com-
panies. 2 
The principle of full, uniform and non-discriminatory application of Community 
law on competition within the Common Market to all restrictive or abusive practices 
by firms, regardless of where their head office is situated, is clear from some 
fifteen Commission decisions concerning a number of firms which could be regarded 
as multinational, with establishments respectively in, and also outside, Com-
munity countries. 
Up to date, Commission experience shows that: 3 
(a) No practical difficulties in applying. Community competition rules have arisen 
in the past from the fact that a firm is multinational. 
(b) The Commission cannot exclude the possibility that in some future cases the 
formal service of official documents or the enforcement of Commission 
decisions could raise problems, in particular as regards companies whose main 
decision-making centres are outside the Community. The Commission believes 
that, to ensure effectiveness of the official steps and decisions adopted by 
it in anti-trust matters under Community law it is necessary to draw up and 
implement, through international conventions or under trade agreements, 
rules governing the effects in other countries of decisions taken in Community 
competition matters. 
In addition to adopting such rules on procedural matters, the Commission is also 
supporting international cooperation on the control of restrictive trade practices 
and dominant market positions. It recalls that it is in favour of continuing and 
1 Information for Press (IP 226/73) of 21.12.1973. 
a Multinational Undertakings and Community Regulations (Commission Communication to 
the Council. 7 November 1973); OJ C 114 of 27.12.1973, p. 28; Supplement 15/73 - Bull. EC. 
l! This was the conclusion reached when the Commission was invited to inform the United 
Nations expert group appointed to study the rOle of multinational corporations and their 
impact on the development process of the experience it ·had acquired in this field, in 
particular in applying competition law. 
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intensifying contacts with the appropriate authorities in non-member countries so 
that views can be exchanged on cases currently being considered and on foreseeable 
developments of individual national competition policies. With this in mind also, 
it has continued taking part in the work of the OECD, which, following consideration 
of the possibility of studying restrictive practices by multinational firms, has 
drawn up a set of rules on their conduct as in the competition field. 1 
§ 3 - Influence of Competition on Prices 
17. In line with the Council Resolution of 14 September 1973, the fight against 
inflation, which requires the simultaneous use of all the Community's economic 
policy instruments, must be backed up by, among other measures, an active policy 
on competition. 2 Apart from the price policies applied in various member countries 
in accordance with their own requirements, competition policy pursued at both 
national and Community level would appear to be an important means of super-
vising markets on which competition on its own is not effective enough to regulate 
prices, especially in a strongly inflationary situation. It facilitates intervention 
where there is reason to believe that high prices are the result of restrictive practices 
or abuses, in particular where firms in dominant market positions carry through 
concerted or abusive price increases, or where price strategies are discriminatory 
according to the market, as a result of restrictive practices or in order to buttress 
dominant positions. 
On 4 December 1973, with a view to strengthening existing provisions in this 
matter, the Council adopted a Resolution3 on measures to be taken against rising 
prices and the maintenance of a high level of employment in the Community 
which, in addition to national measures on prices, invited the Member States and 
the Commission to organize as soon as possible regular exchanges of necessary and 
specific information on price movements and price comparisons in the member 
countries. 
'Member States will aid the Commission in the economic and commercial research 
required for the systematic application of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.' 
The Commission has taken the initiative in organizing the exchanges of information 
on prices called for by the Council, in cooperation with the relevant national 
authorities. 
18. I,t should be recalled here that when presenting its proposal for a Regulation 
on the control of concentrations,' the Commission stated that one of its justifications 
1 See point 45. 
2 OJ C 75 of 19.9.1973. 
3 OJ C 116 of 29.12.1973, p. 22. 
, See point 27. . 
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was that the increase in concentration on a number of markets was likely to reduce 
the effectiveness of measures taken against inflation by enabling dominant firms 
to determine prices with little regard for economic trends. 
19. In the coal and steel industries, where the Treaty of Paris gives the Com-
munity exclusive jurisdiction over prices, a Commission Communication to pro-
duction undertakings which come within the jurisdiction of the European Coal 
and Steel Communityl declared that careful attention will be paid to developments 
in prices, in consultation with undertakings, so that, if necessary, immediate action 
can be taken as provided in the ECSC Treaty, especially in Article 61. Moreover, 
the Commission will intensify inspections to ascertain whether firms are complying 
with the Treaty rules on prices. 
§ 4 - Auto-limitation Agreements 
20. Consideration of the measures notified to the Commission concerning voluntary 
limitations by Japanese firms to the Community has shown that there are various 
types of measures which should be assessed differently with regard to the competition 
rules. 2 Voluntary restraint provisions in trade agreements between Community 
and non-Community countries, if they are acts of foreign trade policy which, 
provided that the quantities to which the restraint applies can be freely disposed 
of within the Community, are not as such caught by the competition rules. Like-
wise, Article 85 would not apply to export agreements imposed on firms in non-
member countries by their governments, unless there was an agreement or concerted 
practice between the firms.3 The Community should seek to solve this situation 
by measures of official commercial policy. 
Auto-limitation agreements, whether concluded by firms in non-member countries 
alone or between such firms and corresponding European firms, are subject 
to Article 85 according to the notice published by the Commission on 21 October 
19724 which calls for measures of competition policy. 
Following that notice, the Commission received a number of notifications which 
are now being processed; in other cases which came to its knowledge, it has carried 
1 OJ C 115 of 28.12.1973, p. 6. 
2 Oral Question 35/73 concerning agreements between producers of electronic equipment in 
the Community and in Japan. Annex to OJ 162 of May 1973, p. 3l. 
3 On the other hand, where the government merely authorizes the export agreement, 
Article 85 may well reach the firms in question for authorization, unlike imposition, does not 
prevent them from refraining from entering into the agreement. 
OJ C III of 21.10.1972, p. 13. 
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out investigations on the subject 
imported into the Community.l 
initiated. 
of the terms on which Japanese products are 
In one of these cases proceedings have been 
In cases where examination of these agreements-whether on the basis of the 
notification or, in the absence of notification, on the Commission's own initiative-
leads to the conclusion that the agreements are incompatible with the Treaty's 
rules on competition, the Commission will take the measures provided for in Regula-
tion No 17. It might even propose appropriate measures of official commercial 
policy if these appear to be in the public interest. 
§ 5 - Orientation of investments 
21. In two cases, concerning respectively the cement and man-made fibres 
industries, the Commission had an opportunity to make known its reservations on 
private agreements for coordination of investment which were designed to prevent 
excess production capacity. It was not established that the agreements in question 
made it possible to achieve the aims of the parties; in addition, the agreements 
involved serious restrictions of competition between the parties as regards pro-
duction and sales. a 
However, this does not mean that, in exceptional circumstances and under condi-
tions designed to ensure that the interests of the Community as a whole are respected, 
the Commission cannot organize for certain industries an improved system for 
exchanging forecasts of market trends and developments in production capacity, 
provided individual firms retain full control of their respective decision-making 
powers and full responsibility over their individual investments. Certain specific 
measures of this kind are envisaged in the action programme on industrial and 
technological policy in favour of industries which are facing special problems, 
such as advanced-technology industries and industries in a state of crisis. 3 
Section 3 
The Proposal for a Regulation on the Control of Mergers 
Introduction 
22. It is incontrovertible that the process of industrial concentration is on 
the increase. The causes lie largely in the desire and need of Community firms 
1 Commission answer to Written Question 558/72, OJ C 29 of 12.5.1973. 
a Second Report on Competition Policy, sees. 30 and 31. 
3 Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Communities, point 328. 
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to adapt constantly to the new scale of their markets and to improve their 
competitiveness on the world market. Many mergers, as a result of the structure 
of the markets in which they occur, in no way lessen competition but, on the 
contrary, can increase it. However, the Commission cannot overlook that the 
EEC Treaty, in making it responsible for applying the rules on competition, requires 
it to preserve the unity of the Common Market, to ensure that the market remains 
open and ensure effective competition. Excessive concentration is likely to obstruct 
these aims. 
The legal instruments in the field of competition law currently available do not 
give adequate means of dealing effectively with the dangers arising from excessive 
concentration. The Community Treaties provide for systematic control of business 
concentration only on the markets in coal and steel (Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty). 
Concentrations in other industries are covered by Community rules on competition 
only if they constitute abuses of dominant positions within the meaning of Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty. . 
23. The Summit Conference held in Paris from 19 to 21 October 1972 referred to 
the problem of business concentration and stated: 
'The Heads of State or of Government consider it necessary to seek to establish a 
single industrial base for the Community as a whole. This involves ... the formula-
tion of measures to ensure that mergers affecting firms established in the Com-
munity are in harmony with the economic and social aims of the Community, and 
the maintenance of fair competition as much within the Common Market as in 
external markets in conformity with the rules laid down by the Treaties'. 1 The 
Heads of State or of Government further believed that it was 'desirable to make 
the widest possible use of all the dispositions of the Treaties, including Article 235 
of the EEC Treaty'. 
In its Resolution of 5 December 1972 on measures to be taken against inflation, the 
Council took 'note of the Commission's intention to submit, independently of the 
application of Article 86 in such cases, proposals aimed at setting up a more syste-
matic control over concentrations of a certain size'.2 
In its Resolution of 7 June 1971, based on the Berkhouwer report, the European 
Parliament stated its belief that there should be prior notification of mergers 
resulting in firms exceeding a certain size or holding more than a stated share of 
the market; such mergers should be regarded as authorized only if the Commission 
made no objection within a specified period. 3 
1 Final Declaration of the Conference of the Heads of State or of Government of the 
Member States of the enlarged Communities, point 7. 
2 OJ C 133 of 23.12.1972, p. 14. 
3 Resolution of the European Parliament on the rules of competition and the position of 
European firms in the common market and in the world economy: OJC 66 of 1.7.197l, p. 12. 
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In its Communication to the Council of 10 May 1973 on the industrial and techno-
logical policy programme, the Commission said that 'it is desirable to provide for 
prior notification of combinations of a certain magnitude, regardless of the form 
the combination may take, in order to enable the Commission to take action before 
a combination is effected which it considers incompatible with the maintenance of 
competition in accordance with the objectives of the Common Market'.1 
24. The Court of Justice, in the judgment given on 21 February 1973 in Case 6/72 
(Continental Can), also refered.to the aims of the Community: 'Articles 85 and 86 
seek to achieve the same aim on different levels, viz. the maintenance of effective 
competition within the Common Market'. The pursuit of this aim, which is even 
more clearly stated in Article 3 (f), is in the Court's opinion indispensable to the 
achievement of the Community's tasks. 
If Article 3 (f) provides for the institution of a system ensuring that competition 
in the Common Market is not distorted, then it requires a fortiori that competition 
must not be eliminated; the Court of Justice also stressed this. 
Article 85, which prohibits agreements between undertakings which have as their 
object or effect the restriction of competition, and Article 86, which deals with 
unilateral actions by one or more undertakings, are both designed to maintain 
effective competition in the Common Market. As Article 85 prohibits restrictions 
which merely affect competitIon, it is hardly likely that Article 86 would allow 
undertakings 'to reach such a dominant position that any serious chance of competi-
tion is practically rendered impossible' (Continental Can). . 
According to the Court of Justice, any differing legal treatment of agreements and 
concentrations between undertakings 'would make a breach in the entire competition 
law which could jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common Market'. 
§ 1 - The Growth of Concentration in the Common Market 
25. The number of mergers in the Common Market is steadily increasing. Between 
1962 and 1970, the annual number of mergers in the Community of the Six (defined 
as acquisitions of holdings in excess of 50%) rose from 173 to 612-an increase of 
three and a half times. Moreover, the rate of increase between 1966 and 1970 
was nearly double that between 1962 and 1966. 
Since 1965 there has also been an increase in the number of mergers in the United 
Kingdom, and the process is tending to speed up. 
1 Supplement 7/73 - Bull. EC. 
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The increasing interpenetration of capital caused the share of the hundred largest 
firms in total sales of manufacturing industry to rise from 26% in 1953 to 50% in 
1970 in the United Kingdom and from 34% in 1954 to 50% in 1969 in Germany. 
In France, the degree of concentration is not so high. Industry is least concentrated 
in Italy. 
26. The effect of the growing number of mergers on market structures in various 
industries is of particular importance for competition policy. In order to ascertain 
these effects, the Commission began a study programme in 1970-71 to analyse 
concentration. The results of these studies show a clear, and in some industries an 
alarming, increase in the degree of concentration. 
In some sectors the concentration process has already gone so far that only four 
manufacturers in such sectors are left in the Community. In many other cases 
there has been a substantial reduction in the number of firms, sometimes by as 
much as half. 
As the number of manufacturers dropped in particular sectors, so the share of the 
four largest firms in total sales or total employment rose. This was found to be 
the case throughout the Community and in all the industries investigated. 
In addition to these studies, information available to the Commission as a result 
of continuing surveys of certain industries also shows that there are many 
industries with a very high degree of concentration, including some where the 
four largest firms in the Common Market control between 80% and 90% of sales 
or production. 1 
In a large number of other industries the degree of concentration has not yet reached 
this level. Nevertheless, here too the speed of the concentration process is increasing 
considerably. 
§ 2 - The need to control mergers 
27. This development should not continue uncontrolled. In many industries the 
maintenance of effective competition could be imperilled if the concentration 
movement persists. Through mergers, firms can reach a market position where 
they can avoid the pressure of competition. They no longer need to adjust the 
price, quantity or quality of their products to demand. The market position of 
such firms allows them to adopt a price strategy which is largely independent of 
economic developments, and this reduces the effectiveness of anti-inflation 
measures and may even amplify cyclical movements. Since price trends are no 
1 For comments on the results of the analytical studies on concentration, see Part 3 of the 
Second Report on Competition Policy and Part 3 of this Report. 
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longer regulated by the market, the distribution of incomes is altered to the 
detriment of consumers, who additionally have to accept restrictions on their 
freedom of choice. The freedom of workers to choose among employers is also 
restricted. 
The effects of mergers are particularly serious because the merger brings about an 
irreversible alteration of the structure of the market. Once a dominant position 
is attained, then substantial competition from the remaining firms on the market 
is not as a rule to be expected, unless there are far-reaching changes in market 
conditions. Furthermore, dominant firms are often in a position to prevent new 
competitors from entering the market. This is the case especially where they 
operate simultaneously on several markets and thus have additional room for 
manoeuvre, particularly in pricing. 
28. The time has come for the European Community to take powers to exercise 
more systematic control over mergers. Accordingly, on 20 July 1973 the Com-
mission sent to the Council a proposal for a Regulation l on the Control of Con-
centrations between Undertakings, based on Articles 87 and 235, whose main 
provisions are as follows. 
1. Concentrations which give the power to hinder effective competition are 
incompatible with the Common Market. Concentrations on a smaller scale 
which do not give such power are not caught by this rule as long as they do not 
exceed certain quantitative limits. 
2. Concentrations which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective given 
priority treatment by the Community may be held not to be incompatible with 
the Common Market. 
3. Concentrations involving firms with aggregate sales of 1 000 million units of 
account are subject to prior notification, after which the Commission has three 
months during which it may initiate proceedings. 
4. If the Commission does not initiate proceedings, the concentration is deemed 
compatible with the Common Market. If proceedings are initiated, a final 
decision must be taken after not more than nine months. 
5. Legal transactions which have taken place in connection with a concentration 
which is declared incompatible with the Common Market are not void. 
Consideration of the essential features of the proposed regulation shows that the 
intention is not to have a system based, like Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, on 
1 OJ C 92 of 31.10.1973. 
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prior authorization nor a per se prohibition, but rather a system where 
incompatibility with the Common Market must be established case by case after 
assessment by the Commission of whether the concentration is liable to hinder 
effective competition in the Common Market. 
§ 3 - Principal Provisions 
The most important provisions of the proposed regulation are Articles 1 to 5. 
29. Under Article 1, concentrations whereby the undertakings involved acquire 
the power or enhance their power to hinder effective competition are incompatible 
with the Common Market if trade between Member States is liable to be affected. 
In its Continental Can judgment cited above, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities made particular reference to the concept of preserving effective 
competition in order to describe the purpose of the competition rules of the 
EEC Treaty. That concept can thus be considered the main test of compatibility 
with the Common Market. 
The concentration may be incompatible with the Common Market by virtue of the 
market share held or of the technical knowhow, raw materials or financial resources 
available to the firms concerned. Consideration can also be given to the absolute 
size of the firms, and their relations with buyers, sellers and non-Community 
firms. Effective competition is, finally, assessed by reference also to the com-
petitiveness of the remaining producers, their conduct, the structure of supply and 
demand, barriers to entry to the market, the rate of technical progress, the growth 
of the relevant industry and actual or potential international competition and 
competition from substitute products. 
In appraising concentrations, their implications for industrial development cannot 
be ignored. Certain combinations may, for instance, be the only practicable way 
of restoring some degree of competition in a market otherwise completely 
dominated by a firm with a high rate of internal growth. 
The transactions caught by the regulation are those which directly or indirectly 
bring about a concentration involving at least one undertaking established within 
the Common Market. This definition covers both intra-Community concentrations 
and concentrations involving non-Community firms. This makes it possible to act 
on all concentrations which are likely to hinder effective competition in the 
Common Market, whether horizontal, vertical or conglomerate, and whether or not 
they involve dominant firms. 
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The rule is designed to cover only such concentrations as bring together under the 
same control undertakings which were formerly independent. External growth 
by the merger route can substantially modify market structures in a short space of 
time. It often does not reflect the competitiveness of the firms concerned. 
Internal growth, on the other hand, which is not covered by the regulation, is not 
of itself subject to control under any country's antitrust laws. 
Article 1 provides that operations which fall within its scope are incompatible 
with the Common Market. To ensure that a decision taken under Article 1 (1) 
does not lead the courts in certain Member States to annul transactions connected 
with the concentration, Article 3 (2) provides expressly that a decision that a given 
concentration is incompatible does not automatically render void the legal 
transactions relating to it. 
Article 1 further provides for a general exception from the principle of incom-
patibility with the Common Market for concentrations which satisfy two require-
ments, namely that the aggregate sales be less than 200 million units of account 
and the market share no more than 25% in anyone member country. This 
provision immunizes concentrations which are not such as to hinder effective 
competition in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it. 
Lastly, Article 1 provides for the possibility of exempting concentrations which, 
although caught by that Article, are indispensable to the attainment of an objective 
which is given priority treatment in the common interest of the Community. This 
makes it possible to take into account certain requirements of industrial, 
technological, social or regional policy applied by the Community. For example, 
a firm may sometimes be obliged to link up with a large group if it is to operate 
profitably in an economically underdeveloped or declining region where there are 
particularly pressing employment problems. However, this possibility for exemp-
tion does not constitute a general exception automatically applicable but must 
be authorized under Article 3 (4) case by case. 
30. Article 2 defines concentrations in terms largely inspired by Decision 
No 24-54 of 6 May 1954 laying down in implementation of Article 66 (1) of the 
ECSC Treaty a regulation on what constitutes control of an undertaking (OJ of 
the ECSC, 11 May 1954, p. 345). This decision, taken by the High Authority after 
consulting the Council, has shown its value over nearly twenty years of practical 
application, during which more than two hundred individual decisions were taken. 
In this Article, business concentrations are defined by reference to the concept of 
control - consisting, in economic terms, of the power of an undertaking to 
determine how another undertaking shall operate. 
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31. Article 3 vests powers in the Commission to enforce Article 1 and gives to 
the Commission exclusive jurisdiction, subject to review by the Court of Justice. 
Provision is made for cooperation with the authorities of the Member States. 
A decision that a concentration is incompatible with the Common Market does not 
automatically avoid legal transactions relating to the concentration (see com-
mentary on Article 1). 
Dissolution orders may be made, either in a decision under Article 3 (1) or in a 
separate decision which, while based on a previous decision, may be issued later, 
where the circumstances of the case are such that the firms should be ordered to 
restore effective competition. Liability for high periodic penalty payments in 
the event of non-compliance is intended to reinforce such orders. 
Pursuant to Article 1, Article 3 stipulates that the possibility for exemption pro-
vided for with a view to attaining a priority Community objective may be granted 
only by a decision giving an individual authorization which declares Article 1 (1) 
to be inapplicable. The conditions which may be attached to such a decision 
should make it possible to impose any necessary obligations consistent with the 
scale or nature of the concentration as authorized. 
32. Article 4 provides that concentrations which reach or exceed a certain figure 
must be notified before they are put into effect. Under Article 6 (time limit for 
commencing proceedings), notification must be given at least three months before 
the concentration is to be effected. 
Article 4 provides that concentrations must be notified in advance where they 
involve enterprises whose aggregate turnover in the last financial year preceding 
the year of the concentration was at least 1 000 million units of account. A 
turnover test was adopted for industrial and commercial firms because it is rela-
tively easy to apply; market shares, which could also have been used, are more 
difficult to determine and therefore less suitable as a method for deciding whether-
the concentration should be notified. 
The reference to turnover means the aggregate turnover of the firms or groups 
directly or indirectly involved in a concentration and is thus not restricted to 
turnover in the Common. Market: turnover outside the Common Market is also 
included. 
On this test, some three hundred firms-including banking and insurance 
companies within the provisions of Article 5 - would have had to notify their 
concentrations in 1971, had the turnover of the acquired firm totalled more than 
30 million units of account in individual cases. This figure of three hundred does 
not give a full picture of all concentrations which might have been notifiable. 
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The obligation to notify would additionally have applied to firms with a turnover 
of less than 1000 million units of account which through merger would have 
reached or exceeded the threshold figure. 
Under Article 4, the obligation to notify does not apply where the turnover of the 
acquired firm is less than 30 million units of account. 
Article 4 also provides for the possibility of voluntary prior notification of concen-
trations which do not reach the specified figure of 1 000 million units of account. 
This is to enable firms to benefit from the procedural rules in Article 6 and following 
articles. 
It is noteworthy in relation to Article 4, that the obligation to notify in no way 
prejudges whether Article 1 is applicable. Conversely, a concentration can be 
within the provisions of Article 1 without having to be notified. 
33. Article 5 stipulates that the aggregate turnover and market shares referred 
to in the proposed regulation are to take account not only of the activities of the 
firms or groups directly involved in the concentration, but also those of firms or 
groups which are indirectly involved. 
Since the turnover test cannot apply to banks and insurance companies, Article 5 
specifies what tests are to be used in these cases. The test for banks and financial 
institutions was selected after comparison between the main industrial firms and 
the main banks and financial institutions. It was found that the total assets of 
banks and finance houses represent approximately ten times the turnover of the 
corresponding industrial firms. For insurance companies, total premium income 
was adopted. 
34. Article 6 contains procedural provisions. 
It concerns all concentrations which are likely to be caught by Article 1, regardless 
of whether notification is mandatory. The institution of proceedings by the 
Commission, notice of which must be given to the relevant firms and to the 
authorities in the Member States, is an important part of the procedure, but does 
not have the force of a decision. It is an essential step in the examination of 
a case, and it marks the beginning of the nine-month period within which all 
decisions must be taken under Article 3 (see Article 17). 
There are special arrangements for notifiable concentrations. Any proceedings 
must be instituted within not more than three months of notification. Otherwise, 
at the end of the three months, the concentration as notified.is deemed to be 
compatible with the Common Market. Moreover, Article 7 implies that the 
transaction can be carried out if the Commission informs the firms concerned 
before the end of that period that it does not propose to institute proceedings. 
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These provisions enable those concerned to know relatively quickly whether there 
are any objections to the proposed concentration. If there are none, the firms 
concerned know definitely within that period of three months that the proposed 
concentration is immune from attack unless they have agreed that the period be 
extenaed or have supplied incomplete, incorrect or misleading information at the 
time of notification. Provision is also made for optional prior notification of 
concmtrations of which notification is not mandatory (s,ee Article 4). 
36. Article 7 provides for suspension of the concentration following prior 
notification, whether mandatory or optional, and this remains effective throughout 
the period during which the Commission may institute proceedings. 
It also empowers the Commission to compel undertakings, by formal decision, 
t6 suspend the proposed concentration throughout proceedings once commenced. 
36. Articles 8 to 22 govern procedural matters, requests for information and powers 
of investigation, fines and periodic penalty payments, professional secrecy and 
cooperation with the authorities of the Member States. On the whole, they have 
been taken over from the corresponding Articles of Council Regulation No 17 of 
1962, implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. However, Article 17 
should be mentioned specifically, since it fixes the period of nine months from the 
date on which proceedings are instituted within which the decisions provided for 
in Article 3 must be taken. This period can be extended if all the parties agree 
and if the circumstances so require. Article 17 also provides for publication of 
decisions taken under Article 3; such publication is to take account of the 
legitimate interest of firms in the protection of their trade secrets. 
37. The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are now 
being consulted. Their resolutions or opinions should be adopted early in 1974. 
At its meeting of 17 and 18 December 1973 the, Council set a timetable for the first 
stage of the action programme on industrial policy called for by the Paris 
Conference of October 1972. One of the items in the timetable reads: 'the Council 
shall by 1 January 1975 act on the proposal for a regulation on the control of 
concentrations' . 
On 2 July 1973, before putting the proposal before the Council, the Commission 
convened the 24th Conference of Government Experts of Member States on 
Restrictive Agreements and Dominant Positions in Brussels, and held a preliminary 
discussion with the relevant national authorities on the draft regulation 
establishing more systematic control over business concentrations. 
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38. Before deciding on its proposal to the Council, the Commission also sought the 
opinions of the trade associations and unions represented at European level on the 
broad lines of the proposed merger regulation. The following organizations were 
consulted: 
Industrial, Commercial and Financial: the European Centre for Public Enterprise 
(CEEP), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Liaison Committee 
of Small and Medium Businesses (Europuni), the Committee of Commercial 
Organizations in the EEC Countries (CCOEEC), the Permanent Conference of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the EEC, the Union of Master-Craftsmen 
of the EEC (UMCEEC), and the Union of Industries of the European Community 
(UNICE); 
Trade Unions: the European Trade Union Confederation, the Confederation generale 
du travail, the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGT-CGIL), the 
European Organization of the World Federation of Labour and the International 
Confederation of Executive Staffs; 
Consumers: the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions (EBCU), the European 
Communities' Committee of Family Organizations (ECCFO) and the European 
Community of Consumers' Cooperatives. 
This gave business and labour the opportunity to give their comments on the aims 
of the regulation and on the main methods by which these aims were to be achieved. 
The Commission appreciates the experience it gained from these comments. 
Section 4 
Work with the OECD 
39. In its Resolution l on the Commission's First Report on Competition Policy, 
the European Parliament expressed a wish that the competition rules applying on 
the world market be harmonized and that there be international cooperation in 
the fight against restrictive practices and abuses of dominant positions which were 
not caught by Community or national law. 
For several years the Directorate-General for Competition has been taking part 
in the work of the OECD's Committee on Restrictive Practices and its various 
working parties. A large variety of topics has been discussed, in many cases 
1 oJ C 14 of 27.5.1973, p. 8. 
REP. COMPo 1973 
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS 39 
giving rise to recommendations subsequently. adopted by the OECD Council, 
mainly with a view to promoting international cooperation between the various 
authorities responsible for applying restrictive practices legislation. The need 
for such international cooperation is making itself felt more and more as a result 
both of the growing liberalization of international trade and of the difficulties 
sometimes met by various national authorities faced with the activities of major 
international companies. . 
40. Turning more particularly to cooperation in matters of restrictive practices 
affecting international trade, mention should be made of the two Recommendations 
adopted by the OECD Council on a report from the Committee of Experts on 
Restrictive Business Practices. 
One is dated 10 October 1967 and the other 3 July 1973. 
The first of these Recommendations is mainly designed to promote a voluntary 
procedure for consultation, exchange of information and coordination where 
member countries, acting under their national restrictive trade practices law, 
undertake investigations or proceedings which directly affect the major interests 
of another member country. The object of this to be able to take account of the 
views of the other member country and of any action which it may be able to take 
under its own national law. 
The second Recommendation introduces a voluntary consultation and conciliation 
procedure under which a member country which considers that enterprises esta-
blished in one or more other member countries are engaging in restrictive practices 
which substantially and adversely affect its interests can request consultation with 
the other country or countries concerned. This consultation is designed to enable 
the other member country, if it agrees that firms established in its territory are 
engaging in restrictive practices harmful to the interests of the requesting country, 
to take steps that those firms take remedial action or itself to take whatever remedial 
action it considers appropriate. The Recommendation also provides that the 
countries concerned may, if they so agree, submit the case to the Committee of 
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices with a view to conciliation, or that they 
may agree to some other means of settlement. 
When the two Recommendations were adopted, it was expressly understood that 
they should not be construed so as to affect the legal positions of the member 
countries, including their obligations under the Treaty of Rome for members of. 
the Community and under the Free Trade Agreements with the EFTA, countries 
which did not accede to the Community. 
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41. Similarly, the Directorate-General for Competition has been taking part in 
the work of the Committee of Experts which led to the Recommendation of the 
OECD Council of 14 and 15 December 1971 concerning Action against Inflation in 
the Field of Competition Policy. 
This Recommendation provided for the adoption of immediate and long-term 
measures in the recognition that an effective competition policy is one important 
facet in the achievement of optimum economic growth and price stability and that 
measures to increase competition exercise a pressure on costs, prices and profits 
and thus contribute to the fight against inflation. The recommended immediate 
and longer-term measures include proposals for prohibiting or controlling resale 
price maintenance, provisions against damaging practices of monopolies and 
oligopolies, provisions against mergers which unduly restrict competition and 
provisions for extending restrictive practices legislation to industries hitherto 
covered by special rules. 
42. Another working party dealt with action against restrictive practices relating 
to patents and licences. The work of this working party led to: 
(a) the publication of a report from the Committee to the Council, describing a 
whole series of restrictive practices relating to patents and licences; 
(b) a draft Council Recommendation which emphasizes the effect which unjustifiable 
restrictions can have on the dissemination of scientific and technological innova-
tion and which invites the Member States to be particularly alert to: 
(1) unwarranted territorial restrictions on trade in, and importation of, patented 
produCts; 
(2) clauses concerning tied sales which are not justified, as for example, on 
technical grounds relating to the quality of the goods manufactured under 
licence; 
(3) grant-back clauses, unjustifiably requiring the licensee to assign or grant 
back to the licensor exclusively all improvements discovered in working 
the patent; 
(4) clauses limiting competition in industrial fields not covered by the licensed 
patent. 
43. Considerable study has also been made of export agreements with a view to 
providing answers to the two following questions: 
(1) Have the favourable effects which national legislatures intended to obtain from 
export agreements by exempting them from the prohibitions in their restrictive 
trade practice laws actually materialized? 
(2) How do these agreements affect international trade? 
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The incompleteness of the available information, which is largely due to the fact 
that these agreements generally escape national competition laws, suggests that 
there is a need for procedures for notifying these agreements for information pur-
poses and for checking whether the activities of these agreements do not in fact go 
beyond the exceptions for which they appear to qualify. 
44. Finally, the Directorate-General for Competition is involved in work still 
going on in working parties to study mergers, measures to be taken against restrictive 
practices by multinational companies and the role of competition policy with regard 
to economic policy as a whole. 
As regards mergers, the topics still being discussed in working parties include: 
(a) levels of concentration and variations in degrees of concentration; 
(b) relative significance of mergers, as distinct from internal growth, as the cause 
of increasing concentration; 
(c) identification, measurement and assessment of the effects of mergers; 
(d) principles to be adopted as a basis for merger control. 
45. As regards restrictive practices by multinational companies, the work has 
largely concerned the legal and procedural problems facing the various national 
authorities, with a view to exploring possibilities of international cooperation 
and with a view to considering provisions for inclusion in a code of conduct for 
multinational companies. 
This last mentioned working party proposes to assess the role of competition policy 
in the context of general economic policy, in particular by clarifying the scope of 
competition policy, measures adopted for its implementation and special measures 
taken in certain regulated or nationalized industries. This last mentioned matter 
is currently occupying the working party. 
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Main Commission Decisions 
§ 1 - Elimination of a~reements prohibited under Article 85 
Sales coordination 
46. In an important decision l adopted in its definitive form on 2 January 1973, 
the Commission had intervened on the European sugar market to put an end to 
concerted practices of the main producers in the Community, who had shared 
their respective markets and had arranged that imports should be made only to 
sales organizations under their control. This had considerably weakened the 
competitive pressure which could have resulted from unrestricted sugar imports.2 
Similarly, sales of products by undertakings which are normally competitors can 
lose their competitive effect when they are carried out on the basis of the coordina-
tion and, in particular, if the distribution of products from various sources is 
carried out by a joint organization. This has occurred in relation to single potassic 
fertilizers. The Commission took several measures to reduce the restrictions on 
competition in this market, which is very highly concentrated and of great impor-
tance for European agriculture. 
SCPA - Kali und Salz A~reement 
47. The Commission intervened, under Article 85, in respect of a verbal 
cooperation agreement which had existed for many years between the Societe 
Commerciale des Potasses et de l'Azote (SCPA), which holds a statutory monopoly 
for marketing potassium salts from French mines, and the Verkaufsgemeinschaft 
Deutscher Kaliwerke (VDK), the sales agency of the eight German potassium 
producers, which was succeeded in 1970 by Kali und Salz AG3, a de facto monopoly 
1 Commission Decision of 2 January 1973, OJ L 140 of 26.5.1973, p. 17. Second Report on 
Competition Policy, sec. 28. 
I This case is now pending before the Court of Justice, following an appeal by the undertakings 
concerned against the Commission decision. 
3 Commission Decision of 11 May 1973, OJ L 217 of 6.8.1973, p. 3. 
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for the sale of these products. This agency has in the Federal Republic of Germany 
the two companies which are the two largest producers of potassium in the Common 
Market, cover about 95% of the requirements of their respective domestic markets 
and more than 50% of the requirements of the other EEC markets, with the 
exception of Italy, where the proportion is smaller because there are Italian pro-
ducers. 
This explains why the Commission was particularly concerned about the effects of 
any coordination of the marketing behaviour of these undertakings on the market 
in the products in question. As regards commercial and industrial activity, 
coordination was reflected mainly in the joint fixing of the quantities and 
qualities of salts to be exported by each of the parties and by the coordination of 
the deliveries and distribution of products from both sources to export markets 
throughout the world, including those of the Member States of the EEC. This 
coordination was achieved by appointing joint distributors in the Netherlands and 
in Italy, which necessarily entailed their agreeing not to compete on those 
markets. This resulted in the coordination of the prices and sales terms of the 
products in each of the countries concerned. SCPA's appointment of a 
subsidiary of Kali und Salz to represent it in Germany was also based on a concerted 
practice between these undertakings. It appeared unlikely that an undertaking 
which was wholly controlled by another would apply a sales policy in conflict 
with the interests of its group or a policy not incompatible with its group's trading 
policy.l 
48. Since.it was evident that the conditions for exemption under Article 85 (3) 
were not fulfilled, the Commission ordered the undertakings to terminate their 
cooperation agreement and the supporting concerted practices. The size of the 
undertakings in question and their production capacity enabled them to supply 
their markets independently. Moreover, the numerous intermediaries operating 
on the market were in a position to adjust deliveries to the special requirements 
of demand. 
The idea behind the decision is that if free competition is to be restored in respect 
of potassic fertilizers, each producer must organize the distribution of his products 
on an individual basis, by entrusting it to undertakings which are separate from 
those chosen by his competitors and not economically or financially dependent on 
1 For its part, Kaliund Salz, the successor of VDK, entrusted the distribution of its products 
in France to SCPA, which held the legal monopoly in that country of the sale, export and 
import of potassic fertilizers. On the continuing adjustment of this State monopoly in 
accordance with Article 37 of the Treaty, following the Commission recommendation of 
25 November 1969, see point 128 below. . 
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them. For this reason, the Commission ordered SCPA and Kali und Salz to 
discontinue selling in the Netherlands and Italy through a joint distributor and 
ordered SCPA to discontinue the distribution of products in Germany by an 
undertaking controlled directly or indirectly by Kali und Salz. During the 
preparatory enquiries in this case the Commission found that the two separate 
companies responsible for distributing in Belgium the French and German 
products respectively had a close commercial relationship which precluded all 
competition between them. Although this was not the subject of the proceedings, 
those to whom the decision was addressed acknowledged the need to put an end to 
such a relationship between distributors of undertakings which would normally be 
competitors and they took the necessary steps to comply with the spirit of the 
decision. 
In putting an end to such cooperation arrangements, the Commission also forbade 
the undertakings to exchange any information regarding production and 
distribution, because it believed this gave them an opportunity and the means to 
concert their production policy and to share export markets. 1 
Kali und Salz - Kali-Chemie Agreement 
49. In another decision2 adopted under Article 85, the Commission also prohibited 
the only two German potassium producers, Kali und Salz AG and Kali-Chemie AG, 
from coordinating their sales of single potassic fertilizers. Under an agreement in 
force since 1971, Kali-Chemie, which belongs to the Belgian Solvay group and 
accounts for about 13% of German production, entrusted its output of potassium 
salts to Kali und Salz for distribution, with the exception of those quantities pro-
cessed in its own plants into complex fertilizers. Although Kali-Chemie was not 
obliged by the letter of the agreement to sell its potassium salts exclusively to 
Kali und Salz, in practice it sold to the latter its entire output of single potassic 
fertilizers. 
The situation under the agreement which entered into force on 1 January 1971 was 
therefore practically the same as that existing previously within the framework of 
the German potassium salts producers' sales agency (Verkaufsgemeinschaft 
Deutscher Kaliwerke - VDK). Until 1970, the latter was alone responsible for 
distributing all single potassic fertilizers produced in Germany. In addition to 
1 In view of the special problems connected with the operation and location of potassium 
mines, the Commission, in adopting its decision implementing Article 85, reserved the right 
to take the appropriate steps within the framework of the social or regional policy if difficulties 
should arise following a reorganization of the potassium industry. (See Bull. EC 5-1973, 
sec. 2109.) 
2 Commission Decision of 21 December 1972, OJ L 19 of 23.1.1974, p. 22. 
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Kali-Chemie, it was composed of various potassium plants belonging to the 
Wintershall and Salzdetfurth groups, which were transferred to Kali und Salz as 
part of a reorganization of the BASF group's potassium interests. VDK was 
dissolved on 31 December 1970 and the agreement which was the subject of the 
decision replaced the joint sales arrangement agreed upon within the framework 
of the agency. 
By this means, the distribution of all single potassic fertilizers produced in 
Germany was to be concentrated in the hands of Kali und Salz. This would have 
precluded all competition between the sole two German potassium producers both on 
the domestic and export markets. Because of its membership of the large Solvay 
group, and for other reasons, Kali-Chemie would have been capable of making 
supplies itself and without intervention by Kali und Salz, all quantities l it produced 
and sold under the agreement, and this could have considerably influenced 
competition in this sector. 
Since the agreement in question was caught by Article 85 (1), the Commission 
considered, for the purposes of the possible application of Article 85 (3), whether 
in fact it procured advantages which justified joint sales and the decision not to 
use its own by Kali-Chemie marketing outlets. The Commission concluded that 
the agreement did not provide appreciable advantages likely to offset the disadvan-
tages to competition arising from the centralization of sales. But in any case, 
exemption had to be refused because the agreement afforded to the undertakings 
concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question. It gave Kali und Salz the opportunity of rein-
forcing the privileged position it already held in the potassium salts sector, where 
it accounted for 87% of German production, by becoming the sole vendor in 
Germany of the German output of single potassic fertilizers. Since imports of 
potassium were insignificant, all competition on the German market could have 
been ruled out in practice. 
Sales agencies 
50. Continuing its examination of the activities of sales agencies,2 the Com-
mission found that a considerable change had taken place in the structure of these 
agencies during recent years. 
1 These quantities are roughly equal to the consumption of potassic fertilizers in Belgium 
or Denmark. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, secs. 11 et seq. With particular reference to the chemical 
fertilizer market, see also the Commission's reply to Written Question No 163/72, OJ C 105 of 
10.10.1972, p. 12. 
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Because of the growing trend in most sectors of industry towards concentration 
between undertakings, most agencies now had fewer members. Several agencies 
(e.g. SEIFA in Italy and CFA in France) were found to have disappeared altogether. 
Conversely, individual member firms were correspondingly larger and it seemed 
that the shares of the markets held by the agencies were also larger. The change 
had also led to some relaxation of the agencies' internal rules. Traditional forms 
and methods of cooperation between the members are now out of favour, and 
less formal, but equally effective, arrangements are preferred. 
Thus in the case of Kali und Salz and Kali-Chemie, the Commission found that an 
agency which, as a result of amalgamations or mergers, had been reduced to two 
members had taken the form of a simple agreement between those two undertakings 
under which one undertook to sell the products manufactured by the other on the 
latter's behalf. However, the manufacturing company was not prohibited from 
selling its products itself and was merely obliged to deliver annually to the other 
company the tonnage specified in the contract. The Commission found that the 
agreement infringed Article 85. It did not accord importance to the fact that, 
unlike most joint sales agencies, the agreement did not expressly oblige the parties 
to use only one distribution network. The Commission felt that this was not a 
distinction of substance. It based its reasoning on the fact that the Kali-Chemie 
company in fact marketed its entire output of single potassic fertilizers through 
Kali und Salz AG and did not therefore appear on the market as an independent 
vendor of those products. 
51. Continuing its investigation into other joint sales agreements of the 
traditional kind, the Commission intervened to bring the Belgian and Netherlands 
producers' agencies for sulphuric acid into line with the requirements of·Article 85. 
Since the beginning of the Second World War, the Belgian non-ferrous metal 
producers had entrusted the marketing of their output of byproduct sulphuric acid 
to a sales agency called Asybel SC, whose task was to resell on the Belgian market 
and for export. The statutes of the agency included a provision for a system 
of price equalization whereby at the end of each financial year all the producers 
received, for each tonne of sulphuric acid delivered during the year, a single price 
calculated on the basis of the agency's total income and deliveries. 
The Commission informed the producers with shares in the agency that this 
arrangement, which had the effect of excluding price competition, was caught by 
Article 85 and did not qualify for exemption under that Article. 
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Following this intervention, the producers decided to terminate their joint sales 
agreement with Asybel. 
52. In the Netherlands, the sale of sulphuric acid produced as a byproduct by 
the metallurgical firms, was also entrusted to a joint sales agency, the Neder-
landsche Verkoopkantoor voor Chemische Producten (NVCP). Since 1970 NVCP 
had been responsible only for domestic sales and confined itself to selling, on behalf 
of the producers with shares in the agency, the products which they delivered 
to it without practising any price eqUalization between themselves. 
The Commission drew the attention of these producers to the fact that, by 
obliging small and medium-sized Dutch retailers to procure their supplies 
exclusively from the agency, the latter deprived them of the right to import 
sulphuric acid from other EEC countries. This constituted a restriction incom-
patible with Article 85. Following the Commission's representations, the Dutch 
producers discontinued the arrangement challenged. 
Agreements covering the domestic market 
A~reement on ~as water-heaters and bath-heaters 
53. The Commission was also concerned with an agreement for the sale of gas 
water-heaters and bath-heaters on the Belgian market, which had been entered 
into in 1966 between three manufacturers and two importers of those products. 1 
The agreement established the distribution channels through which the members 
were to market their products and required the members and the intermediaries 
in the distribution channels to grant to their customers uniform discounts, rebates 
and other sales terms. 
The agreement, caught by Article 85 (1), could not be considered to fulfil the 
conditions necessary for exemption under paragraph 3. Despite the arguments 
adduced by the notifying parties, there was no evidence that the restrictions would 
be likely to improve the marketing of the products in question. Apart from the 
fact that compliance with certain technical standards was irrelevant to the 
restrictions imposed, the elimination of certain categories of purchasers (including 
department stores, cooperatives and distribution chains) and the limited oppor-
tunities for intermediaries in the distribution channels to attract orders were more 
likely to hinder than to foster an improvement of marketing standards. 
1 Commission Decision of 3 July 1973, OJ L 217 of 6.8.1973, p. 34. 
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54. The importance of the decision adopted in this case is that it gave the 
Commission an opportunity to amplify its position with regard to aggregated 
rebate agreements, which are not uncommon within the Community. 
Whereas the Commission's previous rulings on this subject had dealt with agree-
ments under which rebates calculated solely on purchases from producers who 
were parties to the agreement,l in this case the aggregated rebate system also 
covered purchases from suppliers who were not party to the agreement. 
Nevertheless, the Commission considered that such a system could infringe 
Article 85 (1) where it concerned a substantial proportion of the suppliers and 
purchasers on the market in question and where its effect was sufficient, because of 
the characteristics of the product and the conditions on the relevant market,. 
appreciably to distort competition and to influence the trade flows between Member 
States. 
This was true in the present case, where the products were fairly homogeneous 
and selling prices were uniform and where the volume of sales by the undertakings 
which were party to the agreement (three producers and two importers )exceeded 
70% of the total volume of sales on the Belgian market (the two importers accounted 
for only about 20%). Moreover, the intermediaries in the distribution network, 
who marketed some 75% of all products sold, obtained supplies to a value of 94% 
of their total turnover from the parties to the agreement, to which they were 
linked from 1947 until 1966 (date of entry into force of the agreement under exa-
mination) by a reciprocal, exclusive collective sales and purchasing agreement. 
The distinctive feature of an aggregated rebate system under which the rebates 
bear no relation to the services rendered individually to the suppliers by 
the intermediaries is, that in addition to the discount which each supplier must 
grant, there is an additional unjustified charge which is the greater the smaller 
the volume of a customer's annual purchases from a supplier in relation to his 
total turnover. 
In the present case, the result was that importers who were party to the agreement, 
whose share in total sales of the relevant products on the Belgian market was 
considerably smaller than that of domestic manufacturers, had to grant to inter-
mediaries a turnover discount involving a further additional discount on their 
selling prices, without any services being rendered in return. Manufacturers not 
party to the agreement, but who wished to gain a foothold on the Belgian market 
were at an even greater competitive disadvantage. In order to compete, on a 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 24, and Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 34. 
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market where the products were fairly homogeneous, with products from different 
sources, manufacturers who were not party to the agreement had to grant to dealers 
discounts which were greater than those offered by the suppliers who were party to 
the agreement in respect of the bulk of their total turnover. 
When extended to purchases from third parties, therefore, such aggregated rebate 
systems are liable to afford undue protection to domestic manufacturers by main-
taining preferences in favour of traditional suppliers. 
Dutch Sporting Cartridges Agreement 
55. Agreements concluded between twelve Dutch suppliers and some 150 retailers 
of sporting cartidges were also terminated following intervention by the Commission. 
The provisions of the agreements involved reciprocal collective sales and exclusive 
supply undertakings between suppliers and the retailers. Additionally, the agree-
ments imposed on the retailers a collective obligation to charge maintained resale 
prices. The suppliers had also entered into a collective commitment to notify 
prices, thus operating an open price system which was found to be contrary to 
Article 85.1 
The group of suppliers, which controlled all imports of 22 LR calibre sporting 
ammunition and cartridges, comprised, in addition to the only Dutch cartridge 
manufacturer, NIKA Jachpatronenfabriek of Tilburg, the importers of all the 
major brands of sporting cartridges, in particular ICI (United Kingdom), Dynamit 
Nobel (Federal Republic of Germany), Fabrique Nationale and PRB (Belgium), 
Gevelot and Cartoucherie Francaise (France), Fiocchi (Italy), Remington (USA) 
and most of the export agencies of eastern European countries. The Dutch 
retailers were grouped in an association, Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Wapen-
handel (NVW), which accounted for more than 90% of total sales of these products 
on the Dutch market. 
As the Commission has consistently ruled since the dissolution of the 'Earthenware 
Agreement',2 it is clearly established that reciprocal, exclusive collective agreements 
which are designed to oblige the parties to become intermediaries in trade in the 
products concerned in a Member State are incompatible with Article 85. It is 
also clear that the prohibition on retailers linked with NVW to sell cartridges 
at prices lower than the laid-down minimum resale prices and terms deprives them 
1 Bull. EC 7/8-1973, sec. 2111. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy. sec. 19 et seq. 
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of the opportunity of fixing their prices and sales terms as they think fit and of 
'1-ttracting demand for these products away from their competitors by charging 
lower prices or offering more favourable terms. 
56. This case is therefore noteworthy because it shows that collective obligations 
on suppliers to notify their prices infringe Article 85. 
It was found that an undertaking by suppliers to notify their individually fixed 
prices to a Committee was calculated to distort competition in the Common Market. 
Although each supplier could fix his own prices, the obligation to notify prices 
and price changes to a suppliers' committee had the consequence of inhibiting 
price changes and, generally speaking, of reducing the effects of price changes 
on competition. 
The suppliers would be less inclined to change their prices, knowing that their 
major rivals would be immediately informed and could therefore react. The 
system of price notification could thus fully achieve its aim of ensuring, through 
prompt reciprocal prior notification of price changes, that any price change triggered 
off another, and thus of encouraging the parties to the system to maintain their 
prices. The effect sought was that of preventing any unilateral price changes, 
which made it impossible to compete with other parties to the system by altering 
prices. This system made prices fairly rigid, since such price changes as were 
made would tend to be collective in nature. 
In connection with this appraisal of an open price system in the light of Article 85, 
it should be pointed out that in confirming the Commission's decision on the agree-
ment between the Netherlands Cement Dealers, the main feature of which was a 
target price system, the Court of Justice felt that even the fixing of a price which 
is merely a target price affects competition since it enables all the participants to 
predict fairly accurately their competitors' pricing policies. 1 
EUMAPRINT exhibition regulation 
57. The Commission requested the European Committee of Printing and Paper-
making Machinery Manufacturers (EUMAPRINT) to discontinue certain discrim-
inatory practices relating to 'national' exhibitions, which had the effect of excluding 
from these events Community undertakings which were either located outside the 
organizing country or did not have a permanent connection there. 2 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 23. 
B Bull. EC 10-1973, sec. 2108. 
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As a result, the organizing committee of GRAFITALIA '73 ('Mostra Nazionale 
dei Macchinari e dei Prodotti per Ie Industrie Cartarie, Grafiche e Trasformatrici'), 
held in Milan from 6 to 14 October, changed its rules in order to admit foreign 
firms. 
The Commission had received a complaint that, following representations by 
EUMAPRINT, the invitation to take part in GRAFITALIA '73 addressed to 
undertakings in member countries of the EEC had been withdrawn and that 
participation was refused to undertakings located outside Italy and which did not 
have a permanent connection there. 
The examination of this case had shown that the refusal was based on a EUMA-
PRINT regulation which made a distinction between 'international' and 'national' 
exhibitions. Only those undertakings located in the organizing countries or which 
had some connection there (establishment, sales agency, sole agent, etc.) were 
authorized to exhibit at the second type of exhibition. 
The Commission considered that such restrictions were discriminatory and 
incompatible with the Treaty laws on competition. The applicable restrictions 
chosen excluded from 'national' exhibitions those Community undertakings not 
located in the organizing country. This affected these undertakings which were 
not large enough to be represented in the organizing country. Accordingly, 
certain small and medium-sized undertakings were not able to benefit from the 
opportunity of exhibiting abroad and of making their products known and of 
meeting prospective agents or distributors. 
The Commission had already been made aware of problems raised by exhibition 
regulations restricting the freedom of exhibitors to take part in certain other events,1 
but this was the first time it had had to decide on a practice with protectionist effect 
as regards access to exhibitions. 
§ 2 - Encoura~ement of permitted forms of cooperation 
58. In adopting a block exemption regulation2 for certain specialization agree-
ments, the Commission's aim was to encourage the conclusion of certain agreements 
which satisfied the conditions set out in the regulation, since the regulation authorized 
such agreements without the need for notification. Agreements which do not 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, secs. 42 and 43. 
2 Regulation (EEC) No 2779/72, 21 December 1972. See Second Report on Competition 
Policy, sec. 8. 
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qualify for exemption under the regulation because they may not fulfil precisely all 
the requirements of the regulation, may nevertheless qualify for individual exemp-
tion where the Commission finds, following notification, that the conditions for 
applying Article 85(3) are met. 
Prym-Beka agreement 
59. Accordingly, after examining the contractual relations agreed upon between 
William Prym-Werke KG and SA Manufacture beIge d'aiguilles Beka,concerning 
needles for household sewing machines, the Commission gave an exemption to 
agreements on a long-term exclusive supply agreement which was part of an under-
taking by one of the parties to cease manufacture and transfer manufacture to the 
other party. Since the undertaking relating to specialisation was binding on 
only one of the parties, the agreement did not qualify under the block exemption 
regulation, although in relation to production it was likely to have certain specia-
lisation effects. 1 
It has previously been pointed out that the instances of incompatibility with 
Article 85 derive not only from decisions prohibiting agreements but also from 
cases of negative clearance or authorization which reveal restraints of competition 
discontinued or altered at the Commission's initiative to enable Article 85(3) 
to be applied. 2 In this connection, it should be noted that in this case the 
parties to the agreement had to abandon the commitment to share customers within 
the Common Market, as originally envisaged by the the agreement. In earlier 
decisions on specialization agreements (concerning the rationalization groups in the 
German Steel Industry8 and the agreement among French producers of light-weight 
paper') the Commission had previously insisted upon the abandonment of provisions 
intended to organize among the parties the allocation of production quotas, the 
distribution of profits through an eqUalization scheme or the coordination of com-
mercial policies within the Common Market. 
The agreement under consideration resulted from the following situation. At the 
time it was concluded both the undertakings concerned manufactured and sold 
needles for household sewing machines. Prym needed its own manufacturing 
facilities to supplement the large range of haberdashery articles of all kinds which 
1 Commission Decision of 8 October 1973; OJ L 296 of 24.10.1973, p. 24. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 1. 
3 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 30. 
, Second Report on Competition Policy. sec. 37. 
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it sold. Considering it necessary to rationalize production in view of the world 
market situation but believing that automated plant would only be fully used if 
a minimum turnover could be achieved, the two undertakings decided that manu-
facturing operations should be concentrated in a single factory, the Beka plant at 
Eupen, and that production at the Prym factory at Stolberg should stop. The 
plant and equipment involved would be transferred to Eupen. 
To concolidate their collaboration, Prym acquired a 25% interest in Beka and the 
two parties concluded an agreement for supplies to Prym on a long-term basis and 
to confirm that each should retain its traditional clientele. In its statement of the 
matters to which it had taken objection, the Commission informed the parties that 
it could not grant an exemption while the customer-sharing arrangement remained 
in force in respect of Community trade. Finally, Prym and Beka agreed that 
this clause should not apply in respect of the EEC market. 
The position of the undertakings concerned and the conditions on the market in 
question may be described as follows. 
Prym manufactures, in addition to semi-finished brass products, chains and the like 
a whole range of haberdashery goods intended mainly for clothing, such as fastenings 
of all kinds, buckles and needles. It has several factories, employing about 
4 500 persons. 
Beka manufactures solely needles for both household and industrial sewing machines. 
It has one factory, at Eupen, which employs 350 persons. At present 25% of its 
capital is held by Prym an 75% by the Belgian Beckaert company, which is one of the 
major world producers of wire and wire products. 
Annual world production of needles is estimated at i 400 million, valued at approxi-
mately 50 million units of account. There are between 25 and 30 manufacturers, 
mainly in western Europe, North America and the Far East. 
Prior to the implementation of the agreement, Beka produced 90 million needles per 
annum (about 6% of world production) and Prym 40 million (about 3% of world 
production). 
Prym and Beka together account for about 10% of the EEC market. Their main 
rivals are in Europe (the German Schmetz company, which is three times larger 
than Prym and Beka combined, the needle factories of the American Singer and 
Torrington groups, the Dutch Musolf company) but the Japanese and Hong Kong 
manufacturers have also been exerting very great pressure on the market. 
60. The Commission found that both the commitments entered into by Prym 
(the ban on the manufacture of needles and the exclusive supply obligation) as well as 
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in to by Beka (the obligation to meet all Prym's requiremen ts and to grant preferential 
selling prices) had as their object and effect an appreciable restriction of competi-
tion within the Common Market and that they could adversely affect the free flow of 
trade between Member States so as to prejudice the attainment of a single market. 
However, the Commission also took the view that the agreement could be exempted 
from the ban in Article 85(1) since the rationalization of production arising from 
the concentration of manufacturing activity at the Beka factory would result in 
an improvement in the quality of the needles and a fall in their cost price, to the 
benefit of consumers. These advantages could not be achieved and maintained 
unless Prym undertook, as was the case, not only to stop its own production but 
also and above that to obtain supplies solely from Beka over an extended period. 
Moreover, in view of the strong competitive pressure from other manufactures 
both in the Community and in non-member countries, the agreement did not 
afford the partners scope for eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question. The consent to the parties contained in the 
Commission decision, is valid until 31 December 1984, but can be extended. It 
takes account of the fact that the favourable effects of the agreement are asso-
ciated with a continuing long-term cooperation between the parties. 
Transocean Marine Paint Association 
61. Since decisions which apply Article 85(3) are issued for limited periods, 
the Commission must consider at the end of such periods whether the original 
conditions for applying 85(3) are still germane, and whether the original decision 
can properly be renewed. l The Commission carried out such a re-examination 
for the first time in connection with its original Transocean decision. 
The Transocean Marine Paint Association is an association ot twenty medium-sized 
marine paint manufacturers established, in as many countries both inside and 
outside the Community and has a 5-10% share of the EEC market in the products 
of its members. It had obtained an exemption from the ban in Article 85(1) 
by decision of 27 June 1967 in respect of the period up to 31 December 1972. The 
Commission has now extended the period of this exemption up to the end of 1978, 
subject to certain conditions.2 
The aim of the association is to enable its members to compete effectively on the 
world market in marine paint. This means that standard quality paints must 
1 Article 8 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962 (First regulation implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty). 
2 Commission Decision of 21 December 1972. OJ L 19 of 23.1.74. p. 18. 
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be offered for sale in as many ports as possible. Consequently, the members under-
took to manufacture marine paint of identical quality, using a single formula, 
and to sell it under a common Transocean trademark. A territory was assigned 
to each member, namely, the country in which that member was established. 
In addition, other territories were allotted to members in which they were to 
concentrate their sales efforts. 
On the basis of the application for extension of the original exemption, the Com-
mission carried out a further examination of conditions on the marine paint market. 
It found on the whole that the cooperation arrangement which had been made 
between the members was still justified on economic grounds. The regrouping 
and coordination of members' individual sales networks still provided them with 
a suitable and essential means of increasing supplies, of improving sales possibilities 
and competing more vigorously with the major marine paint manufacturers. 
62. However, the Commission also took the view that certain export restrictions 
on the members of Transocean could no longer be regarded as indispensable to the 
attainment of the association's justifiable objectives. In the earlier decision it 
had expressly accepted these only for an initial period in order to enable each of 
the members to build up operations during that period by concentrating on the 
territory granted to it. Under the provisions, a member of the association could 
sell Transocean paint in a territory granted to another member and for a vessel 
originating in such territory only upon payment of a commission, and could export 
other paint only subject to the approval of the member established in the country 
of destination. The maintenance of these restrictions, which at present represent 
a means of acquiring a privileged territorial position, was no longer considered 
justified on the ground of significant increases in total marine paint sales of the 
members of the association since the original Commission decision. 
63. The Commission regarded it as necessary to examine whether certain changes 
in the circumstances of two of the members which had taken place since the original 
decision ought to affect the grant of an extension. Astral (France) and Urrozola 
(Spain) had in the meantime each been incorporated by two separate large groups 
of enterprises, AKZO and BASF respectively. In the event, and after reviewing 
these circumstances, the Commission nevertheless granted an extension of the 
period of exemption, but reserved the right to reexamine its decision in the event 
of any de facto change in the situation and required the parties to notify it of all 
interlocking directorships and acquisitions of holdings between the members of 
Transocean and with other paint manufacturers .. 
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This kind of stipulation in exemption decisions under Article 85(3), and made for 
the first time in the Henkel-Colgate decision,l is intended to ensure that the 
autonomy of the parties is not compromised by the interplay of financial interests 
or personal links with outside undertakings. 
§ 3 - Application of Article 85 to Distribution 
Du Pontlde Nemours (Deutschland) Case 
64. This case is typical of the many cases concerning general sales terms which 
the Commission is systematically tackling with the aim of combing out provisions 
in conflict with Article 85(3) which adversely affect intra-Community trade. 2 
These are, in particular, provisions which: 
(a) prohibit purchasers from exporting or reimporting products within the EEC; 
(b) oblige purchasers who export or reimport products within the Comrilon Market 
to observe resale prices imposed in the country of destination; 
(c) oblige wholesaiers to resell only to retailers and the latter only to final 
consumers. 
The Commission was able to grant negative clearance in respect of the general 
sales terms applied by Du Pont de Nemours (Deutschland) GmbH, a German 
subsidiary in the American Du Pont de Nemours group, for the sale of photographic 
products of its photographic division on the German market, products previously 
marketed under the Adox trademark. 3 
This company had voluntarily terminated a system of maintained prices which it 
had previously operated in relation to the German market and had modified its 
general terms of sale, in particular, by deleting export limitations which had been 
imposed on its German retailers. Thereafter, and on the Commission's initiative, 
the Company also abandoned other provisions from its general terms of sale by 
which it had previously put restrictions on certain inter-dealer sales of its products. 
The subsequent current test of the company's terms of sale no longer contained 
prohibited restrictions within the meaning of Article 85(1). 
Deutsche Philips GmbH Case 
65. The splitting up by agreement of the Common Market into submarkets 
amounts to a serious infringement of Article 85 and is contrary to the Treaty's 
fundamental objectives. This was recognized in the Commission Decision of 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 33. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 57. 
3 Commission Decision of 14 June 1973, OJ L 194 of 16.7.1973, p. 27. 
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23 September 1964 in the Grundig-Consten case and confirmed by the judgment 
of the Court of Justice of 13 July 1966.1 In 1973 the Commission imposed a fine 
of 60 000 u.a. to penalize a contractual ban on exports. 2 
In the proceedings which the Commission initiated in 1967 against Deutsche 
Philips GmbH (DPG) and other subsidiaries of NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken, 
Eindhoven (Netherlands), for having applied export bans, the parent company 
had declared itself ready, in 1968, to lift bans on exports to other Member States 
and called upon the subsidiaries concerned to amend their agreements accordingly.3 
DPG made the necessary amendments, but not to all its agreements. It did not 
lift the ban on exports to EEC countries which was contained in its agreement 
for electric razors until after the Commission had initiated new proceedings against 
this export ban and against certain other obligations contained in separate price-
fixing and distribution agreements. 
DPG pointed out that the maintenance of the export ban in this agreement was 
the result of an error and that the ban applied only to non-member countries. 
Moreover, it was contained in the general conditions of delivery and payment 
which elsewhere expressly stated that exports to Member States of the Community 
were permitted. DPG further pointed out that it had informed German whole-
salers who wished to export Philips electric razors that the export of these products 
to other Member States was not forbidden. DPG presented the Commission 
with letters from German wholesalers which stated that they had actually made 
deliveries of Philips electric razors to other EEC countries. 
The above circumstances suggested that DPG did not commit this infringement 
deliberately. The company was nevertheless considered to have been negligent, 
since it was reasonable to expect that other traders would regard themselves as 
bound by the export limitation contained in the agreement and would therefore 
refrain from exporting to other Member States. In the Commission's opinion, 
DPG did not use the necessary degree of care by stating, in an amendment to the 
agreement, that exports to other Member States were permitted. 
66. The decision is also important for having shown that agreements which 
impose restrictions on dealers in regard to sales to other dealers as well as resale 
price maintenance provisions can amount to infringements of Article 85(1) when 
they affect trade between Member States: 
(a) Under certain DPG agreements, wholesalers were to supply only to specialized 
retailers. They were therefore not to supply products to other wholesalers or 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 47 .. 
2 Commissionj,Decision of 5 October 1973, OJ L 293 of 20.10.1973, p. 40 
3 Bull. EC 4-1969, Part VI, sec. 5. 
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to other trade suppliers, whether for export or not, unless DPG had given prior 
consent in writing for each particular case (ban on horizontal supplies at the 
wholesale stage). 
Retailers were to sell or supply products (even if for export) only to ultimate 
customers. Moreover, under the agreement, retailers were not to engage in any 
advertising in trade journals which were normally distributed to dealers (ban on 
horizontal supplies and advertising at the retail stage). 
These obligations prevented wholesalers and retailers established in Germany 
from supplying the products to dealers at the same trading level in other 
Member States. Such bans on horizontal supplies can, where they affect inter-
national trade, contribute to segregating markets. 
(b) Under some DPG agreements, wholesalers were not to sell to ultimate customers 
(ban on direct supplies) and retailers were not to sell to wholesalers (ban on 
reverse deliveries). 
The prohibition on German wholesalers which restricted sales to ultimate 
customers deprived customers in other Member States of the possibility of 
obtaining products direct from German wholesalers. The ban on sales by 
German retailers to wholesalers further cut down the number of sources of 
supply for wholesalers in other EEC countries. This was additional to the 
ban on horizontal supplies in the case of international sales. 
(c) Under some agreements, the products were to be offered and sold to ultimate 
customers only at the prices laid down by DPG (resale price maintenance 
(RPM)). Under this RPM arrangement, a German retailer could sell the 
products covered by the agreements to customers in another Member State 
of the EEC only at the prices fixed in Germany, although the RPM in force 
in Germany covered only domestic transactions. The extension of RPM to 
actual sales (as well as to advertized prices) in other Member States of the 
EEC, was a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1). 
(d) Since RPM was to apply without exception to all products covered by the 
agreement which German retailers had purchased from DPG direct or from 
domestic or foreign suppliers, the German retailers were obliged to charge the 
maintained prices ruling in Germany when reselling goods covered by the 
agreement and imported from another EEC country into Germany. This 
application of RPM to reimported products therefore 'prevented German 
retailers from entering into competition with other German retailers in respect 
of prices when reselling reimported goods in Germany.l 
1 The decision also amplified the position adopted by the Commission in the Agfa-Gevaert case 
regarding the arrangements designed to preserve the national resale price maintenance 
systems. which are liable to entail market fragmentation within the Community: see the 
First Report on Competition Policy. sec. 55. 
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§ 4 - Application of Article 86 to the Abuse of a Dominant Position relative 
to Demand. 
67. In 1971 the Commission had already applied Article 86 for the first time to 
a case of abuse of a dominant position relative to demand (as opposed to an abuse 
of dominance by a supplier of goods and services). It involved the Gesellschaft 
fUr musikalische Aufftihrungs- und mechanische Vervielfiiltigungsrechte (GEMA), 
a music copyright company which had a virtual monopoly on the German 
market. In a decision of 2 June 1971,1 this company was found to have behaved 
improperly in its dealings, not only with music dealers, but also with music suppliers 
(songwriters, composers and music publishers). The decision obliged GEMA to 
terminate the abuses which were prejudicial to the interests of suppliers of musical 
works. 
In 1973 the Commission examined a case involving an abusive practice on the 
part of a buyer. These cases show that abuses of dominant positions by buyers 
can also be of importance on certain markets. The Commission discontinued the 
proceedings without decision when the abusive practice was abandoned. 2 
Railway rolling stock 
68. In mid-1972 the Commission had received a complaint against a company set 
up by an international convention between 16 European railway administrations. 
It was the purpose of the company to supply the shareholding railway managements 
with railway rolling stock of standard design or performance on most favoured 
terms. The railway managements concerned were to specify what part of their 
requirements they wished to cover through the company but they remained free 
to meet their requirements either wholly or in part through other channels. 
In 1971 that company, on behalf of six national railway managements, invited 
tenders for the development and delivery of an initial series of European standard 
passenger carriages, which were gradually to replace the existing carriages in long 
distance travel and would be used by as many railway undertakings as possible. 
The call for tenders was addressed to railway carriage manufacturers and equipment 
engineers irrespective of nationality. This was in line with the requirement laid 
down by the Commission in its directives3 on the coordination of public procure-
ment procedures, the aim of which was to enable undertakings from all Member 
States to participate on an equal footing. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, secs. 82 et seq. 
2 Bull .EC 4-1973, sec. 2105. 
3 Directive of 15 March 1971, OJ C 50 of 22.5.1971, and Directive of 22 May 1971, OJ L 185 
of 16.8.1971. 
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The complaint was not against the aim to standardize passenger coaches at European 
level nor against the form of the call for tenders but against certain of the condi-
tions for tendering. These included a provision giving unrestricted rights to use 
the designs, documents, patents and other proprietary rights arising from the 
planning and execution of the contract to the company which had invited the 
tenders. 
69. The Commission took the view that, as the largest customer for the type 
of carriage which was the subject of the call for tenders, the prospective buyer 
held a dominant position in the Common Market. Although the associated railway 
companies were not legally obliged to cover their total requirements through the' 
buyer company the Commission considered them to be dependent on it for the 
construction of further series of rolling stock. 
As regards the abuse of this dominant position, the Commission had to assess 
the interests affected by the close technical cooperation between the prospective 
buyer and the successful bidder following award of the development contracts. 
The insistence on the right of unrestricted exploitation was solely in the interests 
of the prospective buyer. The close technical cooperation between the buyer 
and the successful contractor during the development phase should certainly have 
entitled the buyer to a right of exploitation· for his own ends for purposes of 
maintenance and for the manufacture of further series. But to have insisted on 
being able to grant. licences for future rights to third parties who had not taken 
part in the development work, without consulting the successful contractor and 
with no additional payment to him, was regarded as unjustifiable. In the interests 
of successful contractors, appropriate compensation should be provided for in 
their favour in cases in which licences were granted to other railway companies 
for the standardization of railway carriages. Such compensation should not 
be quantified in advance (for inclusion in the overall price of the development 
contract), but only on the particular merits of any subsequently arising proprietory 
rights and by agreement between the parties. 
In his ultimate contract documentation, the prospective buyer abandoned his 
previous insistence on unrestricted exploitation rights which were limited to the 
justifiable needs of the railway administrations which had contributed to the 
development work. To encourage the standardization' of the types of equipment 
in question, the prospective buyer could grant licences to third parties, but only 
with the consent of the successful bidder and in consideration of appropriate 
compensation to be settled in each case. 
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§ 5 - Authorization of Concentrations (Article 66 of th ECSC Treaty) 
70. The entry of the British Steel Corporation (BSC) into the Common Market 
in steel has considerably modified the ratio of scale between Community steel 
undertakings. With an output of 22.5 million metric tons, BSC is the largest 
producer in the enlarged Community. 
In addition, since the Commission published 'Outlines of Competition Policy on 
the Structures of the Iron and Steel Industry'l in 1970, there have been several 
developments in the field of competition. 
There is a continuing trend towards larger production units, often established 
on the coast in collaboration between several steel undertakings. This r~structur­
ing process is made possible by new techniques such as oxygen converters, contin-
uous casting and automated rolling mills and by the advantages of siting plants 
in port areas (lower transport costs and cheaper raw materials). The size of the 
investments involved and the need to make optimum use of the new capacity 
encourage the undertakings to seek ways in which to collaborate. 
The first instances of this were Sidmar at Zelzate in 1962 and Hoesch-Hoogovens 
(outline agreement in 1966, merger within Estel in 1972). A recent instance is 
the foundation at Fos by Sacilor and Usinor of Solmer, a joint undertaking for the 
production of coil and other flat prodUcts. 
Such cooperation arrangements, which are reflected in the foundation of joint 
undertakings, raise special problems as regards the maintenance of effective 
competition in the oligopolistic set-up of the steel industry. The Commission 
must see to it that, the more powerful the groups and the tighter the oligopoly, 
appropriate measures are taken to ensure mutual independence and non-inter-
ference in the operations of other groups. 
There is a tendancy for the steel industry to diversify into sectors other than 
primary processing, for example wire-drawing and the manufacture of tubes. 
In this way the undertakings are trying, while increasing their profitability, to 
reduce the risks inherent in single-product operation on a market subject to sharp 
fluctuations in demand. 
In 1973 the Commission authorized two concentrations of this kind: in the Mannes-
mannfDemag and ThyssenfRheinstahl cases. 
These developments forced the Commission, in addition to exammmg the cases 
in the light of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, to consider whether their financial 
1 OJ C 12 of 30.1.1970, p. 15. First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 97. 
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strength and degree of diversification and self-sufficiency placed the undertakings 
concerned in a position to pursue independent market strategies and thus avoid 
the competition rules in the ECS<; Treaty. 
71. In addition to around fifteen major integrated, diversified steel undertakings, 
there are in the Community about 125 small and medium-sized specialized under-
takings, that is to say producers of special steels, re-rolling mills and 'mini-steel-
works'. 
Some of the many projects for mini-steelworks which have been under study in 
recent years matured during 1973. 
The ComInission authorized the joint foundation of the Societe des Acieries de 
Montereau at Montereau (Seine et Marne) by the Societe Metallurgique de Nor-
mandie SA, Paris, and Korf Industrie und Handel GmbH & Co KG, Baden-Baden. 
It was also notified of two other French projects-Iton Seine and Alpa-which did 
not require prior authorization under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. 
The mini-steelworks, which generally manufacture concrete reinforcing bars and 
merchant rolled products, are particularly well suited to such production, both 
for technical reasons and because of their commercial flexibility and location, 
generally in the centre of a high-consumption area. Their profitability depends 
mainly on the availability of scrap and abundant cheap electric power. 
Although the mini-steelworks at present operating in the Community produce 
only a small proportion of the Community's output of crude steel, they can never-
theless have a considerable influence on the market price of the relevant products. 
Their low costs enable them to exert pressure on the selling price of bars and rods 
fixed by the large companies, thus creating considerable competition on the relevant 
markets. 
72. The most important decisions adopted in 1973 by the Commission in the 
light of Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty as regards steel are those relating to the 
MannesmanjDemag, UsinorjSolmer and ThyssenfRheinstahl cases.l 
Mannesman/Demag 
73. In a decision of 27 June 1973, the Commission authorized the acquisition 
of a majority of shares in Demag AG by Mannesmann AG.l 
The effects on the steel market of this concentration operation are of only secon-
dary importance. Mannesman, which produces 3.18 million metric tons of crude 
1 The other decisions taken under Article 66 as regards steel and coal are listed in the Annex. 
See pp. 135-138. 
a Bull. EC 6-1973, sec. 2113. 
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steel, or 2.5% of Community production, uses the whole of this output (in the 
form of tube rounds, plate and sheet, and hoop and strip) for tube-making at 
Mannesmannrohrenwerke AG. Mannesmann thus produces no rolled products 
for the market and Mannesmann and Demag must cover their steel requirements 
for products other than tubes by purchase elsewhere. 
The operation, therefore, does not alter the position of the parties concerned on 
the steel market and, consequently, will not afford them the opportunity of pre-
venting the maintenance of effective competition. 
In the Commission's view, neither the group's increased financial strength nor 
the diversification of its output will of themselves enable the new grouping to 
evade the Treaty rules on competition on the market in steel products, where 
it will continue to operate as a purchaser only for small quantities. 
Demag, however, was strongly represented in the construction of steel-making plant 
(e.g. blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling Inills). Other steel undertakings with seats 
on Demag's policy boards and Committees would thus be able to obtain specific 
information on their rivals' investment schemes and to take this information into 
account, to the detriment of competition, in their own investment schemes. For 
this reason, the ComInission attached to its authorization the condition that such 
interlocking directorship and other personal links should be dissolved and that 
no new ones should be created. 
The concentration operation between Mannesmann and Demag relates essentially 
to the construction of machinery and equipment, a sector covered by the EEC 
Treaty. The activities of the two undertakings coincided, especially in the con-
struction of steel-making machinery and eqiupment, in transport and handling 
technique and, to a lesser extent, in compressor and plastics techniques. 
In respect of the construction of machinery and equipment, the concentration 
strengthens and extends the position of MannesmannjDemag as regards production, 
know-how, investment and sales. In view of the conditions of competition on 
the market and in particular the position of the group (with 14% of total production 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, where it occupies fourth place) and having 
regard to the position of the group's competitors, both in Germany and in the 
Community, the concentration was held not to infringe Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty. 
Usinor/Solmer 
74. By a Decision of 25 July 1973 the Commission also authorized the acquisition 
of 50% of the shares of Solmer by Usinor and approved a contract between Sollac, 
Usinor and Solmer.1 
1 Bull. EC 7/8-1973, sec. 2112. 
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With its 50% participation in Usinor, Solmer, which was established in 1970. 
following the organization and expansion of the Sadlor group in Lorraine (formerly 
Wendel-Sidelor), becomes a joint venture of the two major steel groups in northern 
and eastern France. Solmer, which is situated at Fos on the Mediterranean, 
will enjoy the advantages of a coastal plant producing crude steel and flats (coil 
as of 1974, and sheet and plate as of 1978). Planned production capacity by 
1978 is estimated to be 7 million metric tons of crude steel and 6 million metric 
tons of coil. 
Solmer is intended as a production cooperative for its shareholders and will supply 
them with its products at cost price in quantities proportional to their financial 
participation. Usinor and Salicar each market the products and also products from 
their own plants through their own commercial networks. Solmer does not market 
products. 
J oint control of Solmer has the effect of a concentration between the Solmer and the 
Usinor groups, over and above the previously created concentration between Solmer 
and Sacilor. However the relationship of Usinor with Salicor in Solmer was held not 
to entail a concentration between the Usinor and Salicor groups. Apart from 
their respective holdings in Solmer, they remain independent of one another, and 
Solmer, though it could be regarded as a 'hinge' between them, need not (provided 
certain conditions are met) jeopardize their mutual freedom. ~ 
Nevertheless, the joint control of Solmer by Usinor and Salicor and the extent 
of their joint investment would result in each of the groups making their investment 
decisions in the light of investment carried out by Solmer. Consequently, the joint 
control of Solmer was regarded as restricting competition between both groups in 
respect of investment in and the production of flats. 
Thyssen/Rheinstahl 
75. By its Decision of" 20 December 1973, the Commission authorized 
the acquisition of a majority of the shares of Rheinstahl AG by August Thyssen-
HUtte AG. . 
The new group is to be one of the largest concentrations in the Community's steel 
industry. The undertakings within the Thyssen· and Rheinstahl groups are steel 
producers and steel processors. Thyssen's production interests are mainly in the 
steel sector; of its ex-Group sales of DM 10 700 million during the 1971/72 financial 
1. OJ L 84 of 28.3: 1974, p. 36 (First publication of a decision under Article 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty). 
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year, steel sales accounted for DM 6400 million, the remainder having been attrib~ 
utable mainly to castings, forged items, drawn wire, cement and shipbuilding. 
Rheinstahl's major activities lie in the steel-using sector, notably mechanical 
engineering, plant construction, shipbuilding, and manufacture, of transport, con-, 
struction and heating materials and equipment (which accounted for DM 4300 mil-
lion out of ex-group sales of DM 5100 million). The turnover in the steel sector 
(DM 800 million) is relatively small. 
The unified ThyssenfRheinstahl group will be in a strong position on the steel 
market and will be a highly diversified concern with considerable economic and 
financial potential. 
In terms of total turnover, the group will be the largest steel group in the Com-
munity. 
An assessment of the planned concentration and of its effects on the market in 
steel products shows that Rheinstahl's contribution to the Thyssen group in the 
steel sector will not in itself give rise to a situation in which the size of the resulting 
group in the steel sector would preclude an authorization under Article 66. 
After 1976 the three undertakings in question are estimated to produce around 20% 
of all coil, sheet and plate manufactured in the Community. Their products would 
however, be marketed only by Usinor and Sacilor, which may pursue independent 
sales and further processing policies, particularly since production in their own 
factories would still be higher thim the supplies to be made to them by Solmer. 
There would, therefore be two distinct and independent decision-making centres 
which would treat Solmer's production as their own. Consequently, there would 
still be competition within the production sectors where the activities of Usinor 
and Salicor would overlap and the choice of coil, sheet and plate available to con-
sumers would not be affected, since there would still be the same number of suppliers. 
Othe): important producers accounting for 20%, 15%, 12% and 10% of Com-
munity production would be present on the market; the ten leading undertakings 
would account for approximately 98% of Community production, which, for tech-
nological reasons, is highly concentrated. Furthermore, the requirements of the 
French market, which is the main outlet for the undertakings concerned, would be 
met to a considerable extent, by imports from the rest of the Community and from 
non-member countries. The Community's enlargement would be likely to result 
in a greater degree of interpenetration on steel markets. 
Under these circumstances, the Commission held that the venture would not 
undermine the ~a.intenance of effective competition on a large part of the relevant 
market provided that the independence of both Usinor and Salicor was not impaired 
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to an extent greater than that dictated by their joint control of Solmer, and provided 
that no agreement on restricting their commercial independence was reached and no 
interlocking directorships or other personal links were established between these 
groups. The transaction was authorized subject to conditions on the foregoing basis. 
The Thyssen group's production of crude steel would rise from 11 700000 metric 
tons to 13200000 metric tons, which would be 13.4% of production within the 
old Community of Six and 10.3% (Thyssen's 9.1 % + Rheinstahl's 1.2%) of that in 
the enlarged Community. 
The position of the new Thyssen group will be considerably strengthened, parti-
cularly in the plate sector, where its share of the Community market will rise 
from 10 to 14%, thus making it the second largest producer in the Community, 
and in the foundry pig sector, where its market share will rise from 4 to 14%, 
thus making it the Community's third largest producer. Thyssen's position in 
other sectors, already very strong, is hardly or not at all affected by the concentra-
tion since Rheinstahl produces few or none of these products (its market share for 
wire rod rose from 16 to 17%, whilst its sales of sheet remained unchanged at 12%). 
The table below gives the position of the combined Thyssen-Rheinstahl group 
in the various sectors of the Common Market in steel as a percentage of Community 
production: 
Product group % Position amongst Community producers 
Foundry pig 14.0 3 
Crude steel 10.3 2 
Hot-rolled wide strip (total) 13.5 2 
Permanent-way material 7.4 6 
Wire rod 17.0 1 
Merchant bars 4.2 8 
Heavy angles, shapes and sections 6.9 4 
Hoop and strip 3.6 8 
Plate and sheet (more than 3 mm) 14.3 2 
Sheet (less than 3 mm) 12.3 2 
Tinplate 12.3 .4 
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In view of the special conditions of competition on the product markets concerned 
and, above all, in view of the large degree of interpenetration on the Common Market 
in steel-almost one third of the Federal Republic's requirements are met by 
imports-the Commission took the view ThyssenfRheinstahl would not be in a 
position to prevent effective competition on the steel market. 
By its acquisition of Rheinstahl, particularly its steel-using parts, the new group's 
economic strength, diversification and intragroup consumption will increase but 
not excessively compared with other large groups in the Community such as BSC, 
Finsider, Usinor and Estel. Nor will the new group's position on the markets in 
steel and in other, non-ECSC, products enable it to act independently of normal 
market taxes and, thereby, circumvent the ECSC Treaty competition rules or 
infringe Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
76. However, authorization for the concentration between Thyssen and Rhein-
stahl could only be given on special conditions since Thyssen and Mannesmann 
had become linked by way of their joint control exercised over Mannesmannrohren-
Werke (MRW) (authorized by the Commission in its Decision of 21 January 1970).1 
Thyssen holds one third of MRW's capital and in collaboration with Mannesmann, 
which holds the other two thirds, has a contract which gives it joint control over 
MRW. Thyssen and Mannesmann have also concluded a contract for rolling 
steel products under which approximately one sixth of MRW's supplies of products 
necessary for the manufacture of tubes is in the form of steel produced by Mannes-
mann and rolled under contract by Thyssen (coil, heavy plate, hoop and strip). 
All these circumstances combine to give Thyssen considerable influence over the 
Mannesmann group. In 1970 the Commission viewed this situation as acceptable 
since Thyssen and Mannesmann were not competitors on the steel market since 
Mannesmann manufactured only products necessary for the manufacture of tubes. 
These circumstances however had changed through the Mannesmann takeover of 
Demag and the resulting diversification. At the same time, Thyssen, by. taking 
over Rheinstahl, had also become considerably more diversified and had strengthened 
its position on the steel market, thus creating a new situation. 
In order therefore to maintain conditions of effective competition within an industry 
with an oligopolistic structure, it was held to be necessary that the independence of 
the groups and their non-interference in the affairs of other groups should be safe-
1 EC Bull. 3{1970, Part Two, Chap. I, sec. 5 and First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 97. 
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guarded, particularly since the groups in quesiton. were growing more powerful 
within a narrowing oligopolistic sector. 
Consequently, in order to ensure that the planned concentration satisfied the 
authorization requirements set out in Article 66(2), measures were tO'be taken to 
avoid the exercise of future Thyssen influence on the Mannesmann group in such 
a way as to undermine the latter's decision~making autonomy or cause both groups 
to coordinate their policies. 
The Commission considered that this could be achieved if Thyssen's influence over 
the Mannesmann group became such as is normally exercised by a minority 
shareholder. Mannesmann would retain relations with the new group through its 
rolling contract. The value of this contract was not disputed but Mannesmann 
should be in a position to release itself from the contract if it so wished. 
The Commission therefore made its decision authorizing the concentration between 
Thyssen and Rheinstahl conditional upon Thyssen selling to Mannesmann a 
proportion of MRW's capital equal to at least 8 1/3% so that its holding should 
not exceed 25%, so as to lose its voting rights to block decisions in general meetings. 
Similarly, Thyssen was barred from taking part with Mannesmann in ,any contract 
giving it control over MRW. A one-year period of grace-uhtil 31 December 
1974-was granted for compliance with these conditions. 
The following additional requirements were imposed as safeguards for the inde-
pendence of the undertakings:' 
(il Thyssen and Rheinstahl were required prior to 1 April 1974 to withdraw from 
the West and Westfalen rationalization groups, in which they participated 
with other German undertakings, such as Krupp and Hoesch.! 
(ii) Thyssen would be required to submit for the Commission's prior authorization 
any proposal for the acquisition of a holding of 10% or more in steel under-
. takings, or in steel using undertakings where the latter use more than 
50 000 metric ton's of steel per year. 
(iii) Members of the boards and other management bodies of the undertakings 
in the new Thyssen group may not hold similar board or management positions 
in other similar undertakings. 
The Commission considered that the foregoing conditions and requirements would 
ensure the maintenance of effective competition in the Community'S steel industry. 
1 Commission Decision of 27 July 1971; OJ L 201 of 5.9.1971. See First Report on Competition 
Policy, sec. 30. 
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§6 - Dumpin~ 
77. Article 91 of the Treaty, which lays down rules on intra-Community dumping 
during the transitional period for the Six, ceased to have effect on 1 January 1970. 1 
For the new transitional period for the enlarged Community, Article 136 of the 
Act of Accession incorporates the provisions of Article 91 (1). 
Article 136 reads as follows: 
'1. If, before 31 December 1977, the Commission, on application by a Member 
State or by any other interested party, finds that dumping is being practised 
between the Community as originally constituted and the new Member States 
or between the new Member States themselves, it shall address recommendations 
to the person or persons with whom such practices originate for the purpose of 
putting an end to them. 
Should the practices continue, the Commission shall authorize the injured Member 
State or States to take protective measures, the conditions and details of which 
the Commission shall determine. 
2. For the application of this Article to the products listed in Annex II to the 
EEC Treaty, the Commission shall evaluate all relevant factors, in particular 
the level of prices at which these products are imported into the market in question 
from elsewhere, account being taken of the provisions of the EEC Treaty relating 
to agriculture, in particular Article 39.' 
An exception to this procedure is provided for in respect of Ireland in Article 137, 
which is worded as follows: 
'1. Notwithstanding Article 136, Ireland may, until 31 December 1977, take 
the necessary measures in cases of extreme urgency. It shall forthwith notify 
such measures to the Commission, which may decide to abolish or modify them. 
2. This provision shall not apply to the products in Annex II to the EEC Treaty.' 
78. The first decision relating to dumping was taken by the Commission on 
30 November 1973 in a case concerning two new Member States. 
One Member State had imposed temporary duties on' imports into its territory, 
by a Common Market firm, of two types of paper product at prices which suggested 
dumping. 
, I 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 106 et seq. 
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When the matter was referred to it, th~ Commission applied the rules laid down 
during the transitional period of the Community of the original Six Member States, 
which were inspired by Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
These rules involve detenuining the ex-works prices for the exported products 
and the 'normal value' of the same products within the exporting country. The 
margin of dumping, if any, is the difference between the two prices where the 
export price is lower than the 'nonual value'. 
When applying these rules, the Commission allows an exporter to pay all or part 
of the import duties imposed on his products upon importation into the other 
Member States, provided that in doing so he does not undercut prices for similar 
products in the importing country. This position is justified by the fact that such 
fonus of degressive customs protection as still exist during the transitional period 
have the required effect by their very existence, in that they make it more difficult 
to export to protected countries. Such protection must not, however, hinder 
the development of trade between Member States should certain suppliers agree 
to pay all or part of the customs duties. 
Applying these principles, the Commission, after a thorough investigation, concluded 
that there was no margin of dumping for one of the products. 
For the other product, the Commission confirmed that there had been sales with 
a margin of dmnping, but that these had ceased before the importing State took 
its temporary measures. 
The Commission therefore decided to abolish the temporary duties on both products 
as from the date on which they were first introduced. 
By confinuing certain principles applied by the Commission in dealing with cases 
of dumping and by defining the respective functions of the Commission and the 
Member States during the transitional period, this decision clarified the thresholds 
for application of Articles 136 and 137 of the Act of Accession. 
REP. COMPo 1973 
Part two 
Competition Policy 
and Government Assistance 
to Enterprises 
                                                                     72-74
Chapter I 
State aids 
Section 1 
Application of the EEC Treaty 
§ 1 - General 
79. The accession of the three new Member States necessitated a great deal of 
technical work before a list of aid systems existing in those countries could be 
drawn up and before their implications could be more fully understood. In a 
number of cases existing rules which had been formulated for a six-country 
Community had to be amplified. 
In some instances-for example, sectoral and general aids-1973 also saw the 
continuation and fuller implementation of actions previously undertaken and 
described in the first two competition reports. 
§ 2 - Re~ional aid systems 
Principles of coordination of national regional aids 
80. The principles of coordination applicable as of 1 January 1972 to regional aids 
granted by Member States in the central regions of the Community as originally 
constituted and the technical work undertaken in 1972 with a view to implementing 
these principles were described in the First and Second Reports on Competition 
Policy respectively. 1 
As a follow-up to the preparatory administrative work begun in 1972 in conjunction 
with each of the new Member States, the Commission organized in 1973 several 
multilateral meetings of national experts designed to provide a better understanding 
of the regional aid systems in those countries. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees. 143 to 153, Second Report, secs. 82c87. 
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At the same time, the Council examined the Commission's proposal for a 
regulation based on Article 94, the aim of which was to establish a supervisory 
procedure for the application of the coordination principles in the central regions 
of the Community.l Although there was a general consensus of opinion within the 
Council Working Party concerned in favour of this proposal, the Council has not 
yet adopted the regulation. 
81. The problem of the designation of the central regions in the enlarged 
Community dominated the Commission's activities as regards the coordination of 
regional aids in 1973. The aim was the application of Article 154 of the Act of 
Accession, which stipulates that the coordination principles, being part of what 
the Community has already achieved, shall apply to the new Member States by 
1 July 1973 at the latest. A six-month postponement was designed to permit the 
texts relating to the coordination principles to be supplemented (Commission 
Communication and Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council).2 
Following the preparatory administrative work conducted bilaterally with each of 
the Member States, the Commission organized in May 1973 a multilateral meeting 
of the senior officials responsible for state aids within the government departments 
in order to ascertain the views of the Member States on the rules and conditions for 
implementing the principles in the three new Member States and, more particularly. 
on the designation of the 'central regions' and 'peripheral regions' in those States. 
At this meeting no agreement was reached on either of the solutions envisaged and 
despite the numerous political contacts made after the meeting it became clear 
that - in contrast with the situation in 1971, when the coordination principles 
had been adopted - no general agreement was to be found. 
82. Under these conditions and in view of the deadline of 1 July 1973 prescribed 
by Article 154 of the Act of Accession, the Commission decided to supplement the 
coordination principles for the general regional aid systems dealt with in its 
Communication to the Council of 23 June 1971B and in the Resolution of the 
Member States of 20 October 1971.' In accordance with the procedure followed in 
1971, this new decision ofthe Commission was notified to the Council on 28 June1973, 
who began to examine it immediately. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec 85. 
I Ibid, sec. 88. 
a OJ C 111 of 4.11.1971, pp. 7-13. 
S OJ C 111 of 4.11.1971, pp. 1-6. 
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Basically, the decision deals with two main points: 
(a) In the three new Member States the 'central regions' where the coordination 
principles have been applied since 1. July 1973 are the following: 
(i) In Denmark, the central regions include. the entire territory, with'the 
exception of Greenland, the islands of Bornholm, Ar0, Sams0 and 
Langeland, and also the special development area in northern Denmark .. 
The territories not included amongst the central areas are designated 
peripheral regions. At a later stage the Faroes will also be considered as 
peripheral regions. 
(ii) In Ireland there are no central regions since the entire territory has been 
designated a peripheral region. 
(iii) In the United Kingdom the central regions are that part of the country 
not receiving aid and those referred to as intermediate areas. The other 
areas in the United Kingdom will be classified at a later date, when aids 
will be coordinated throughout the enlarged Community. 
(b) In order to ensure equal treatment for all Member States as regards the, 
coordination principles; the Commission will, on the basis of these principles, 
adopt not later than 31 December 1974 a coordination procedure applicable to 
all the regions in the enlarged Community. This procedure may include a fresh 
classification involving several categories of regions to which different ceilings 
of intensity would be applicable. In any case, this new approach will take 
account of the problems peculiar to each of the peripheral regions. 
83 .. When the ComulUnication was being discussed by the Council, the Member 
States asked the Commission to submit a proposal permhting them to adopt, in the 
near future, before any precise details are decided concerning the new coordination 
principles announced by the Commission for the end of 1974, a resolution stressing 
their commitment to comply with the coordination principles for regional aids over 
the whole territory of the enlarged Community as of that date. 
To this end, the Commission, after consulting national experts on aids, sketched the 
major guidelines on which the work of laying down not later than 31 December 1974 
coordination principles applicable to all regions in the enlarged Community, which 
the Commission has undertaken in· close collaboration with the national 
administrations, will be based. 
These guidelines, which were dealt with in a further C9mmission' Communication 
to the Council on 28 November 1973, are the following: 
(a) The coordination. principles applicable to all regions in the Community will en~er 
. into force on 1 January 1975. 
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(b) Regional aids will be coordinated in accordance with the principles set out in the 
1971 Resolution for the various categories of regions yet to be decided and the 
coordination arrangements will include, in particular: 
(i) the imposition of ceilings on regional aids throughout the Community, 
account being taken of the problems existing in the various regions; 
(ii) detailed rrues for measuring regional aids throughout the Community. 
(c) Pending the implementation of the coordination principles applicable to all 
regions in the Community, no new opaque aids will be introduced and any 
renewal or modification of existing aid systems will be used as an opportunity 
to make them effectively transparent. 
In the Communication to the Council, the Commission further expressed the wish 
that the Member States should adopt a resolution underlining their approval of the 
guidelines summarized above. 
At its session of 3 and 4 December 1973, the Council discussed this matter for the 
first time. The Commission decided to embark in January 1974 on the initial 
technical work necessary for the formruation of a new solution to the matter of 
coordination. This work will be continued in conjunction with national experts, 
so as to ensure that the coordination principles applicable to all regions in the 
Community enter into force on 1 January 1975. 
Commission comments on specific systems C 
84. Pursuant to Article 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty and the abovementioned 
coordination principles, the Commission expressed its views on a number of regional 
aid systems. 
Special British aid scheme 
in favour of the transfer of service industry undertakings 
to Assisted Areas 
85. In June 1973, for the first time since the enlargement of the Community, 
the United Kingdom Government informed the Commission, pursuant to 
Article 93 (3), that it was considering setting up a spe~iaLaid scheme intended to 
encourage the relocation of service industry undertakings in regional-aid areas. 
This scheme is planned under Section 7 of the Industry Act, as 'regional selective 
assistance' . 
The aid scheme-assistance with the costs incurred in relocating the undertakings 
and office rent relief grants-is designed to enable aCgreater proportion of service 
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industry undertakings to set up in the Assisted Areas. The United Kingdom 
Government feels that aids already granted in these regions, which have been of most 
help to the development of the manufacturing sector, have not contributed suf-
ficiently to the creation of a balanced economic structure. The new aid scheme is 
therefore intended to reinforce measures-so far concerned mainly with industrial 
development-to assist these areas. 
In view of the complementary nature of the aids as compared with the regional aids 
provided for in the Industry Act, the Commission decided not to oppose the 
introduction of the scheme. However, it has reserved the right to make a final 
pronouncement after examining those aids from the angle of aid transparency, 
geographical scope, etc. 
New French regional development aid system 
86. The French Government submitted to the Commission1 in draft form the 
modifications which it intended to make-backdated to 1 January 1972-to the 
geographical scope of tax concessions in favour of regional development. These 
modifications are complementary to the new regional grant system instituted in 
France in April 1972, with regard to which the Commission initiated, in June 1972, 
the procedure of Article 93 (2). The institution of the new grant system made the 
modifications necessary, for the geographical scope of the tax concessions required 
adaptation since part of these tax areas has always coincided with the areas in 
which the grants are conferred. 
The Commission considered that the modifications could not be assessed separately 
from the final ruling which it would be making with regard to the areas in which 
the grants may be paid. It also noted that the regional justifications for the tax 
areas which did not coincide with the grant areas had not been provided. For 
these two reasons, it decided to extend to the modifications of the geographical 
scope for the tax concessions, the procedure referred to in Article 93 (2), 
initiated with regard to the new grant system. 
Meanwhile, the French authorities have .forwarded to the Commission the 
statistical information required to assess the regional justifications-for the aid areas, 
and details of the modifications which they propose to make-as from 1 Ji.dy 1973..:... 
to the regional development aid system: -
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 91. 
REP. COMPo 1973-
80 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
Investment grants in the German coalmining regions 
87. In pursuance of the second subparagraph of Article 93 (2), the Commission 
may, when a Member State does not comply with the decision to abolish or alter aid, 
refer the matter directly to the Court of Justice. The Commission used this power 
for the first time in respect of the system of investment grants in the German 
coalmining regions, taking the view that the Federal Republic of Germany had not 
complied with the Commission decision of 17 February 1971 enjoining it to put an 
immediate end to blanket investment grants in the mining regions of North Rhine 
Westphalia. 1 
The Commission took the view that the decision applied, in the areas in which 
-according to objective criteria subsequently agreed with the German authorities-
aid was no longer justified, to grant applications pending, where such applications 
concerned investments to be made after 20 August 1970 or where they had been 
filed after that date with the German award authority. In fixing the date of 
20 August 1970, i.e., six days after the publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities of the notification informing interested third parties of the 
incompatibility of the aid system, the Commission had intended to respect the 
legitimate interests of such third parties, who, before the pUblication, could not 
have been aware that the system conflicted with the Commission's findings. 
The German authorities, for their part, had felt entitled to process all outstanding 
applications without distinction, as long as the investments had been begun or the 
applications submitted before the decision of the Commissicm. 
In the action brought before the Court of Justice (case 70/72), the Commission' 
therefore asked the Court: 
- to declare that the Federal Republic of Germany had failed to comply with the 
Commission Decision of 17 February 1971, 
- to order the Federal Republic of Germany to require repayment of grants paid 
in error. 
88. By its judgment of 12 July 1973,2 the Court dismissed the action on the 
following grounds: 
Even if the extension of the system of aid had been notified to the Commission 
belatedly by the German Government, the application of the system was still. 
equivalent to that of an existing system of aid, given that the Commission had been 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 155, and Second Report, sec. 89. 
I OJ C 93 of 8.11.1973. 
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slow in initiating the procedure of -Article 93 (2):. Therefore,the£oIIl11}issi6rt w~ 
not justified in laying down provisional measures aimed at suspending application 
of the system, but could only decide whether the system of aid was to be abolished 
or altered within a specified period. ' . 
Now, for lack of adequate instructions in the Decision as to the definitioniof the 
areas in which the maintenance of investment aid could be considered compatible 
with the Common Market, the nature of the obligation imposed on the German 
Government by this Decision remained undetermined until 16 December 1971, 
when, as a result of work accomplished in common with the representatives of the 
German Government, the Commission was able to indicate to the latter what 
could henceforth be the territorial scope of the aid cOhcerned. In view of the 
uncertainty which thus· prevailed between the date of publication of' the Com-
mission's Decision and that on .which it could actually be applied, the Federal 
Republic of Germany could therefore not be reproached for taking into account.the 
legitimate interests of the investors operating within the areas which were eventually 
to be excluded from the benefit of the aid in question. 
In this connection, the Court emphasized that the publication in the Official Journal 
of the notification by which the Commission informed interested third par'tje~ that 
it had initiated the procedure of ArtiCle 93 (2) with' regard to the aid in question 
in view of its presumed incompatibility, could not-given the purpose of the notifica-
tion, which was aimed at eliCitirig remarks form these interested parties, and of 
its excessively summary character-have an effect on the rights of' individual 
cases and that consequently the date on which this notification could have been 
known to the interested parties (i.e. according to the Commission, 20 August lino) 
did not end the legimate interest which they will have in receiving the aid. I 
89. The Court dismissed the argument put forward by the F~deral ;Republic oJ 
Germany that the Commission's ac~ion was not admissible because the decision 
of 17 February 1971 did not stipulate a specific period of time, as required by the 
first subparagraph of Article 93(2); but requested that the ~id system <;h~rienged 
be terminated withQut delay. 
The Court confirmed that the Commission, in deciding that art aid: system shotud 
be abolished or altered, was entitled to require, in order that . this' ab~litiori; or 
alteration have a practical effect, .tl;mt the Memb~r State concerneq. should procee9. 
to recover the aid granted in v,iolation of the Trea~y; the aim of this ruling wasAf} 
ensure the effective elimination of failures on the part of the Member States to 
comply with the law and of the past or future consequences of such inactiol!~ .... Str!~~ 
the Commission lost this particular action, the Court's ruling,had, of course,jno 
practical implications in the case at isSU:~~" .. , .'.~ .. . .. '" ': :: ' "',:; . 
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§ 3 Aid systems for specific industries or sectors 
Ship building 1 
90. The second Council Directive! on shipbuilding aids provided that the Com-
mission would examine the various aspects of the imbalance between supply and 
demand on the shipbuilding market and all State aid and intervention directly or 
indirectly affecting the conditions of competition and trade in this field. Using 
the results of the study, the Commission was to endeavour to provide solutions 
to the overcapacity problem which might arise and to the aids problem, by submitting 
to the Council proposals for action to prevent supply developing in such a way as 
to jeopardize the desired balance, and a new draft directive coordinating in the 
common interest all aid and intervention to shipbuilding and ship conversions; 
The Council was in theory to act upon these proposals by 31 December 1973 at the 
latest, the date on which the second Directive was to lapse. 
91. The study made by the Commission, in collaboration with the national 
experts of the nine Member States and in liaison with OECD, showed that world 
shipbuilding capacity could well exceed, in the middle of the present decade, the 
expected growth of requirements, and points to a risk of excess capacity for the 
end of this period. It is unlikely that the currently full order books of the shipyards 
will be maintained, given that foreseeable requirements for sea transport are devel-
oping at a slower pace and are likely to be met without delay. The difficulties 
which would arise from such a situation would particularly affect Community 
shipbuilding, since the Community'S restructuring drive is not yet completed and 
its competitive capacity remains generally below that of some of its competitors. 
92. An industrial policy for European shipbuilding must therefore aim to close 
this gap in order to make the industry competitive on a world-wide basis within a 
maximum period of four years so that it can, in the best conditions, face the situation· 
of surplus capacity that can be foreseen. The Commission's shipbuilding proposals 
sent to the Council at the end of October 1973 are directed towards attaining this 
objective through a policy of restructuring and of investment coordinated at 
Community level. 
This policy would be based essentially upon support for investments in the Com~ 
munity shipyards with a view to boosting investment during the 1974-77 period, 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sees. 94 to 96. 
2 OJ L 169 of 27.7.1972, p. 28. 
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given that after this period, with the risk of excess capacity, action taken could come 
too late. The policy advocated would comprise both reconversion measures and 
social measures, including the intervention· of the Social Fund, since it is by n:o 
means certain that some shipyards will, in future yeats, not have chahged their 
activities because the cost of. maintaining operations has already or is likely to 
become prohibitive. In addition, the policy will be supported by a research and 
development programme, necessitated, inter izlia, by the defiCiencies of· the small-
and medium-scale shipyards in this respect. Equally, these shipyards should 
be urged to collaborate in market research, so as to enable "them to adjust their 
production better to dem~nd and to increase their outlets. 
93. In general, this approach is designed to substitute for the aids given so far 
to shipyard production incentives that will eventually render their structures 
competitive without any State support, This approach, underlying the two 
previous Council Directives concerning aid to shipbuilding, constitutes the main 
feature of the draft third Directive, which has been submitted by the Commission 
to the Council. This draft document makes the following provisions for the period 
1974-1977: 
Direct aids and intervention 
94. The reduction in direct aids to production, i.e., those bearing a direct relation 
to the price of ships, would be pursued in accordance, moreover, with the guidelines 
of the OECD General Arrangements, which provide for the complete termination, 
by 1 November 1975, of aids liable to distort competition in the industry. 
The second Directive fixed the ceiling of direct aid at 5% of the contractual price 
in 1972 and at 4% in 1973. Since this Directive allowed for a number of exemptions 
to these ceilings and since, in several new Member States, the level of aids was 
relatively high, it was proposed that the new ceilings should be fixed at 5% in 1974 
and 4% in 1975, on the understanding that the new ceilings will now include some 
aids which had not been included in the ceiling fixed by the previous directives. 
Furthermore, a more detailed method for assessing the aids has been formulated, 
and this will enable compliance with the ceilings to be verified more accurately. 
The Directive, whose duration would be fixed at four years, does not lay down a 
specific ceiling for 1976 and 1977; it is, nevertheless, agreed that the rate of decline 
must be at least one point per year: the OECD general arrangement provides for 
the complete abolition of direct aids by the end of 1975, when the res,iIUs obtained 
under this arrangement should be examined. , , 
REP, COMPo 1973" 
84 'COMPETlTION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
Aids for the. sale of shiPIi 
95. As regards credits granted for the sale of ships, the Second Directive made 
reference to the OECD agreement (most favourable rate 7.5%, payment on account 
20%, maximum duration 8 years) and in fact it thus confined itself to harmonizing 
the conditions for obtaining one of the factors of production, in this case, credit, 
but not the aids themselves: the latter consist of the difference between the normal 
cost of borrowing capital, which can vary from State to State, and the rate of 
preferential creditgrante'd. The 7.5% rate would thus give a varying degree of 
assistance depending on the Member State. A ceiling should therefore be fixed for 
these aids. The maximum subsidy which the shipbuilder may receive when a ship is 
sold will be restricted to five percentage points in relation to the normal cost of 
borrowing. The Commission arid the Member States will endeavour to have this 
limitation adopted within the OECD .. 
Investment aids 
96. While it considers that for the reasons given above, investment in the ship-
yards of the Community should be facilitated, the Commission is of the opinion that 
the efficiency of aids conferred for this purpose must be increased, by granting 
them only after examination of the objectives relating to areas and industries 
concerned that are to be attained and of the results which may be expected in terms 
of increased competitiveness of the shipyards qualifying. To this end, the draft 
directive provides that prior notification of plans for investment aid and intervention 
exceeding four million u.a. will have to be given to the Commission for multilateral 
examination. 
En1ergency n1easures 
97. Any emergency measures taken by Member States in the form of aids or 
interventions aimed at safeguarding the continued operations of an undertaking 
or the employment it provides will be taken only when they are justified by the need 
for avoiding acute social difficulties and in so far as they enable the competitive 
position of the undertaking receiving assistance to be restored within a reasonable 
period of time. 
The draft third Directive thus covers ali direct and indirect ;tids which Community 
shipyards may receive. .... 
When these proposals were' examined by the Council, it was, however, found that 
the problems dealt with in the Commission's proposals were too important and too 
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wide in scope to be dealt with by the Council before the end of the year. Adoptinga 
proposal from the Commission to this effect, the Council therefore decided to 
e~tend the durati~n of the Second Directive until 30 June 1974; this will enable the 
Council to carry out a thorough examination of the new proposed aids Directive 
and of the guidelines for an industrial policy for shipbuilding submitted at the same 
time. 
Italy 
98. The Italian Government has notified the Commission of a new draft law on 
shipbuilding aids covering a period of 5 years (1972-1976). The aim of the law 
is to continue reorganization and rationalization initiated under the previous law 
(Law No 19 of 4 January 1968, which expired at the end of 1971), in order to bring 
about progressively a situation in which Italian shipbuilding will be competitive 
without subsidy. The draft law provides for direct aids for the construction 
and repair of ships and in favour of investments made in these sectors, and for the 
construction of marine engines. 
Direct aids to shipbuilding will be degressive and will amount to 9% of the prices 
fixed in the contracts concluded in 1972, falling to 4% in 1976. For the conversion 
and repair of ships, aid will be fixed at 7% of the work undertaken in 1972 and will 
be lowered to 5% in 1976. 
Investment aids will be granted on condition that the investments qualifying come 
within the plan for reorganizing shipbuilding. They will amount to 10% of the 
investments for shipbuilding proper and for the conversion and repair of ships. 
They will be 6% for the setting up of establishments for the construction of marine 
engines. 
The reorganization and rationalization programme, whose implementation will 
be facilitated by the new system of aid, includes the following: coordination of 
production and management activities in the shipyards; an effort to increase 
specialization and structural adaptation within the Fincantieri groups; reduction 
of the number of production lines; modernization of certain shipyards. 
Not wishing to encroach on the arrangements to be agreed by the Council under the 
third shipbuilding aids Directive, the Commission has commented on the Italian 
draft law only for the period covered by the second Directive. Within these limits, 
the Commission has made no objection, provided aids are not granted: 
(i) for the construction of nautical training or scientific research ships, 
(ii) for the conversion of ships other than metal-hulled, seagoing vessels with a 
gross registered tonnage of at least 5 000 tons .. 
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France 
99. Article 5 of the Council Directive of 20 July 1972 concerning shipbuilding 
aids requires Member States to refrain from any discriminatory practice calculated 
to favour, within their national territories, the building or conversion of ships or the 
manufacture of products intended to form part of such ships. 
France applies an insurance scheme against exceptional cost increases resulting from 
changes in raw materials prices or in wage levels, by virtue of which French shipyards 
receive compensation equivalent to the cost increases occurring during the building 
of ships from the time when the order was placed to completion, whenever these 
increases exceed a certain level. This system, which, following the intervention 
of the Commission, applies only to the sale of ships in France and in outside countries 
excluding sales to other Member States, is financed, for the greater part, by a 
financial contribution from the State which is added to the insurance premiums 
paid by French shipbuilders. 
The basis for calculating the guaranteed price payments is the selling price of the 
ship, but from the latter is deducted the amount for the incorporated items imported 
from abroad. This practice prevents, or makes more difficult, the use of imports 
(marine engines and various fittings) from other Member States by the French 
shipyards and encourages them to give preference to national products at the risk 
of losing part of the benefit of the guarantee. 
Consequently, the Commission initiated against France the procedure provided for 
in Article 196 for infringements of Article 5 of the Directive of 20 July 1972. In 
submitting its observations under the procedure, the French Government expressed 
its intention to terminate this discrimination. 
The Textile Industry 
100. In July 1971, the Commission submitted to the Member States a Communica-
tion! on the coordination of State aids to the textile industry. This contained a 
number of criteria intended as guidelines for the Member States as regards these 
aids. Practical experience has brought to light the wide diversity of State aid 
arrangements used by the Member States for this purpose and the difficulty of 
assessing and comparing the ways in which the systems are actually applied. The 
Commission has consolidated and supplemented its 1971 initiative and in 1973 
informed the Member States that it had decided to introduce the following ar-
rangements: 
(1) Any specific assistance for the textile industry (special terms or conditions 
concerning the granting of aids, aids granted under agreements between the 
First Report on Competition Policy. sec. 172. 
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industry and the central authority) included by Member States in aid schemes 
which are otherwise not specific to the industry (general aids, regional aids) will 
be submitted in advance to the Commission for vetting from the 'sectoral' 
angle; 
(2) A bilateral or even multilateral consultation procedure will be organized by the 
Commission to consider all complaints with evidence received from the national 
Governments against aids granted to textile firms which are liable to have a 
serious effect on trade and competition; in this connection, no distinction will 
be made between aids granted specifically for the textile industry and aid 
arrangements of a wider scope. 
(3rA catalogue of aids granted to the textile industry will be up-dated each year; 
. . 
a statistical analysis will indicate, for each year, all the investment schemes 
which have been assisted and all the aids which have been granted to such 
schemes, regardless of the arrangements under which the aids have been granted; 
the analysis will be broken down according to the various branches of the 
industry. 
101. In addition, the Commission continued to implement the principles it set out 
in the Communication of July 1971, commenting on certain Italian aids. 
During the Parliamentary procedure for the adoption of Italian Law No 1101 on 
the restructuring, reorganization and conversion of the textile industry, a new 
provision for aid to textile and garment firms was introduced without prior noti-
fication to the Commission. 1 This provision consisted of a temporary (three years) 
and partial (rate reduced from 15 to 10%) reduction in payments chargeable to 
firms in respect of their employees' family allowances. According to the Italian 
authorities, the measure would reduce the costs borne by the firms concerned by 
almost 31 thousand million lire, in other words about 0.8% of their turnover. 
On completion of the proceedings which it initiated in respect of this provision 
under Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission adopted a Decision on 
25 July 19732 calling upon Italy to cancel these tax reliefs in respect of welfare 
payments. The Commission Decision was taken on the basis of the following 
considerations. 
Because of the implications of the aids and the fact that they have a direct effect 
on the costs of the firms receiving the aids, they may have a substantial effect on 
trade and competition within the Community in an industry in which trade is on 
large scale and competition is keen and which, throughout the Community, IS 
facing difficulties as regards adaptation to new conditions. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 98 (b). 
I OJ L 254 of 11.9.1973, p.14. 
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Furthermore, these aids, which were granted in'the form of tax relief in respect of 
welfare payments constitute operating aids of a 'conservatory' nature which are 
noUntended to facilitate the 'development' (within the meaning of Article 92 (3,c) 
of the EEC Treaty) of the undertakings receiving the aids, since they would· not 
encourage undertakings which have problems of a structural nature to carry out 
the changes which must be made if their problems are to be solved. Moreover, 
this tax relief was granted as a blanket concession to the whole of the textile industry 
and no distinction was made between firms which have problems of a structural 
nature and firms which have no such problems and, therefore, should not qualify. 
Moreover the Commission felt that it was impossible to accept the argument put 
forward by the Italian authorities that the tax reliefs in question were justified by 
the burden of welfare payments borne by these firms, which is heavier in Italy 
than in the other Member States. The fact that the general factors affecting firms' 
operations often vary from one Member State to another is no justification for 
isolating one particular factor (welfare costs, for example), and compensating, by 
means of aids, for the additional costs which this factor imposes on firms in one 
Member State in comparison with their competitors in the other Member States. 
This situation could well be quite the reverse in respect of other factors. 
Aid systems financed by para-fiscal charges 
102. The Commission's attitude as regards aid systems financed by para-fiscal 
charges was set out in the first' and Second2 Reports on Competition Policy. In 
1973, the Commission gave practical expression to its views, as a result of new 
developments concerning two French aid systems. 
103. As regards 'occupational technical centres' in France which assist the clock 
and watch and leather and hide trades,3 the Commission, in a Decision4 taken on 
completion of the procedure provided for under Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty, 
advised the French Government that the para-fiscal charge used to finance these 
centres should no longer be levied on items imported from the other Member States 
of the Community. 
The Commission' considers that these centres are in fact providing State aids to 
the industries they are serving. As their main aim and effect is to promote technical 
1 Sees. lSI to IS3. 
I Sees. lOS to 111. 
8 Second Report on Competition Policy. sec. 109. 
A OJ L 14 of 17 January 1974. 
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progress in these industries, -they help to improve productivity and the quality of 
production' of the firms, and relieve. them (particulary in the caseoL firms which 
are not in a position to carry out research work themselves) of expenditure which 
would normally be part of their costs. 
The fact that 'firms in th~ other Member States are free to' avail themselves of the 
services provided by the centres without discrimination, and that the centres 
publish the results of their research work, does not alter the Commission's assess-
menU Even if equal treatment is established on paper, the fact remains that in 
practice these centres base their own research work on the special features and 
specific needs of French industry and, because they are near at hand, it is easier 
for French firms to have them carry out the research work which they require. 
Furthermore, firms in the other Member States often undertake identical research 
work either directly or by making financial contributions to similar research centres 
in these Member States and, therefore, do not need to avail themselves of the ser-
vices of the French centres. The criteria of Article 92 (1) of the EEC Treaty are 
met therefore in the case of these aids. 
However, in view of the limited sums allocated to this French scheme, of the fact 
that the centres help small and medium-sized firms (most larger firms more often 
than not have adequate research facilities of their own), and of the fact that the 
Commission is usually favourably disposed towards aids which facilitate industrial 
development by improving technical progress, the aid system qualifies for excep-
tional treatment under Article 92 (3, c) of the EEC Treaty, as aids to facilitate the 
development of certain activities, as long as they do not 'adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest'. The last condition can 
only be considered to be fulfilled, however, if products imported from other Member 
States are no longer subject to the para-fiscal charge which partly finances the 
technical centres in question. 
104. In December 1972 the Commission took a Decision2 regarding French aids 
to paper-making and reafforestation activities which were financed by a special 
charge on paper and board. 
Pursuant to this Decision: 
(a) the French Government must not resume payment of premiums for the produc-
tion of paper pulp, since, as they are operating aids, these aids do not qualify 
as one of the exceptions provided for in the Treaty; 
1 This attitude was confirmed by the Court of Justice, as regards the Institut textile de France, 
in Judgment 47/69 concerning the French aid system, mentioned above, designed to promote 
the restructuring of the textile industry. 
t Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. Ill. 
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(b) while aids to paper research and the reduction of pollution and 'nuisances' 
though liable to affect trade and competition within the Community, can .. 
nevertheless, be regarded as likely to facilitate the development of the industry 
concerned without adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary 
to the common interest, they cannot be financed by means of a para-fiscal charge 
on paper and board imported from other Member States. 
In accordance with this Decision, the French Government confirmed that it would 
no longer pay premiums for the production of paperpulp. 
It also reduced the rate of the para-fiscal charge on paper and cardboard from 0.70% 
to 0.30% on products imported from other Member States. The 0.40% reduction 
represented the part of the levy which served to finance aids to paper research and 
to the reduction of pollution in the paper industry; the Commission took the view 
that levying this part of the charge on imported products was liable to aggravate 
unnecessarily the impact of the aid on competition and trade within the Com-
munity. The remainder of the charge, which will be levied at the rate of 0.30% 
on products imported from other Member States, represented the part of the charge 
which financed aid to forest and reafforestation research and, as the link between 
the products on which the charge was levied and the products for which aid was 
granted was very indirect, the Commission felt that this type of financing did not 
have an aggravating effect, and that aids granted in this area should not be con-
sidered as adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest. 
Oil refining 
105. In response to the Commission's policy of examining in advance general aid 
schemes to be implemented by the Member States,l the Belgian Government sub-
mitted a draft law aimed at granting aids to certain investment projects in the 
oil-refining industry. The aids in question are provided for by the Belgian Law 
of 17 July 1959 encouraging economic growth and the creation of new industries. 
The operations in question would involve extending an existing refinery in Antwerp 
and creating a new refinery in Kallo (in the province of East Flanders). In view 
of their scale, these investment projects, which are to be carried out by two large 
oil groups, would considerably increase refining capacity in Belgium with effect 
from 1976 and 1977. . There would be an interest rebate of 2% for three years 
1 Point 112 of this Report. 
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on 50% of the value of the investments and certain tax advantages (three-year 
exemption from the 'precompte immobilier' (tax paid in advance on income from 
fixed assets).) 
106. In October 1972 the Commission initiated the proceedings provided for under 
Article 93 (2) in connection with these aids, because of the following considerations: 
(a) Neither the locations nor the operations involved were of a type normally 
justifying support. The investments concerned were outside the regions and 
areas for which the Commission, in its Decision of 26 April 1972 concerning the 
Belgian Law on economic growth! of 30 December 1970, had agreed that the 
social and economic situation justified regional aids. The refining industry 
in Belgium does not have any special structural problems or problems concerning 
its own capacity for growth; production capacities exceed domestic needs, and 
this difference is likely, according to reasonable forecasts, to increase. 
(b) In the context of the oil-refining industry, the aids in question seemed liable 
to affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. 
Surpluses, however small, on the market in oil products tend to force prices 
down sharply and could well, therefore, jeopardize the equilibrium of the 
Community's refining industry, in which idle capacity is particularly unwelcome, 
this being an industry in which the variable cost factor is a small proportion of 
total costs. 
107. In the observations made as part of the procedure, most of the Member States 
endorsed the Commission's own reservations, and on 11 September 19732 the 
Commission closed the procedure by adopting a Decision ordering the Belgian 
Government not to grant the aids in question, as there was no specific need for 
them and they were contrary to the common interest. 
In taking this attitude, the Commission felt that it could not accept a proposal, 
submitted by the Belgian Government during the proceedings provided for under 
Article 93 (2), to retain only the part of the proposed aids which would cover the 
investments in the two refineries intended for combating pollution. 
The Commission takes the view that the Member States should endeavour to attain 
the aims of environmental protection not by means of a generalized aid policy but 
by making polluters defray, in various ways, the cost of eliminating the pollution 
for which they are responsible. As a general rule, this principle can be waived for 
aids only if its full application could engender special difficulties in certain regions 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec.90. 
a OJ L 270 of 27.9.1973, p. 22. 
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or industries, or if the aids granted· allow firms to make necessary adjustments to 
existing investments. 
The preceding analysis of the situation in the refining industry in Belgium and a 
consideration of the regions or areas in which the two refineries are to be located 
indicate no such difficulties. Furthermore, as they are new investments, it falls 
to the developer to take full responsibility for the cost of the installations in such 
a way as to allow the plant to be operated without jeopardizing the environmental 
objectives which the Belgian Government considers should be attained in this 
field. 
A ids to steel-using firms located in Northern Ireland 
108. The United Kingdom Government notified the Commission of a scheme 
to set up a system of temporary aids to steel-using manufacturing firms located in 
Northern Ireland. This scheme was based on the finding that, as a result of 
accession and the fact that British steel producers have adopted the ECSC pricing 
system, the supply conditions for steel products for manufacturing firms located 
in Northern Ireland have altered considerably. . . 
Before accession, the British Steel Corporation and the independent steel producers 
charged all British purchasers of steel identical delivered prices, regardless of their 
location, and therefore shared out aggregated freighting costs equally among 
customers. Since 30 April 1973, in accordance with Article 60 of ECSC Treaty, 
the schedules used by British producers have been based on prices ex-basing point, 
these points usually being steel production centres and the freighting costs from 
the points being covered individually by each consumer. The result has been a 
new, unequal, pattern of freighting costs, which, although it has improved the 
supply conditions for some consumers, has had the opposite effect for consumers 
operating in more remote locations. 
Other regions in Britain have been affected by the increases in the delivered price 
of steel, but Northern Ireland (where there is no basing point and where the price 
of all steel used includes an additional charge for the cost of sea transport from 
Great Britain) has been particularly affected at a time when its regional, economic 
and social problems are being aggravated even more by political problems. 
109. The adaptation difficulties which might face manufacturing. firms whose 
activities are based on the processing or utilization of steel might well threaten 
their very existence and aggravate even more the present situation. For this 
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reason the United Kingdom Government proposed to pay these consumers a 'steel 
freight equalization grant' in accordance with the following procedures: 
(a) Manufacturing firms in Northern Ireland will receive a griult calcuiated on the 
basis of their purchases of steel; this grant, which will not vary according to the 
origin oi the supply, will be paid for three years on a descending scale of£ 3.50 
per metric ton of steel for the first· year, £ 3.25 for the second and £ 3.00 for 
the third; £ 3.50 per metric ton is the approximate cost of freight· between 
ports in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
(b) The grant will be payable in respect of all purchases of steel originating in the 
ECSC, regardless of whether they are British or not; it will not be payabl~ for 
the supply of a number of products whose price has not been affected by tbe 
change in steel price scales (rails, tin-plate and ship-plate). 
(c) The total amount of budget appropriations to cover the three-year scheme 
should not exceed £ 650 000, which represents purchases of about 200000 
metric tons of steel products by firms in Northern Ireland. 
110. The Commission took the view that, despite the type of financial support 
granted to steel processors or consumers and the fact that it is a grant intended to 
reduce the delivered price of one of their basic materials, it was not an operating 
aid as such. As it will apply for a limited period (three years) at a degressive rate, 
this suggests that the objective of the aid is to give a respite to the firms concerned 
in order to allow them to adapt themselves to the new operating conditions with 
which they have been confronted as a result of the. changes in price scales for steel 
in the United Kingdom; the aid is indeed such as to encourage these firms to make 
structural changes. 
In view of the very special economic, social and political situation in Northern 
Ireland and in view of the fact that the aid is temporary and will be applied at a 
degressive rate, the Commission did not oppose payment of the grants for a period 
of three years. However, the Commission made it clear .~o the United Kingdom 
Government that the grant can be paid only to manufacturing firms' which were 
already openlti~g in Northern Ireland on 30 April 1973 ~hen the price' scales .'for 
British steel producers were brought into line with the rules of the ECSC Trea{y. 
This grant may be considered to be compatible with the Common Market only in 
so far as it allows firms to adapt themselves to a sudden change in the conditions 
affecting their operations. The effect attained would go furth~rthan the objeCtive 
set if the grant were to be paid to new firms. . . '.' , '. 
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§ 4 - Aids to exports 
111. Following the initiation by the Commission of the procedure provided for in 
Article 93 (2) of the EEC Treaty against the system of tax concessions designed to 
help French firms set up establishments abroad,l the French authorities adopted 
a law-within the framework of the amending Financial Law for 1972 No 72-1147 
of 23 December 1972, Article 6 (5)-repealing the relevant clauses. However, this 
action did not entail the immediate abolition of all the tax concessions challenged. 
It was decided that the replacement of the concessions by a system which is neutral 
from the point of view of competition and compatible with the right-of-
establishment rules would not come into force until 1 April 1973 and that the old 
arrangements would continue to apply to establishments and offices set up 
abroad before that date. 
On 25 July 1973, the Commission therefore adopted a decision2 prohibiting the 
system. This Decision, based both on the Community's right-of-establishment rules, 
which forbid the Member States to provide aid to help their nationals to settle in 
other Member States, and on those concerning aids, requires the French Republic to 
adopt the necessary measures to withdraw the tax concessions forthwith. 
§ 5 - Systems for providin~ ~eneral aid 
112. In its Second Report on Competition Policy3 the Commission gave its 
reasons for embarking on general action with regard to general aid systems which, 
being subject to the discretionary powers conferred on the competent national 
authorities and not being of a sectoral or regional nature, may be granted to 
undertakings whatever their location or the industry to which they belong. 
As part of this action, the Commission, while not seeking the abolition of the 
systems, would like the Member States to stop applying them save within the 
framework of programmes concerning particular industries or regions in line with 
the requirements as regards aid 'specificity' provided for in the Treaty, the 
programme to be notified to the Commission in advance. Should certain Member 
States feel that they could not break down their general aid systems into 'sectoral' 
and regional aid systems, another solution could be employed whereby all sig-
nificant cases of implementation of the aids are submitted to the Commission in 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy. sec. 113. 
I OJ L 253 of 10.9.1973. 
3 Sees. 116 to 119. 
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advance, such cases being defined with reference both to the size of the assisted 
investment and to the effect of the aids granted on the assisted investment. 
During 1973, there were a number of developments in connection with this policy. 
France: Economic and Social Development Fund 
113. Through the Economic and Social Development Fund-a special Treasury 
account whose resources are determined annually by the State budget-the French 
Government, by granting loans on preferential terms, encourages industrial 
investment for the conversion and adaptation .of industrial structures. Such 
loans are granted either to facilitate the achievement of the objectives set out in 
the modernization and equipment plans or to enable specific industrial moderniza-
tion projects to be implemented. The State therefore contributes towards col.;. 
lecting the resources necessary for projects which might not have been possible if 
the normal financial channels had been used. 
Loans from the Fund are granted on more favourable terms-from the pointof view 
of interest rates, duration, redemption rules and the security required-than those 
which undertakings could obtain either on the capital market or from credit 
institutions. The terms are as follows: 
- the duration of the Fund's loans is eight to twenty years (25 years in 
exceptional cases); 
- redemption may be deferred for 2 to 5 years, dependent on the case; 
- the interests rates, which also vary from time to time and are dependent on 
the industry concerned, are considerably lower than the interests rates 
generally in force for medium- and long-term credit. 
Such aid may be granted to assist industrial investments whatever the industry, 
and the Commission is therefore unable-either in respect of the system itself or of 
its application, of which it receives no prior notification-to assess the effects 
on competition and trade, although the budgetary appropriations involved 
annually in such loans amount to almost FF 800 million. 
114. The general position defined above led the Commission to initiate; at the 
end of 1972, the procedure provided for in Article 93 (2)1 against this aid system. 
The Commission asked the French Government to subject the application of the 
system to one or other of the control procedures (notification of programmes for 
specific industries or, failing this, of significant concrete cases). . 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy. sec. 119. 
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In response .to the Decision, the French Government advised the Commission 
that Fund loans granted as aids to specific industries to further structural reconver-
sion or readaptation operations would be granted in future only as part ,of 
programmes covering the entire industrial sector, and that such programmes woUld 
be communicated to the Commission, as provided in Article 93 (3), in advance. 
In view of this satisfactory commitment, the Commission decided, on 
20 June, to close the procedure of Article 93 (2) which it had initiated against the 
~id system. . 
Italy - Provision of supplementary funds to cover action under law No 1470 
115. The Italian Government notified the Commission of its draft law No 946, 
which increases by Lit 15 000 million the budgetary appropriations granted to the 
Instituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) for the grant of the aid provided for in 
law No 1470 of 18 December 1961 to industrial undertakings which are in dif-
ficulties and which, for this reason, are unable to obtain funds through the usual 
channels. 
LawNo 1470 provides that the IMI may-acting for the State-support the following 
operations: 
- investments made by small and medium-sized industrial undertakings which are 
in difficulties or which have suspended operations; 
- reopening of industrial undertakings or establishments which have suspended 
operations. 
The aids for these purposes are granted for a period of five years, at a rate of three 
per cent, with a ceiling of Lit 500 million for each individual case; the period of grace 
before redemption is also five years. 
116. The system has two features which might make it incompatible with the 
Common Market: 
(a) as a general system" it may be applied to any undertaking whatever its 
location or to whatever industry it belongs; the lack of a regional or sectoral 
'specificity' means that the Commission is unable to ascertain the effects on 
trade and competition· in the Community; 
(b) law No 1470 is designed to forestall liquidations of firms which have run into 
difficulties; while agreeing that the Member States should intervene under 
certain circumstances to help such undertakings, the Commission nevertheless 
considers that the aid granted should be used to contribute towards the 
realization, by the undertakings cOl1~erned, of adaptation programmes aimed at 
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eventually restoring their ability to compete; this is not the case as regards the 
aid provided for in law No 1470, which is concerned purely with keeping under-
takings in existence. 1 
117. The Commission did not take action earlier with regard to this aid system 
because the Italian Government had stated that it would discontinue the arrange-
ments once the budgetary appropriations allocated for that purpose had been 
exhausted. As draft law No 946 provides that further aid may be granted under 
law No 1470, the situation must now be viewed in a different light. This is why 
the Commission decided to initiate the procedure provided for' in Article 93 (2) 
against both draft law No 946 and law No 1470, and called upon the Italian 
Government: 
(a) to notify it, as provided for in Article 93 (3), of 'sectoral' or regiomil programmes 
which it will be establishing for the application of such aid, or, failing this, of 
significant specific cases where aid is ,granted to undertakings;", ' 
(b) to amend the laws or regulations governing the grant of the aids provided for in 
law No 1470 so that they will in future be granted only within the framework of 
suitable reorganization, modernization or conversion programmes designed .to 
ensure the rationalization of the industries or undertakings concerned. 
Netherlands - State guarantees for operations carried out 
by the Nationale Investeringsbank (NIB) 
118. The Bijzondere Financiering (BF) is an aid system whereby the Netherlands 
Government provides guarantees for financial transactions which the Nationale 
Investeringsbank would not otherwise undertake on account of the risks involved. 
The Nationale Investeringsbank (NIB) is a bank 50.3% of whose capital is 
controlled by the State, the rest being controlled by various financial institutions. 
The principal responsibility of the NIB is the medium- and long-term financing of 
investments made by undertakings, either by granting them credit directly or 
providing guarantees for credit put up by other financial institutions. 
A State guarantee may be given for such operations if they are in the interest of the 
economy as a whole, cannot be financed through any other channels, and entail 
undue risks for the NIB because: 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 184. 
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(a) the firms concerned dispose of insufficient resources of their own; 
(b) the nature of the operations of the firms concerned is unsuitable; 
(c) the NIB's involvement in the relevant industry is already excessive. 
It is, in fact, as if, apart from its banking operations proper, the NIB were 
managing, on behalf of the State, the grant of aid in the form of guarantees for 
economic development. Such State guarantees are given in connection with: 
(a) credit granted direct to undertakings by the NIB; 
(b) guarantees given by the NIB in connection with credit granted by other 
financial institutions (State counter-guarantees). 
Such State guarantees are granted within the framework either of 'sectoral' or 
regional programmes or in respect of specific programmes concerning a specific 
undertaking .. 
During the first 25 years of its life (1945-70), the NIB was covered by State 
guarantees in an amount of Fl560 million. On 31 December 1970 sums outstanding 
covered by State guarantees totalled Fl 340 million. In 1969 and 1970 State 
guarantees were provided covering sums loaned of FI 91 million and 
FI 43 million respectively. 
119. By guaranteeing NIB loans, the Netherlands Government in effect grants a 
form of official aid to those undertakings receiving support. Such guarantees 
constitute a benefit which enables the undertakings to make use of the normal 
banking channels in order to finance their investments, although the guarantees 
which they normally could provide would not suffice to enable them to borrow from 
the banks on such favourable terms, or would exclude them from banking channels 
altogether; a State guarantee very often enables an undertaking to obtain credit. 
The fact that the benefit represented by the guarantee is of a qualitative nature and 
cannot be quantified, save where a mishap entails actual disbursement of State 
funds under the guarantee, is no barrier to the application of Articles 92 et seq. 
Furthermore, this system of guarantees, based on the value to the overall economy 
of certain operations, may-subject to the discretionary powers conferred on the 
competent national authorities and without any prior control by the Com-
mission-be applied to operations involving the development, adaptation or 
reorganization of undertakings, whatever the industry. 
The Commission must therefore impose the same requirements as for the general 
aid systems instituted by other Member States. Such requirements are all the more 
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indispensable in this particular case since when the guarantees in question are 
provided in specific cases they often cover loans to undertakings which have run 
into difficulties and would otherwise have to go out of business. 
This is why the Commission initiated the procedure provided for in Article 93 (2) 
against the system. In this way it hopes. to elicit from the Ne~herlands 
Government an undertaking that it· would give the Commission prior notice, in 
accordance with Article 93 (3), of: pro~ammes for which it intends to provide 
the guarantees through the Bijzondere Financiering (BF), or, failing this, specific 
cases for benefiting given unde.rtakings. ' 
Luxembourg - Law lor the promotion 01 economic expansion 
120. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg notified the Commission of a dIaft law for 
the promotion of economic expansion to replace the. former general aid system. 
This draft law was aimed at promoting the creation, rationalization and conversion 
of undertakings through the grant of various forms of aid: 
(a) subsidies up to 15% of the cost of investments; 
(b) interest subsidies .reducing interest to be paid up to three percentage points; 
(c) tax exemption -for eight years for 25% of the profits of a new undertaking or of 
the profits accruing on a new product; 
(d) State guarantees provided in exceptional cases to cover a maximum of 40% of 
the expenditure financed by borrowing; 
(e) aid for the acquisition and development of land and buildings. 
None of these forms of aid excluded any of the others, except for the interest 
subsidies and ordinary subsidies, which cannot both be paid at the same time. 
121. The two objectives of the original draft law, which were not considered 
separately, were: 
(a) to ensure the expansion and structural improvement of Luxembourg's economy; 
(b) to promote a better geographical distribution of the economic activities of 
the country. 
No stated preference or priority was given to either of those objectives, as the aids 
provided for could be used, on the same terms, for investments coming under either 
head. 
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In fact, an analysis of the scheme revealed that it was oriented more towards the 
first objective-the expansion and structural improvement of the economy-and 
that, not being concerned with any particular industry or area, it thus constituted 
a general aid system which was applicable to any investments made in Luxembourg, 
whatever the area or industry concerned. The draft law of which the Com-
mission was notified gave rise to objections on this ground alone. But what is more, 
it was not in line with the 'aid transparency' requirement set out in the principles 
of coordination (if regional aids in the central regions. l 
122. This led the Government of the Grand Duchy to amend theclraft law and 
to provide for a number of implementing regulations for submission to the Com-
miSSIOn. In amending the draft, the Luxembourg Government made the necessary 
distinction between the fundamental objectives .. Furthermore, it undertook to 
apply the law in question, in the initial stage, purely as a 'framework' sectoral 
aid system, with significant cases being submitted to the Commission in advance. 
It also declared its willingness to defer the ·application of the law-as a form of 
regional intervention-until an implementing regulation had been drawn up 
providing sufficient regional 'specificity'; it made the necessary provisions to 
reduce the 'opacity' of the principal aids granted under the new system. Finally, 
the draft law provided that investments into existing undertakings to solve or 
forestall problems relating to pollution or the environment could also be assisted; 
the Luxembourg Government indicated that such aid would be granted only in 
exceptional cases and that an implementing regulation provided for the prior 
notification to the Commission of all cases of the grant of such aid. 
123. In view of the adjustments thus made to the original draft, the Commission 
decided to make no comment for the time being on the application of the regional 
aids in question until it had received the draft concerning their application, and 
not to oppose implementation in respect of specific industries, while reserving the 
right to rule on each significant case. As regards aids connected with environ-
mental problems, the Commission also decided to make no comment for the time 
being on the draft which would govern their application and which would provide 
that the Commission be notified of concrete cases. Nevertheless, the Commission 
reminded the Luxembourg Government that it was normally the responsibility 
of the undertakings to face the consequence of pollution which they cause and 
that it was up to them to provide, in each case, the information to justify a waiver 
of that principle for any particular industry. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 150. 
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Section 2 
Application of the ECSC Treaty 
to State aids to the steels industries 
124. In 19721 the Commission had to implement the infringement procedure 
provided for in Article 88 of the ECSC Treaty against Belgium and Italy, who 
had failed to provide sufficient information on the aids granted to· their steel 
industries. As the two Member States subsequently provided the missing infor-
mation, the Commission terminated the procedure. 
The Commission will now be in a position to check, on the basis of information 
obtained from all nine Member States, whether any of the specific aids prohibited 
by Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty have been granted to the steel industry and 
whether aids granted to those industries within the framework of regional aids 
or more general aids are liable to . engender the disequilibria referred to in 
Article 67. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 126. 
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The adjustment of State monopolies 
of a commercial character 
125. The Commission continued the work it began many years ago on State 
monopolies of a commercial character.l As it has mentioned repeatedly in its 
recommendations, Article 37 of the EEC Treaty is aimed at obtaining the same 
results at the· end of the transitional period for products which are subject to a 
monopoly as those obtained for other products through the application of Arti-
cles 30 to 34, i.e. free movement of goods. 
The Commission believes that the best way to achieve this objective would be 
to abolish exclusive import, export and/or marketing rights. One objective 
could be the mere adjustment of the monopolies, with the necessary procedures, 
assurances, and guarantees for the elimination of any discrimination resulting 
directly from the arrangements applying to the monopoly items. This objective 
would include the elimination of any scope for discriminatory action deriving 
from certain residual powers left in the hands of the monopolies. But the Com-
mission has preferred to ensure free movement of goods at the end of the transi-
tional period, by trying to induce the Member States to abolish the monopolies 
altogether in relation to the other Member States. 
Such action, aimed at obtaining a result which is not explicitly provided for in 
Article 37, has already led France to abolish its match monopoly and its gun-
powder and explosives monopoly; Italy, for its part, has put an end to its mono-
polies of cigarette lighters, cigarette papers, flints and salt. France and Italy 
have also undertaken to abolish their manufactured tobacco monopolies before 
the end of 1975. 
126. Moreover in 1973 the Commission succeeded in obtaining the abolition of 
a number of discriminatory practices within the meaning of Article 37 (1) which 
it had noted; however, in other cases, it had to continue the infringement pro;-
cedures already started or even to initiate new ones. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sec. 195 et seq, and Second Report, sec. 150 et seq. 
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Thus despite the adjustments already made by France to its manufactured 
tobacco monopoly, the Commission noted that certain measures restricting the 
introduction and marketing of foreign brands still persisted in France. Following 
the activation by the Commission of the procedure provided for in Article 1691 
the French Government made numerous adjustments to this monopoly. 
Consequently, new foreign brands which' could formerly be introduced onto the 
French. market only once a year can now be introduced onto the market, as can 
France's own products, on any of several specific dates during the year. The 
minimum amount (FF 6 000) levied on receipts from sales of every brand imported 
will be replaced by a fee of FF 3 000 for certain administrative expenditures. 
The effect of the amendment of the tobacco price scale in 1972 was to reduce the 
foreign manufacturers' supply price ('prix de cession') without the foreign manu-
facturers being able to change these prices; as the tax system applicable to tobacco 
has been revised, they are now in a position to increase these prices. The rule 
that imported goods must pass through the general warehouse in Paris, entailing 
additional costs for the manufacturers, has been adjusted by the assumption by 
the monopolist of the transport costs from the frontier to the general warehouse. 
As far as the Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly is concerned, the Commission 
reached the conclusion, following investigations hampered by technical difficulties, 
that certain aspects of this monopoly discriminated against imported items. It 
therefore decided to initiate against Italy the procedure provided for in Article 169. 
Those measures and practices which hinder the import and marketing of the impor-
ted products in question consist in the limitation of the number of new foreign 
brands which may be marketed and the time limits and excessive amount of infor-
mation required before marketing is possible, the need for the imported tobacco 
to pass through the central warehouse in Bologna, the restrictions as to the amount 
of imported tobacco which may be stored in the monopolist's warehouses, the 
difficulties encountered by foreign manufacturers when they want their supply 
prices to be altered, and the levying of unduly high distribution costs on imported 
tobacco. 
127. As regards matches, following the recommendation sent to the Italian 
Government on 22 December 1969 and the infringement procedure2 initiated 
against that Government, the latter adjusted its monopoly system in part. 
Pursuant to a ministerial decree of 25 June 1973,3 the import of matches from 
other EEC countries will henceforth be free from restrictions and importers will 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, sec. 151. 
2 Second Report on Competition Policy. sec. 150. 
3 Gazzetta ufficiale No 171. 6 July 1973. 
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be able to supply the ,distribution network of the Amministrazione Autonoma dei 
Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) direct and negotiate freely with the agents in that 
network (warehousemen and retailers) the gross profits of the latter earned' on 
the imported products; however, the AAMS's monopoly of the wholesale trade 
in matChes is to be maintained until 31 December 1975, and the consortium of 
national producers retains the right to levy on the State's account a fiscal tax 
on imported products. The Commission decided to suspend the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 169 initiated against Italy in order to examine the implications 
of these amendments and of the new price system for matches in Italy whereby 
technically identical matches must be sold at the same retail prices, whether 
home-produced or not. 
The Italian decree-law of 18 December 19721 put an end to the Italian monopoly 
of the import and sale of cigarette papers, ' 
The law of 16 February 19732 put an end to the Italian monopoly in salt for food 
as from 1 January 1974. The import of salt for industrial uses is still subject 
to prior authorization from the monopolist; since the monopolist is thus in a 
position to refuse to allow imports at any time and can thereby limit the quantity 
of imports from the other Member States, the Commission ruled that this was a 
case of dicrimination incompatible with Article 37 (1), and decided to initiate the 
infringement procedure against Italy, as provided for in Article 169 of the EEC 
Treaty. 
128. The French potash monopoly has also been adjusted. The monopoly on 
the import of compound fertilizers containing potash from other Member States, 
held by the French joint sales agency, was withdrawn by decree No 73-379 of 
23 March 1973.3 Nevertheless, imports remained subject to prior authorization 
from the competent French ministry. Considering this requirement to be incom-
patible with the Treaty, the Commission initiated the infringement procedure 
against France. In the case of the potassium salts monopoly, the French 
Government notified the Commission of a draft decree withdrawing the French 
joint sales agency's import monopoly and abolishing the sales monopoly. However, 
that decree provides that the import of potassium salts be subject to the same 
prior authorization system as compound fertilizers containing potash; and hence 
provokes the same objections. 
In the case of the basic slag monopoly, the Commission delivered the reasoned 
opinion provided for in Article 169 and continued the infringement procedure. 
1 Converted to a law as at 16 February 1973; Gazzetta ufficiale No 44, 17 February 1973. 
2 Gazzetta Ufficiale No 44, 17 February 1973. 
3 Journal officiel de la Republique frans:aise, 31 March 1973. 
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The French Government then notified the Commission of a draft law, approved 
by the French Parliament at the end of December 1973, providing for the with-
drawal from the Societe Nationale pour la vente des Scories Thomas (SNST), 
which comprises all the French producers, of the sales monopoly of both home-
produced and imported basic slag on the French market. The Commission has 
not yet decided whether the new situation thus created is in line with the provisions 
of Article 37. 
129. In the case of the French alcohol monopoly, in spite of having repeated its 
intention to end the discrimination brought about by levying a surcharge on the 
import of spirits and spirituous beverages from other Member States which is 
higher than the levy on home-produced products, the French Government has 
not made the necessary arrangements to end this discrimination. Consequently 
the Commission delivered the reasoned opinion provided for in Article 169 and 
continued the infringement procedure initiated earlier. 
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§ 1 - The development of concentration in further selected industries 
in the Community 
130. The information given below is based on studies carried out under the 
Commission research programme on concentration. l The latest results are given 
first. These are fo1l9wed by a summary of all the studies already available and 
a brief description of work planned for the futur~. 
Methods used 
131. To facilitate comparison with the results published in the Second Competition 
Report, the same presentation will be followed. The analysis of concentration 
trends in further selected industries is thus also based on data concerning the 
number of firms, employment and sales. The statistical indices used are: 
- the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for the description of the changes in the 
degree of concentration of an industry over Hme; 
- concentration ratios for comparisons of degrees of concentration from country 
to country and industry to industry; 
- the Linda indices weighted by the number of the largest firms in an industry 
for determining size disparities between these firms. 
Also with a view to facilitating comparisons, the data published in the Second 
Report are repeated in the tables for those industries on which additional reports 
have been received (paper and paper products industry and chemical industry). 
132. Table 1 summarizes the studies already available to the Commission under 
its research programme on concentration. In addition to further reports on the 
two branches of the paper and paper products industry and on the chemical 
industry already studied, five branches of machinery manufacturing, two branches 
of the electrical engineering industry and the food industry have been studied 
for the first time. The studies were carried out by the following national research 
institutes and experts: 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
IFO-Institut fUr Wirtscha£tsforschung, Munich (manufacture of machinery 
and electrical goods); 
Kienbaum Unternehmensberatung, Gummersbach (chemical industry); 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, sees: 204 to 216; Second Report on Competition Policy. 
sees. 166 to 187. 
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France: 
GREFI of the University of Rennes, Professor G. Bertin (machinery); 
BIPE-Bureau d'Informations et de Previsions Economiques, Neuilly-sur-Seine 
(electrical goods); 
Netherlands: 
Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek der Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
Prof. H.W. de Jong and A.H. Smolders; 
Belgium: 
STUDIA VZWD, Brussels. 
TABLE 1 
Studies available analysing concentration 
(situation on 31 December 1973) 
Industry 
(NICE nomenclature) 
G I F 
23 Manufacture of textiles 
232 Wool X X 
233 Cotton X X 
237 Knitted and crocheted goods X X 
27 Manufacture of paper products 
271 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard X X 
272 Processing of paper and paperboard X X 
31 Chemical industry 
313.1 Pharmaceutical industry 0 0 
313.2 Manufacture of photographic products 0 0 
313.5 Manufacture of cleaning and maintenance 
products (waxes, polishes, metal polishes, etc.) 
38 Manufacture of transport equipment 
385. 1 Manufacture of motorcycles, cycles and mopeds Xl X 
36 Manufacture of machinery 
361 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and tractors 0 0 
362 Manufacture of office machinery 0 0 
364.1 Manufacture of textile machinery 0 0 
366.3 Manufacture of machinery for construction and 
366.4 for preparation of construction materials 0 0 
366.5 Manufacture of machanical handling equipment 0 0 
Country 
I I I N I B 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 0 
X 0 
X X X 
X X X 
x X X 
X X 
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TABLE 1 (continued). 
'. 
Country 
Industry 
(NICE nomenclatu're) 
G I F I I I N I B 
3'1 Electrical engineering 
375 Manufacture of radios, televisions and sound 
reproduction equipment 0 0 
376 Manufacture of electrical appliances for domestic use· 0 0 
20-B Food industry 0 0 
In Germany the industry was subdivided into cycles on the one hand and motorcycles and mopeds on the other. 
x = Given in ·the Second Report on Competition Poiicy. 
o = New studies, . 
Changes in the numbers of firms 
133. Table 2 shows the numbers of firms for the industries chosen and the changes 
over the reference period (1962 , 100). For the Netherlands chemical and paper 
and paper products industries and for the ,French mechanical handling equipment 
industry, the reference period begins in 1963, and for the Netherlands food industry 
in 1964. ' . 
134. Of the thirty-five cases studied, only three show an increase in the number 
of firms from 1962 to 1969 (electrical engineering in Belgium, construction machinery 
and machinery for the manufacture of construction materials and the mechanical 
handling equipment industry in' France), In eight cases the number of firms 
remained unchanged. In three industries it was already so low in 1962 that it 
was hardly likely to drop, the degree of concentration already being extremely 
high (photographic products ind1,lstry with three firms in the Netherlands, two 
in Italy and one in Belgium). In four cases, the fact that the number of firms did 
not change reflected difficulties in obtaining materials, In the absence of precise 
figures, th~ research institutes assumed that the number of firms had not changed 
at all over the reference period (pharmaceutical industry in Germany; paper 
processing industry in Italy; paper and paper products production in the Nether-
lands; radio, television and sound reproduction equipment in Germany). In 
twenty cases there is a decline throughout the period in the number of firms, and 
in four cases the decline appears only in the years 1962-69. In all cases for which 
data are available for 1970 and 1971' '(radio, television and sound reproduction 
equipment in France;: food industiies in':Ge~anyand the. Netherlands) the number 
of firms h~s continu,ed its decline. :. 
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135. Though the trend was by no means even from country to country or from 
industry to industry, the latest studies as well thus indicate, on the basis of the 
changes in the numbers of firms, that overall the concentration process in the 
Community was gathering momentum in the 1962-69 period and in some cases 
continued to do so in the period up to 1971. 
TABLE 2 
Nutnber of firD1s and chan~es in nUD1bers in certain industries 
and certain COD1D1unity countries, 1962, 1966 and 1969. 
G F I N B 
Industry Year (NICE nomenclature) AbSO'11962 AbSO'11962 AbSO'11962 AbsO.[1962 AbSO'11962 lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 
31 
Chemical industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 1962 690 100 807 100 653 100 26 100 87 100 
1966 690 100 520 64 638 98 27 104 78 90 
1969 690 100 496 61 539 83 25 96 75 86 
313.2 
Photographic products 1962 24 100 19 100 2 100 3 100 1 100 
1966 - - 17 89 2 100 3 100 1 100 
1969 12 50 14 74 2 100 3 100 1 100 
27 
Manufacture of paper 
and paper products 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 1962 253 100 280 100 598 100 19 100 
paper and paperboard 1966 226 89 247 88 559 94 19 100 
1969 191 76 203 73 532 89 19 100 
272 
Processing of paper 19621 346 100 1 470 100 700 100 229 100 
and paperboard 19661 183 87 1 288 88 700 100 235 103 
19691 120 82 1 350 92 700 100 194 84 
37 
Electrical engineering 
375 
Radio, television, 1962 19 100 90 100 106 100 
sound reproduction 1966 19 100 60 67 112 106 
equipment 1969 19 100 39 43 112 106 
1970 - - 35 40 - -
1971 - - 33 37 - -
Manufacture of 1962 104 100 214 100 
electrical appliances 1966 103 99 185 86 
for domestic use 1969 .96 92 167 78 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
G F I N B 
Industry Year (NICE nomenclature) AbSO-/1962 AbSO-/1962 AbSO-/1962 AbSO-/ i962 AbSO-11962 
lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 lute =100 
36 
Manufacture of machinery 
361 
Manufacture of 1962 220 100 431 100 
agricultural machinery 1966 223 101 460 106 
and tractors 1969 217 99 433 100 
362 
Manufacture of office 1962 70 100 98 100 
machinery 1966 66 94 90 92 
1969 60 85 75 77 
364.1 
Manufacture of textile 1962 246 100 145 100 
machinery 1966 238 97 130 90 
1969 208 85 125 88 
366.3 and 366.4 
Manufacture of 1962 257 100 591 100 
construction machinery 1966 251 98 690 117 
and machinery for 1969 238 93 - -
preparing construction 
material 
366.5 
Manufacture of 1962 215 100 170 100 
mechanical handling 1966 211 98 197 116 
equipment 1969 199 92 200 118 
20-B 
Food industry 
(not including beverages) 
20-B 
Food industry 1962 3 308 100 1 536 100 
1966 3 035 92 1 470 96 
1969 2 718 82 1 407 92 
1970 2 626 79 1 280 83 
1971 - - 1 231 80 
- No data available. 
The number of firms fell by about 25% more between 1966 and 1969 than between 
1962 and 1966. 
Changes in the degree of concentration 
136. The Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for the three reference years (1962, 1966 
and 1969) are available for employment in twenty-nine and for sales in nineteen 
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out of the total of thirty-five cases ·(Table 3). The development of concentration 
in the ·industries· chosen according to these indices (monopoly '1000) can be 
sumrried up as follows: 
TABLE 3 
Concentration in selected industries and countries 
.of the Community; 1962, 1966 and 1969 
. (Herfindahl - Hirschman indices) 
G F I N 
(NICE nomenclature) Year Em" 
B 
Em" 
ploy- Sales Em· I ploy- Sales Em'l ploy- Sales Em., ploy, Sales ploy- Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment 
31 
Chemical industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 1962 29 36 19 - 24 25 152 108 .46 ·46 
1966 27 35 18 - 21 24 138 115 102 103 
1969 29 33 18 - 27 35 173 142 83' 83 
313.2 
Photographic products 1962 - - 276 - - - 581 431 -. -
1966 - - 131 - - - 615 534 - -
1969 - - 313 - - - 644 635 - -
27 
Paper industry and 
manufacture of 
paper products 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 1962 26 45 14 - 21 24 279 224 
paper and paperboard 1966 23 53 14 - 23 25 251 208 
1969 32 68 16 - 20 :25 199 187 
272 
Processing of paper 1962 14 22 2 - 4 8 16 21 
and paperboard 1966 14 24 3 - 3 6 14 19 
1969 17 29 4 - 3 5 23 29 
37 
Electrical engineering 
375 
Radio, television 1962 - - 82 82 183 181 
sound reproduction 1966 - - 93 92 171 172 
equipment 1969 - - 134 123 206 200 
1970 - - 138 149 - -
1971 - - 156 152 - .-
376 
'. Household 1962 - - - - . -
electrical goods 1966 - - - -
1969 - - - -
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
G F I N B 
(NICE nomenclature) Year Em-I Em-I Em-I Em-I Em-I ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment . 
36 
Manufacture of machinery 
361 
Manufacture of 1962 20 38 28 -
agricultural machinery 1966 20 41 24 -
and tractor~ 1969 15 33 24 -
362 
Manufacture of office· 1962 48 - 22 .-
machinery 1966 56 168 22 -
1969 54 126 21 -
364.1 
Manufacture of textile 1962 23 '25 35 -
machinery 1966 23 30 41 -
1969 25 29 58 -
366.3 and 366.4 
Manufacture of 1962 21 41 72 -
construction machinery 1966 21 47 70 -
and machinery for 1969 22 58 81 -
preparing construction 
materials 
366.5 
Manufacture of 1962 26 41 25 -
mechanical handling 1966 27 48 21 -
equipment 1969 27 62 49 -
20-B 
Food 'ind1~stry 
(not including beverages) 
20-B 
Food industry 1962 3 4 9 10 
1966 3 4 10 10 
1969 3 4 11 10 
1970 3 4 12 15 
1971 - - 16 16 
During the reference period, concentration in terms of employment (i.e. the extent 
to which' the labour force was concentrated in the largest firms) increased in 
twenty cases and decreased in seven. In two cases there was no change. 
Concentration in terms of sales (i.e. the extent to which sales are accounted for 
by the largest firms) increased in thirteen cases, decreased in four cases and remained 
unchanged in two cases. The concentration process, which had already generally 
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gathered momentum between 1962 and 1966, showed a substantial further accele-
ration between 1966 and 1969 (between 1966 and 1970/71 in cases where more 
recent material is available). 
137. A closer analysis of the seven cases where concentration in terms of employ-
ment dropped shows that such cases are statistically significant only in three 
instances (the manufacture of agricultural machinery and tractors in Germany 
and pulp, paper and paperboard production in France and in the Netherlands). 
In the German and French agricultural machinery and tractor manufacturing 
industries, differences in size diminished as small and medium-sized firms evidently 
were growing faster than the larger producers, while the number of firms remained 
practically unchanged. On the other hand, in the Netherlands pu1p, paper aJ;ld 
paperboard production industry, the decline noted in the degree of concentration 
is based on findings in the nineteen largest firms in each case and thus shows 
only that disparities between these undertakings are being narrowed down. In 
three further cases where there is a tendency for concentration in terms of employ-
ment to decline (pharmaceutical and office machinery industries in France, pulp, 
paper and paperboard production in Italy), the cause is to be found in the dis-
appearance of large numbers of firms from the market and the resulting narrowing 
of the size gap between the remaining competitors. Finally, the last case (paper 
and paperboard processing in Italy) is presumably connected with the fact that 
the number of firms remains unchanged at 700. 
138. The parallel development of concentration in terms both of employment 
and of sales was confirmed in all but two of the nineteen comparable cases available. 
In the German pharmaceutical industry, concentration in terms of employment 
remained at the same level while concentration in terms of sales declined; in the 
Italian pulp, paper and paperboard production industry the slight fall in the 
degree of concentration calculated on the basis of numbers employed was accom-
panied by a slight increase in concentration calculated in terms of sales. 
Most of the studies indicate that large firms have higher sales per person employed 
than small and medium-sized firms: in eleven cases the degree of concentration 
by sales in 1962, 1966 and 1969 was higher than the degree of concentration by 
employment. In two other cases concentration in terms of employment roughly 
matched concentration in terms of sales (Belgian pharmaceutical industry and 
electrical engineering) and in another two cases (radio,· television and sound 
reproduction equipment in France and the Netherl~nds food industry) the position 
changed from reference year to reference year (static comparison). Only in three 
industries (pharmaceuticals, photographic products and pulp, paper and paper-
board production in the Netherlands) was the degree of concentration in terms 
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of employment consistently higher than concentration measured by sales; In all 
these cases the number of firms is so small that the concept of small and medium-
sized firms becomes inapplicable. A more important point here is that the results 
reflect a statistical problem. Large firms are frequently so diversified that it 
is impossible to calculate precisely how many persons are employed in a given 
industry. Persons employed in other branches are often included in the' calcula-
tions and this inflates .the concentration ratio measured in terms of employment. 
I ndustry-to-industry and country-to-country differences 
in the degree of concentration 
139. The employment and sales concentration ratios accounted for by the four 
or eight largest firms in the industries chosen (Table 4) show that concentration 
ratios vary appreciably from industry to industry and from Member State to 
Member State. This will be examined in greater detail for 1969, using, as examples, 
employment in the four leading firms in each case (but the leading firm in the 
Italian, Belgian and Netherlands photographic products industries and the eight 
leading firms in the German electrical engineering industry). 
TABLE 4 
Percentaaes of employment and of sales by the four or eiaht lar~est firms 
in selected industries and countries of the Community (concentration ratios) 
in 1962, 1966 and 1969 
G F I N B· 
(NICE nomenclature) Year Em- Em-ploy- I Sal~ Em-I ploy- Sales ploy- I Sales Em-I ploy- Sales Em-I ploy- Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment . 
31 
Chemical indust.y 
Pharmaceutical 1962 26 43 32 46 28 88 - - 24 81 26 36 73 87 57_76 34 52 34 '52 
industry 1966 25 41 31 45 24 33 
- -
22 30 25 U 69 83 59 81 47 66 47 65 
1969 25 43 29 43 23 82 - - 28 37 32 43 U - 72 - 43 64 43 64 
313.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Photographic 1962 - - - - 95 - - - 98 - 97 - U - 59 - 100 - 100 -
products 1966 - - - - 96 - - - 98 - 98 - 77 - 70 - 100 - 100 -
1969 - - - - 96 - - - 98 - 98 - 79 - 78 - 100 - 100 -
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
G F I N B 
(NICE nomenclature) Year 
Em-I Em-I 
Em-
I 
Em-
I Sales 
Em-
I 
ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- ploy- Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment 
27 
Paper indust.y and 
manufacture of pap .. 
p,oducts 
271 
Manufacture of bulp, 1962 23 37 30 43 20 30 - - 20 29 25 35 82 93 71 83 
paper and paper oard 1966 23 34 34 47 19 . 29 - - 22 32 24 36 80 92 70 83 
1969 26 37 40 54 20 31 - - 22 32 23 37 76 88 72 86 
272 
Processing of peper 1962 18 21 20 26 26 7 13 - - 6 10 12 19 15 25 19 
and paperboard 1966 18 22 24 29 6 11 - - 5 8 9 16 14 22' 18 29 
1969 20 25 28 34 8 14 - - 5 8 8 15 21 32 25 39 
37 
Elect,ical engi""mng .. 
375 
Radio, TV, 1962 - 51 - 45 51 67 48 64 76 00 75 90 
sound reproduction 1966 - 62 - 63 54 73 62 73 76 90 75 90 
equipment 1969 - 62 - 71 65 82 66 85 78 90 77 88 
1970 - - - - 66 83 69 88 - - - -
1971 - - - - 72 87 68 86 - - - -
376 
Household 1962 
-
61 - 57 - - - -
electrical goods 1966 - 66 - 73 - - - -
1969 - 69 - 85 
- -
- -
36 
Manufacture 
of machinery 
361 
Agricultural 1962 25 37 24 35 45 56 - -
machinery and 1966 24 36 30 42 44 57 - -
tractors 1969 30 44 31 45 41 56 -
-
362 
Office machines 1962 - - 67 - 83 92 - -
1966 - - - - 86 94 - -
1969 - - 69 - 86 95 - -
364.1 
Textile machinery 1962 17 25 18 27 46 57 ~ -
1966 19 27 32 31 47 63 - -
1969 23 32 26 36 51 69 - -
366.3 and 366.4 
Manufacture of 1962 13 21 16 26 44· 58 - -
construction 1966 11 20 17 25 48 57 - -
machinery and 
machinery' for . 
preparing construction 
1969 11 19 16 24 51 61 - -
materials 
366.5 
Manufacture of 1962 16 24 25 34 19 33 - -
mechanical handling 1966 17 26 23 32 17 29 - -
equipment 1969 17 25 25 33 29 40 -' -
.' 
20-B 
Food.iffdUsI,y (nol 
including bevmiges) .. 
20-B 
Food industry' 1962 5 8 5' 8 13 19 14 19 
1966 I> 8 5 8 14 21' 14 21 
1969 4 7 5 8 15 21 14 22 
1970 4 8 4 8 16 22 19 27 
1971 - - - - 17 23 19 28 
No data avaIlable. 
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140. The photographic products industry is easily the most highly concentrated. 
It is followed by the electrical engineering and pharmaceutical industries. There 
is a substantial degree of concentration in the industry manufacturing textile 
machinery, the pulp, paper and paperboard producing industry and the agricul-
tural machinery an,d tractor industry. ,The manufa,cture of constI;'uctionm;:tchinery 
and of machinery for the preparation of construction materials and the mechanical 
handling equipment 'industry show, medium concentration, The concentration 
ratio in the paper and paperboard processing industry' and in'the food industry 
is, on the whole, relativelY low. The order of ciassification of industries is almost 
identical if; relative degrees of concentration in various industries are assessed on 
the basis of available information concerning sales of the four leading firms: the 
coefficient correlating the two, classifications is 0.93 (absolute identity wbuld 
give a coefficient of ~nity). 
i 41. The differing sizes of the Member States also exercises an indirect influence on 
the degrees of concentration of their respective industries, measured by mean;; 
of the concentration ratios. Helke it is not surprising that the sample of industries' 
chosen suggests that the Belgian and' Netherlands economies are more highly 
concentrated than the German, French and Italian economies. It makes more 
sense to divide the member countries into the 'large' countries and the 'smaW 
countries .. Germany:is the most highly ,concentrated of the 'large' countries 
followed by France and, much .further behind, Italy. In the 'small' 9:luntries, 
Netherland,S industry)s more highly concentrated than B~lgian industry. " . 
Disparities between the lar'gest firms and trends 
,-". 
142. Concentration processes can leave size ratios between large undertakings' 
in a given industry untouched, can b~oaden them and can narrow them. These 
phenomena have different effects on the intensity of competition. The weight~d 
Linda indices (Table 5) are used as a quantitative measurement of disparities only 
between the largest undertakings in each industry. Where the level of this index 
is high, this means that the disparity between the sizes of leading, firms is ·wide. 
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TABLE 5 
Disparities between the largest firms in selected industries and countries 
of the Community; 1962, 1966 and 1969 
(Weighted Linda-indices). 
G F I N B 
(NICE nomenclature) Year 
Em-I Em-I Em-I Em-I Em-I ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales 
ment ment ment ment ment 
31 
Chemical industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 1962 0.17 0.21 0.21 - 0.24 0.21 0.48 0.54 0.20 0_20 
1966 0.17 0.21 0.19 - 0.21 0.20 0.46 0.51 0.42 0-42 
1969 0.17 0.20 0.19 - 0.21 0.20 0.63 0.45 0.36 0_36 
313.2 
Photographic products 1962 - - 1.68 - - - 1. 85 1.08 - -
1966 - - 1.85 - - - 2.50 1.12 - -
1969 - - 1. 70 - - - 3.03 2.52 - -
27 
Paper i·ndustry 
and manufacture 
of paper products 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 1962 0.24 0.34 0.54 0.38 0.34 0.28 1.04 0.92 
paper and paperboard 1966 0.26 0.33 0.51 0.36 0.27 0.23 0.93 0.85 
1969 0_31 0.34 0.42 0.36 0.24 0.21 0_76 0.59 
272 
Processing of paper 1962 0.44 0.44 0.10 - 0.34 0_26 0.14 0.18 
and paperboard 1966 0.41 0-42 0.09 - 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.15 
1969 0.39 0.38 0.10 - 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.17 
37 
Electrical engineering 
375 
Radio, television, 1962 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.63 0.58 
sound reproduction 1966 0.44 0.40 0-44 0.39 0.59 0.60 
equipment 1969 0-47 0.47 0.53 0-42 0.54 0.54 
1970 - - 0_54 0.57 - -
1971 - - 0.55 0.59 - -
376 
Household 1962 0.35 0.32 - -
electrical goods 1966 0.36 0.38 - -
1969 0.49 0.72 - -
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TABLE 5 (con~inued) 
G F I N B 
(NICE nomenclature) Year Em· , Em· , Em.' Em.' Em.' ploy. Sales ploy- Sales ploy- Sales ·ploy· Sales ploy· . Sales 
ment ment ment ment . ment . 
: (1 
36 
Manufacture of machinery 
361 
Manufacture of 1962 0.29 0.33 0.28 -
agricultur'al machinery 1966 0.29 0.34 0:26 -
and tractors 1969 0.34 0.34 0.25 -
362 
Manufacture of office 1962 - - 1.15 -
machinery 1966 - - 1.31 -
1969 - - 1. 25 -
364.1 
Manufacture of textile 1962 0.46 0.37 0.29 -
machinery 1966 0.39 0.38 0.31 -
1969 0.41 0.38 0.31 -
366.3 and 366.4 
Manufacture of 1962 ·0.27 0.31 0.28 -
construction machinery 1966 0.26 0.35 0.25 -
and machinery for 1969 0.26 0.31 0.27 -
preparing construction 
materials 
366.5 
Manufacture of 1962 0.39 0.48 0.11 -
mechanical handling 1966 0.37 0.46 0.12 - , 
equipment 1969 0.37 0.48 0.11 -
20-B 
Food industry 
(not including beverages) 
20-B 
Food industry 1962 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.23 
1966 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.20 
1969 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.21 
1970 0.08 0.07 0.22 0.20 
1971 - - 0.28 0.20 
- No data available. 
143. The process of concentration, which generally gathered momentum in the 
iridustries selected, did not cause large firms to change positions in relation to each 
other to the same extent. Although comparison of the degree of concentration 
ill twenty-one out of a total of thirty cases in 1962 and 1969 shows that concen-
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tration measured by employment increased, this is true in respect of disparities 
between the leading firms in thirteen cases only. Against eight cases where 
concentration measured by employment declined, there are fourteen cases where 
differences in size (same measure) between the leading firms were reduced; no 
change occurred during the reference period in one case as regards the degree 
of concentration and in three cases as regards disparities between the largest firms. 
On seventeen occasions (eleven increases, six decreases), changes in the degree of 
concentration are matched by changes in the same direction in the disparities 
between leading firms only. In eight cases, as the concentration ratio increased, 
disparities between large firms declined (paper and paperboard processing, textile 
machinery, construction machinery and materials, mechanical handling equipment 
in Germany, pulp, paper and paperboard production, construction machinery 
and materials in France, electrical engineering in Belgium and pharmaceuticals 
in Italy). In two cases a decline in the degree of concentration is accompanied 
by an increase in the disparities between large firms (agricultural machinery and 
tractors in Germany, office machinery in France). 
i44. It is impossible to come to any conclusion relating to individual industries 
or regions on the basis of these results. An important fact established, however, 
is that concentration processes can be associated with changes in the opposite 
direction in size disparities among leading firms only. In practice, this may give 
a first quantitative clue as to whether the intensity of competition is increasing 
or decreasing. To that extent, examination of the disparities between leading 
firms, linked with the general analysis of concentration, can provide a tool for 
examining the competitive situation in a given industry. 
§ 2 - General results of the research programme 
The development of concentration 
145. Of the fifty-five studies carried out (Figure 1), forty-six individual reports 
give comparable information on the degree of concentration in 1962 and in 1969. 
The individual studies cover industries and Member States where levels of con-
centration are high and low. Thus they can be considered to give a repres~ntative 
sample of Community industry and can provide information on the development 
of concentration which is of general validity for purposes of statistical comparison. 
146. If we set out, from smallest to largest, the sales proportions in given industries 
accounted for by the four leading firms in individual industries (if these figures 
are unavailable, then the employment shares) for the two reference years (1962 
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ProportiOD of sales 
accounted tor by tho 
lour leadicg lirms (%) 
FIGURE 1 
Pro~ress of Concentration in the Community 
(proportion of sales accounted for by the 
four leading firms in 46 case studies: 1962 and 1969) 
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by the leading fmns. 
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·1969 _ 8 cases 
1962 _ 6e .... 
1969 _ 10 cases 
1962 _ 14 case. 
1969 _ 13 caseo 
1962 = 19 cases 
1969 _ 15 cases 
and 1969), we obtain the pattern shown in Figure 1. It shows that the concentra-
tion ratios in 1969 (black columns) were substantially higher in virtually all Industries 
than in 1962 (white columns). . 
While in 1962 the four largest firms already accounted in 28% of cases for 50% 
or more of the forty-six relevant markets, in 1969 the corresponding proportion of 
cover had risen to 39%. So that between 1962 and 1969, the number of less 
concentrated industries (where the four largest firms accounted for' less than 50% 
of the relevant market) fell by 15%, while the number of highly concentrated indus-
tries (where the four largest firms accounted for 50% or· more of the market) rose 
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by 38%. The largest rates of increase (67% are found in the industries where 
from 50% to less than 75% of the relevant markets were accounted for by the 
'top four', and the sharpest decline in concentration (21 %) is found in industries 
where less than 25% was held. 
147. The decline in the number of firms, which is a general conclusion to be drawn 
from the studies already processed by the Commission in selected indlMries and 
countries of the Community, is ~ccomp'!Ilied1:JY ~ g~~eraJ rise in the marketshares 
held by the leading firms. Admittedly this does not lead directly to the conclusion 
thC\.t competition is becoming . less intense in the Community. However, if this 
process were to continue uninterrupted, then the workability of competition would 
be jeopardized in more and more industries. 
Concentration and integration 
148. This section will consider whether the results of the Commission research 
programme on concentration can provide evidence of an interrelation between 
degree of concentration and degree of integration. For this purpose the degree 
of-concentration will be measured by the proportion of sales on -a- given market 
(or, if this is not available, the proportion of total employment) of the four leading 
firms (CR,) and the degree of integration will be measured by the proportion of 
total exports accounted for by intra-Community exports (Exports) (Table 6). 
The fact that the proportion of total exports accounted for by intra-Community 
exports can act as a measure of the degree of integration can be established by- a 
simple arithmetical correlation, for intra-Community exports of a given industry 
from one -member country are, inevitably, intra-Community imports in another 
member country. 
149. Intra-Community trade increased substantially between 1962 and _ 1969. 
Although it accounted for only 41% of total average export-s in the industries 
selected in 1962, this figure had risen to 53% by 1969. Of a total of thirty-one 
comparable cases, the degree of integration rose in twenty-eight. In three cases 
it fell (the manufacture of radio, television and sound reproduction equipment 
and woven and crocheted goods in Belgium and the wool industry in France). 
150. Integration made most progress in the least concentrated industries. In 
industries where the four leading firms accounted for 50% or less of total sales; 
the degree of integration rose by 37% between 1962 and 1969, while in industries 
where the four largest firms accounted for 50% or more of total sales the increase 
was only 5%. As a result, in 1969 the less concentrated industries sold on average 
55% of their exported goods within the Community (40% in 1962) while the figure 
for the highly concentrated industries was only 47% (45% in 1962). 
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TABLE 6 0 
Shares of sales accounted for by the four. leading firms (CR4) and proportion 
of total exports accounted for by intra-Community trade (Exports) 
in selected Community industries and countries; 1962, 1966 and 1969 
(NICE nomenclature) 
31 
Chemical industry 
313.1 
Pharmaceutical industry 
313.2 
Photographic products 
27 
Manufacture of 
paper and 
paper products 
271 
Manufacture of pulp, 
paper and paperboard 
272 
Processing of paper 
and paperboard 
37 
Electrical engineering 
375 
Radio, television, 
sound reproduCtion 
equipment 
376 
Household 
electrical goods 
1 1963. 
• 1968. 
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Year 
1962 
1966 
1969 
1962 
1966 
1969 
1962 
1966 
1969 
1962 
1966 
1969 
1962 
1966 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1962 
1966 
1969 
G F 
C I Ex-R. ports I Ex-CR. ports 
32 18 28 -
31 21 24' -
29 25 23 -
- - 95 -
- - 96 -
- - 96 -
30 44 20 18 
34 53 19 46 
40 62 20 47 
20 37 7 -
24 47 6 37 
28 59 8 6 
- - 48 17 
- - 52 28 
- - 66 39 
- - - -
- - -
-
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
I N B 
CR, I Ex-ports CR, I Ex-o ports I Ex-CR, ports 
26 17 57 43
' 
34 27 
25 17 59 40 47 36 
32 21 72 472 43 54 
97 - 59 38' 100 32 98 - 70 51 100 36 
98 - 78 452 100 38 
25 26 71 -
24 51 70 -
23 39 72 -
12 34 19 66 
9 36 18 74 
8 47 25 82 
75 75 
73 63 
77 66 
- -
- -
: 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
: 
G F I N B 
.. 
.. 
'" 
(NICE nomenclature) Year 
CR< I p~:is I Ex- CR..I,EX- I Ex- I Ex-; CR.. ports , ports CR.. ports CR, ports 
36 : 
Manufactur~ of mqchinery 
-361 
Manufacture of 1962 24 41 45 -
agricultural 'machinery 1966 30 50 44 61 
and tractors 1969 31 48 41 52 
362 : 
'" Manufacture of office 1962 67 33 83 -
machinery 1966 
- -
86 53 
1969 69 42 86 50 
364,1 
Manufacture of textile 1962 18 34 46 -
machinery 1966 23 33 47 -
1969 26 36 51 -
366, 3 and 366.4 
Manufacture of 1962 16 - 44 - \ , 
construction machinery 1966 17 - 48 -
and machinery for 1969 16 - 51 -
preparing construction 
materials 
366_5 
Manufacture of 1962 25 35 )'9 -
mechanical handling 1966 23 38 17 -
equipment 1969 25 42 20 -
20-B 
Food industry 
(not including beverages) 
20-B 
Food industry 1962 5 32 14 54 
1966 5 42 14 58 
1969 5 62 14 65 
" 
1970 - -
'. 1971 - - - -
", 
, 
23 
Textile industry 
232 
Wool 1962 - - 20 84 22 45 30 77 
1966 - - 21 67 21 57 33 79 
1969 - - 20 43 18 53 34 80 
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TABLE 6 (fontinued) 
.• ,G', ' .... '1'" ., , I N, ~ ~! B{ . , 
, .' ,; 
(NICE nomenclature) Year I Ex- C I Ex- CR I Ex- CRa I Ex- CR ! Ex-CR, ports R4, ports 
.. po~ts po~ts. " .. ports 
233 
Cotton 1962 - - 13 17 13 31 18 59 
1966 - - 14 39 13 40 21 67 
-1969 - - 15 47 15 56 32 76 
237 
Woven and 1962 - - 11 37 7 37 10 97 
Crocheted goods 1966 - - 13 49 6 53 10 92 
1969 - - 14 63 6 68 13 91 
38 
Manufacture of vehicles 
385.1 
1962 Cycles 45 22 
} 
1966 54 -
1969 63 38 62 - 70 - 58 47 
63 - 63 - 75 70 
Motorcycles, 1962 99 - 63 - 65 - 78 , 62 
Mopeds 1966 99 -
1969 98 -
No data available. 
151. Clearer conclusions can be drawn when the degrees of integration for the 
two reference years are allocated among four categories of concentration. (where 
the four leading firms account for less than 25%,25% to 50%, 50% to 75% and 
75% to 100% of the market respectively) (Figure 2). As the degree of concentration 
increases, integration growth at first increases also but thereafter declines, and in 
the most highly concentrated industries (where the four largest firms account for 
between 75% and 100% of the market) actually becomes negative. 
152. As detailed analyses show, the relationship between degrees of concentration 
and of integration shown above does not seem to be based on other factors'such as 
the size of the firm, the relative size of its export business or the extent to which 
the domestic market is supplied by domestic ·production. Thus ·the number -of 
persons employed in highly concentrated industlies (four leading firms accounting 
for 50% and more of sales) in 1969 varied between 2200 (manufacture of cycles in 
Germany) and 89586 (manufacture of office machinery in Germany), the share 
of export business varied between 11 % (manufacture of cycles etc. in the Nether" 
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FIGURE 2 
Degree of concentration and of integration in selected Community industries 
and countries: 1962 and 1969 
Degree of integration ' 
(Proportion ·of total exports accounted for· 
by exports to Community countries) 
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lands) and 64% (manufacture of photographic products in Belgium), and supply 
of the national market by home production varied between 45% (pharmaceutical 
industry in the Netherlands) and 82% (manufacture of radio, television and sound 
reproduction equipment in France). The relationship between concentration and 
integration raises the question whether increasing concentration ratios give rise to 
greater market fragmentation coinciding with national frontiers. This will be 
further studied in the course of the research programme on concentration. 
Cooperation agreements, financial interpenetration and market structures' 
153. Analysis of studies processed so far shows that the quantitative results are 
generally confirmed by the qualitative results, within the limits set by the reliability 
of the degree of concentration as calculated. However, in individual cases, as one 
institute has put it, 'no reliable conclusions can ,be drawn from data and measure-
ments of concentration, based on unequal distributions, considered in general 
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terms... Any valid assessment must be based on what is often protracted research 
into details, many of which cannot be measured with precision'. 
154. This is Qot the place to examine the competitive situation in individual 
industries in the light of available ' qualitative information. That kind of analysis 
can be found in the reports of the institutes and experts, published by the Commis-
sion. However, a few examples can show clearly how the purely quantitative 
conclusions of these studies change and which factors influence concentration 
processes when information on cooperation agreements, financial interpenetration 
and market structures is also used for the analysis. 
155. All the available information on cooperation agreements, financial inter-
penetration and market structures points to a substantially higher, degree' of 
concentration than the purely quantitative criteria. For example, the number of 
firms in the German pharmaceutical industry remained stable at 690., However, 
in December 1972, the ,eighty-five largest firms accounted for 81 % of total ,sales by 
dispensing chemists., The ,fifty most important pharmaceutical producers were 
combined in eighteen groups of companies. Between them,. these accounted:for 77% 
of the market. In the German photographic products industry, production was 
shared out among twelve firms. However, ·the leading producer on. the market 
accounted for 80% of total production. In 1972 there were only three major 
corporate groups manufacturing radios, televisions and sound reproduction 
equipment in France. In Germany, too, there were extensive reciprocal,rela-
tionships between the leading firms in this industry. In German industry 
manufacturing electric appliances for domestic use, only three,major'snpply groups 
survived by 1972. The overall conclusionis,that"'cross~frontier interpenetration is 
on a sharp upward trend. ,In'many cases the outcome of this is a heavy involve-
ment of "capita1 from non-member countries (especially the USA) in the Member 
States' industry. 
156. In addition to inter-company capital arrangements at national and 
international levels, cooperation agreements relating to joint research and develop-
ment projects on new products (German pharmaceuticals) and to production 
rationalization (electric appliances for domestic use in France and Germany) also 
became more 'numerous. During the period considered, cooperation agreements 
often foreshadowed actual mergers. 
157. The picture becomes even clearer when the situation on individual markets'is 
considered. A prime example of this is the German and Dutch food industry . 
. Although on the whole the results of the quantitative measurements of con-
centration yield relatively low concentration ratios, on individual markets there are 
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definite market leaders. In 1971, the, largest firms in Germany account; for 
instance, for 81% of the' market" in liquid spices,'60% of' the ,market in 
margarine, cooking oil and cooking fat and 46% of the market in prepared soups. 
"fhe situation is'similar in' other branches. Similarly, int971 the four leading firm's 
atcounted for '88% 'of the 'washing machine market in France (34%' iii" 1962) and 
99% of the refrigerator,maiket,(only 59% iil{962), It is also 'estimated thatirt 
1969 some 50% of the market in storage heaters in Germany' was supplied' by the 
leading firm, These' examples show that purely quantitative measurements, of the 
degree of concentrati'on'can become substantially more revealing whell'industries 
are analysed by product sub-market. ",' : 
158: Mergers 'and' amalgamations ma.y be undei-taken, for various re1tsoils: The 
studies mention: the-,'need ',for, greater capital, outlay fOF mass production 
(electrical" engineering in Germany and France), techniCal progress (photographiC 
products, office machinery aIidtextile machinery in Germany), structural changes 
in; demand (food indusbyand the,manufacture ofagnculhiraJinachirtery and 
tractors in ,Germany); intensity of external trade (the manufacture of n'lachinery and 
tl'):e fooei' industry iIi Cermany, electrical engineerin'g iIi ' France)' in temal growth 
(food industry in .tHe Netherlands) and Jegal requirements (regulatio'ns'cdilcernirig 
the ,marketing 'of new 'pharmaceutical products in Germany). These 'incentives' fo 
amalgamation seldom occurred iii., isolation. The seriousness of their consequences 
for the)concentration process 'increases as the number; ot" them found together in a 
given 'case rises, " ' 
.~ ···.1·':' .. . :\ 
§ -3 -'--'- Summary 
.. • l' .; I: .' I " .. ,i ;, . 
159,_ The, latest resul~s of the, Commi~sion",research programmeon:,<;:on~entration 
cQ;I).firm apd provide further ,evidence .. tor ,the conclusions, reach~d ,in the: Second 
Competition Report:I ,/,', :1 .. :, ' 
- In, the Community, the degree of concentration varies widely from industry to 
i,:' industry and' country tbcouritry. " ' .' " .,. . :.' ','.:. '. 
-:- '. in ,the reference pe~iod-, a,lni~~t ~ll in:dilst~ie~' in ~lmost' all the '~ountries ~er~ 
:. )llldergoing a', 'proc~ss' ,9f c~ndentration: that \vas g<;lthe~ing morn~~~,um: The 
" Dum,ber o(c~)Iiipetitor~ dec,lin~d., : .,' '.. " " ;! ': ::' 
- There was an increase in the number of nation,al and; internat;ion~ cooperatiQn 
agreements and interlocking arrangements_ 
~ Dominant, positions 'occurred 'm:ot'eahd 'more' frequently on':h6mogeneous 
;:: sub-markets.:" .: ." :. : ' , ' 
• ,' ~ '.,. ~ • :. f • I: ',r:. . .:: . . ,,~ . '... ", ~ : ' I • • ~. r 
',;'! ;:{., 
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- Highly concentrated industries made a smaller contribution than less 
concentrated industries to the integration of the markets. 
160. In order to keep its knowledge of the development of concentration in the 
Community up to date, the Commission is at the moment extending its research 
programme to the 'new' Member States and at the same time is updating its 
information on the 'old' Member States. Special attention will be given to 
analysing relatively homogeneous product markets. 
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ANNEX 135 
LIST ',' I 
.; ,-' ,,; ; ~ J • ..' : •• 
of individual decisions of the Commission af\d:rb.lin!5s 'o'('th~CoiiIt'6(Justi~~ 
made in 1973 concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86 oftheIEEC''freaty 
and of Articles 60, 65 and 66 of the ECSC Tr6aty .. i'" ,", ,',. "'; .,.~, .' .. ' ' '. 
, ~ ': .1 I '" 1, J • ,". , ' ! ",' 
tf i"': tl. ," 
DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES' " 
1. Concerning Ar~ic!.es.8~ FndJ~ of t!le r;,¥C Treaty ... " .' r~. ~'I C"':'" \' 
, ,\.: , ' .. I . 'I " 
Decision of 11 May 1973 OJ. .J;..,217o~ 6.8,1973;p, .. 3. '.' . 
on a proceeding under Article 85 of the B~~l. )!:S·~-f973.'.pol~t)!109·. 
., :r 
EEC Treaty 
'S.C.P.A.-Kali 2md Salz' 
Decision of 14 June 1973 
on an application for negative clearance 
under Article 2 of; <,:ouncil RegutationNo .1'( 
'Du Pont de Nemours Deutschland' 
Decision of 3 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty 
'Gas water-heaters and bath-heaters' 
Decision of 5 October 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty 
'Deutsche Philips GmbH, 
Decision of 8 October 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty 
'PRYM-BEKA, 
Decision of 21 December 1973 
on a ·proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty 
'Transocean Marine Paint Association' 
Decision of 21 December 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty 
'Kali und Salz/Kali-Chemie, 
.' ;~. .' . ,;: r.' 
" .' " ~: I • , •• , J 
OJ L 194 of 16.7.1973, p: 27 
Bull. EC 6-1973, point 2111 
'1 
:il! '-': 
~':" ;' : ", '.';"') 
.J' ',; :; .',: ~ .. : l, .; • (I I • '" I , ' ... 
oj r.: 21.7;of6.S:i973,'·p: 3;l' '. ,,' " 
Bull. EG7/8-1973, poiIit2110 ",., 
OJ L 293.of 20.10.1'973; p:4t:( : ':; " : 
, ',' '.1 : :. j '.::' ,,: '_ .: :',.' ,'1' ~'!' ; 
:., ): ~ 
" 
" !: 'i. ' .... ' , 
OJ L 296·'of 24:10.197;1/p. 24·" " 
.• : ,··f ': . i'. ',,' ,::, 
;'! 
-' I'· 
:-;. 
!. 
~; ,I 1 .: ii' :. ; , !, • :', ' ... I 
oj L 19: of 23.p974, p:1S;:"i", Bi.Jll:'E~~2~1973;:poi~;.'2P8.,. :r 
:', " ".:':' 'i 
.. , 
OJ L 19 of 23:Ll974, pj'22, 
Bull. EC 12-1973, point 2117 
I;::" ,r. 
"". 
2. Concerning Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty.:.''' :',' .,.':~' ~ ~'.:,' ',' .' , ", .~ 
Decision No 73/75/ECSC of 20 March 1973 OJi'i02 of i'i.4.1973·,:p~ '1)9" 
on a proceeding under Article 65 of the Bull. EC 3-1973. point 2113 
ECSC Treaty extending the authorization 
of joint fuel sales by the mining companies 
of the Belgian coalfields associated within the 
'Comptoir BeIge des Charbons, Societe 
cooperative' (Cobechar) 
" . ~ : '.' 
;~ '!." ., 
., ; ~ . 
; ~. ',(. 
,', . .::;' I,. . . ~. 
.': I 
',.~ , . ;', 
, f." 
Decision of 26 March 1973 Bull' .. 'EC 3c197-3;'-i)oint2112' '.'" .... :<: 
, '.: •..•.. :' J" ,: .' ,; '. .. . . , ~ on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty 
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Decision of 8 June 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquis~tion of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale coal 
undertakings Gebr. Haldy J-Cohlenhandels-
gesellschaft mbH, Karlsruhe, Gebr. Haldy 
Kohlenhandelsgesellschaft mbH Frankfurt, 
Winschermann Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 
Recklingshausen, Winschermann GmbH, 
Karlsruhe by Saarbergwerke AG, Saar-
bliicken 
Decision of 21 June 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty concerning the merger of the 
Rodange mill of the SA Miniere et Metallur-
gique de Rodange and the 'Athus mill of 
the SA Cockerill-Ougn!e-Providence-
Esperance-Longdoz. 
Decision of 27 June 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty authorizing Mannesmann AG 
to acquire the majority of the shares of 
DEMAGAG. 
Decision of 28 June 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale coal 
undertaking T.P. Fuels (Holdings) Limited, 
Shirley, Solihull, Warwickshire by L.C.P. 
Fuels Limited, Brierly Hill, Staffordshire. 
Decision of 4 July 1973 
on a pro,ceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale coal 
undertaking Alexander Beeby & Son 
Limited, Peterborough, England, by the 
British Fuel Company, London 
Decision of 4 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of the 
fixed assets and goodwill of the wholesale 
coal undertaking, Burnley Coal Dealers 
Association Limited, Burnley, by the British 
Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of 4 July 1973 
on a procceding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale coal 
undertakings Smith and Machin Limited, 
Stafford and Brereton Wharves Limited, 
Lichfield, by the British Fuel Company, 
London. 
Bull. EC 6-1973, point '2112 
Bull: EC 6-1973, point 2112 
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Decision of 4 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale Coal 
undertaking, Barton and Company (Coal 
Limited, Wrexham, North Wales, by the 
British Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of 4 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of all the 
shares of capital in the wholesale coal 
undertaking J ames Monteith & Sons Limited, 
AlIoa, Clackmannanshire, by, the British 
Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of 20 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the formation of Fisser & 
Van Doornum, Kindler GmbH & Co. KG, 
Hannover, jointly by wholesale coal under-
takings. 
Decision of 25 July 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty authorizing SA USINOR to 
acq uire 50% of the shares in SA SOLMER 
and approving a draft contract expressed 
to be between SOLLAC, USINOR and 
SOLMER. 
Decision of 8 October 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty approving the setting up 
by the British Steel Corporation and 
Arthur Lee & Sons Ltd. of the jointly 
owned company, Lee Bright Bars Ltd. 
Decision of 20 November 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty authorizing the joint establish-
ment of NAMASCOR BV by Montan Staal 
BV and the Mitsubishi Corporation. 
Decision of 29 November 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty relating to the formation 
by Societe Metallurgique de Normandie 
and Korf Industrie und Handel GmbH & Co. 
KG of a jointly owned company known 
as Societe des Acieries de Montereau. 
Decision of 29 November 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty concerning the acquisition by 
Dunford and Elliott Ltd. of the capital 
of Brown Bayley Steels Ltd. 
Decision of 20 December 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty approving the acquisition 
by August Thyssen-Hiitte AG of a majority 
shareholding in Rheinstahl AG. 
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Bull. EC 7/8-1973, point 2112 
Bull. EC 10-1973, point 2110 
Bull. EC H-1973, point 2107 
Bull. EC 11-1973, point 2109 
Bull. EC 11-1973, point 2108 
OJ L 84 of 28.3.1974, p. 36. 
Bull. EC 12-1973, point 2116 
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Decision of 21 December 1973 
on a proceeding under Article 65 of the 
ECSC Treaty on the authorization of a 
joint-buying agreement between a number 
of Danish Steel product distributors. 
OJ L 30 of 4.2.1974, p. 29 
BUll. EC 1-1974, point 2115 ' 
RULINGS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
RUling (6 February 1973) in case 48/73: 
'Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen' 
Ruling (21 February 1973) in case 6/72: 
,Continental Can Company Inc., Europ-
emballage Corporation v Commission of the 
European Communities' 
OJ C 45 of 23.6.1973, p. 28 
Bull. EC 2~197,iI, point.24,48 
OJ C 69 of 21.8.1973, p. 33 
BUll. EC 2-1973, points 2106 and 2443 
Reports 1973-2, p. 215. 
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